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Abstract
This thesis explores the causal effect of institutional, geographical and cultural
factors on civil conflict and economic development in developing countries. It
contains an introduction to the thesis, followed by six self-contained papers, and
a concluding chapter that summarizes the main findings of the thesis. The thesis
begins by exploring the effect of economic factors on the likelihood of civil conflict
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Particularly, Chapter 2 investigates the causal effect of
economic policy shocks that are related to the real exchange rate (RER) misalignment
on civil conflict in SSA. To address the potential endogeneity problem, the chapter
implements two stage least square (2SLS) and GMM estimation and finds that RER
overvaluation significantly raises the likelihood of conflict in the region. Chapter 3
studies the effect of emergency food aid on the incidence of civil conflict in SSA.
This study proposes a novel identification strategy (IV) to isolate the causal effect
of emergency food aid on conflict. Unlike the previous literature, I do not find a
statistically significant impact of food aid in raising civil conflict.
The next three chapters focus on identifying the effect of the introduction of
monetary policy rules, geographical impediment and agricultural market institution
on economic integration in the form of FDI, export and import flows. More
specifically, Chapter 4 compares the effectiveness of inflation targeting and fixed
exchange rate monetary policy rules in attracting FDI in the context of developing
countries. Using propensity score and difference-in-differences estimation techniques,
we find that the two monetary policy rules are equally important in increasing
the inflow of FDI to these countries. Chapter 5 investigates the causal effect
of landlockedness on disaggregate export and import. Exploiting the de facto
landlockedness of Ethiopia in 1998 and using a triple-differencing strategy, we find
that landlockedness has a large negative and statistically significant effect on the
import and export of several goods in Ethiopia. Chapter 6 examines the introduction
xii
of a modern agricultural commodity market institution in Ethiopia on the export
of coffee, the major export item in the country. Using the establishment of the
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) in 2008 and the sudden introduction of coffee
into the ECX platform, it implements a triple difference-in-differences estimation
approach and shows that the export of coffee has significantly improved following the
introduction of coffee trade through the ECX.
Finally, Chapter 7 explores the role of deep-rooted historical factors on the
diffusion of technology from the technology frontier to laggard countries. This chapter
has two major contributions to the literature. Firstly, it provides a micro channel
evidence through which genealogical distance reduces the diffusion of technology from
the technology frontier. Secondly, it sheds light on the distributional impact of genetic
distance on the productivity of firms. Employing a harmonized survey data and a
novel group IV quantile approach, it finds that the effect of genetic distance tends to
be stronger for firms that are more productive. Additionally, it shows that cultural
barriers to the diffusion of technology across countries affect firm-level productivity
through firms’ ability to adopt technologies from the frontier countries.
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There is a large difference in economic development across countries. For example, the
average income per capita level between the world’s advanced and poorest countries
differs by a factor of more than 100 (Rodrik et al., 2004). What accounts this large
differences in economic development across countries and how can we reduce it? This
is one of the most challenging questions in the development economics literature over
the past four decades (Hall and Jones, 1999; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). Scholars
have offered different explanations for the stark divergence on the level of economic
development between the rich and the poor countries. Among the several candidate
explanations three fundamental determinants stand out in the literature (Easterly
and Levine, 1997; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004).
The first underlying cause behind the sluggish economic performance of developing
countries is poor geography. Geography is regarded as a fundamental determinant of
economic development as it strongly influence climate, disease burden, endowment of
natural resources, transport costs, and the diffusion of knowledge and technology from
the developed countries (Rodrik et al., 2004). The second fundamental or “deeper”
determinant of economic development is the establishment of good institutions.
Institutions refer to the rules, regulations, laws and policies that affect economic
incentives (Acemoglu, 2008). A high quality institutional environment enables the
government to design as well as adopt appropriate economic policies, incentivize
individuals to undertake more productive socio-economic activities, and increase the
effectiveness of international aid (World Bank, 2014). The third core determinant of
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development is culture which refers to beliefs, values and preferences of an individual
or a society that influence economic behavior.
Moreover, civil conflict is regarded as one of the leading causes of human suffering
and underdevelopment in developing countries (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003; Collier, 2008). Fore instance, conservative estimates suggest that
around 16.2 million deaths occurred in 127 civil wars between 1945 and 1999 (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003). What are the underlying root causes of the prevalence of civil
conflict in these countries? Anthropologists and political scientists have studied this
topic for several decades. The former group tend to focus on longstanding ethnic and
religious hatreds as the primary causes of conflict. But, political scientists who are
on the political right group claim lack of democracy as the central cause of conflict.
They argue that violence occurs when opportunities for the peaceful resolution of
political disputes are scarce. On the contrary, political scientists on the political
left side argues that the underlying causes of civil conflict are economic inequalities
and the deep-rooted legacy of colonialism (Collier et al., 2003; Collier, 2008). Very
recently, economists start to conduct thorough empirical studies to better understand
the causes of civil conflict and war. They provide evidence that civil conflict is more
likely to occur in poor countries that are prone to negative income shocks, have weak
institutions, sparsely populated peripheral regions, and mountainous terrain. Yet,
the most robust empirical finding in the economic literature is that the likelihood of
civil war is strongly correlated with lower per capita income (Blattman and Miguel,
2010). As such, high incidence of civil war and poor economic performance are the
two intertwined core economic development challenges of least developing countries.
Despite the success of the literature on identifying the root causes of economic
development and the likelihood of civil war, providing compelling explanations using
more credible econometric methods that establish causality has become a new and
most promising avenue of empirical research (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Rodrik et al.,
2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; World Bank, 2014). This thesis explores the impact
of different factors that impede economic development via influencing international
economic integration between advanced and least developing countries (LDCs). In
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particular, the thesis consists of six self-contained chapters that explore the causal
impact of economic policy, institutional, geographical and cultural factors on the
probability of civil conflict and economic development in the context of LDCs.
Chapter two investigates the effect of income reducing shocks on civil conflict in
SSAs (sub-Saharan African countries in short). Here, we demonstrate that a new
type of economic shock, which is related to the misalignment of the real exchange
rate (or RER, interchangeably), can explain civil conflict beyond the effects of rainfall
and commodity price shocks. Why would the real exchange rate matter for the
SSAs? For developing countries, especially the SSAs, RER misalignment is a common
empirical phenomenon (Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Elbadawi et al., 2012). Besides, the
export industry is an important driver of growth for developing countries (Krueger,
1998 for example). This is particularly true for the SSAs where the export sector
accounts for more than a third of GDP (Deaton et al., 1995; Deaton, 1999; Elbadawi
et al., 2012). Because of their reliance on exports, the SSAs are vulnerable to RER
shocks, especially those leading to an RER overvaluation, as it erodes the comparative
advantage of the exporting industry and acts as an implicit tax on exporters (Ghura
and Grennes, 1993), which potentially results in the loss of income and therefore an
increased risk of conflict.
Our estimated results show that RER misalignment is statistically significant for
the incidence of civil conflict in the SSAs, where a one-standard-deviation increase
(i.e. overvaluation) in the real exchange rate is associated with a 4% increase in
civil conflict incidence on average. This effect is present even after controlling for
rainfall and commodity price shocks – two widely acknowledged factors of civil
conflict. Hence, RER misalignment has explanatory power on civil conflict in the
SSAs beyond what rainfall and commodity price shocks may explain. Furthermore,
when we decompose the misalignment index into RER over and undervaluations, we
find that only RER overvaluations are statistically significant for civil conflict. Thus,
the effect of RER misalignment on conflict is driven mainly by the effect of RER
overvaluation. Our work has policy implications, as it suggests that beyond having
economic benefits, the stabilization of the real exchange rate may foster political
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stability in SSA by helping to reduce conflict in the region.
The third chapter extends our analysis on the determinants of economic factors
on civil conflict. In this chapter, we investigate the impact of emergency food aid
on the incidence of civil conflict. In the foreign aid literature, finding a convincing
instrumental variable in order to identify its effect on civil conflict and economic
growth is problematic (Galiani et al., 2017). To address the potential endogeneity
problem in the food aid vis-a-vis civil conflict relation, I propose a new instrumental
variable. Here, I employ the number of natural disaster affected people in other
SSA countries as an instrumental variable to emergency food aid. The two stage
least square (2SLS) estimates suggest that emergency food aid has no a statistically
significant effect in increasing civil conflict in SSA countries. In addition, I generate
and control the first order and the second order spatial lagged conflict variables to
consider the spatial spillover effect of civil conflict in SSA. Despite the existence of
large civil conflict spillover in SSA, we fail to find a statistically significant effect of
food aid on conflict. As such, food aid can still be used as an important international
development policy tool to fight hunger and suffering in developing countries.
International integration is a fundamental determinant for economic development
(Rodrik et al., 2004). For example, it has a large role in fostering the economic
convergence between the advanced and the poor countries of the world. Factors
such as economic policy uncertainty, landlockedness, poor institutional quality and
cultural factor may, however, impede international economic integration between
countries. The rest of the thesis examines the impact of these factors on the flow
of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology to developing countries. In
particular, in chapter four we compare the effect of inflation targeting (IT) and fixed
exchange rate monetary policy regimes in attracting in FDI in a context of developing
countries. To address the endogeneity problem that may arise due to the self selection
problem of the monetary policy rules, we employ difference-in-differences (DiD) and
propensity score matching estimation (PSM) techniques.The findings show that the
two monetary policy rules are equally effective in attracting FDI.
Chapter five extends the analysis on international market integration and its
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determinant factors. The chapter investigates the causal effect of landlockedness on
the trade flow. To quantify the impact of landlockedness, existing studies typically
rely on a time invariant dummy variable – an indicator of landlockedness - that
takes a value of one if a country is landlocked and zero otherwise. However,
the country fixed effect will partial out the time invariant landlocked indicator,
causing the effect of landlockedness to be unidentified. Moreover, there is no
empirical evidence that examines whether the impact of landlockedness is temporal
or long-lasting. This chapter provides the first natural experiment that explores the
causal effect of landlockedness on trade using the sudden “de-facto” landlockedness of
Ethiopia in 1998. In doing so, we address two empirical issues that have constrained
existing studies. First, there is a general lack of data on time varying trade barrier
measurements. Second, researchers confront identification issues while comparing
trade shares between coastal and landlocked countries as trade itself may affect trade
cost. Hence, the presence of reverse causality may result biased conclusions.
Our main estimation technique that is employed to identify the causal impact of
landlockedness is the triple-differencing (DDD) approach. This approach exploits
three sources of variation: country variation (landlocked country–Ethiopia– and
coastal country–Kenya), product variation (bulky ocean-borne freight and light
airborne freight) and time variation (before and after “de facto” landlockedness).
We find that landlockedness has a large negative impact on Ethiopia’s export and
import products.The results show that landlockedness on average reduces the export
of coffee, leather, crude vegetable and hide & skin by about 43%, 49%, 80% and 72%,
respectively. In addition, landlockedness has a strong negative effect on different
ocean-borne imported goods of Ethiopia. For example, landlockedness reduces the
import of petroleum, fuel and fertilizer by 71%, 68.6% and 66.9%, respectively. For a
developing economy that highly depends on agriculture a 68.6% reduction in fertilizer
import, for instance, has an important implication on the productivity of the sector.
Chapter six extends the analysis on the establishment of modern market
institution and trade flows. Agricultural commodity exchanges help to eliminate
exploitative intermediaries, provide more transparency on the prevailing market price
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to producers, and ultimately, promote agricultural production and exports. So far,
there were no empirical evidences that analyze the impact of agricultural commodity
exchanges on export in the context of developing countries. By exploiting the
introduction of the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX) in 2008 as a quasi-natural
experiment, this chapter examines effect of the ECX on coffee export in Ethiopia.
To minimize some of the criticisms of the gravity literature, we include a full set of
country pair, exporter-year, exporter-product, product-year, and importer-year fixed
effects. The estimated results show that the ECX has a large positive impact on the
country’s coffee export. Our main results show that ECX has increased coffee export
on average by about 84%. In addition, the ECX has a statistically significant impact
on new market destinations (i.e. the extensive margin of coffee export increases).
The diffusion of technology from advanced to poor countries is another crucial
factor for economic convergence between them. The last chapter explores the role
of deep-rooted historical factors on the diffusion of technology from the technology
frontier to laggard countries. This chapter has two major contributions to the
literature. First, it provides micro channel evidence through which genealogical
distance reduces the diffusion of technology from the technology frontier to the
adopter countries. Second, we investigate the distributional impact of genetic distance
on the productivity of firms. Employing the survey data of more than 32,000 firms
and a novel group quantile instrumental variable (GQIV) estimator, we find that the
effect of genetic distance is bigger for high productive firms. The findings provide an
underlying mechanism for the earlier empirical studies in such a way that cultural
differences reduce the flow of technology to firms (which reduce firm productivity)
and hence the diffusion of development for the country.
The reminder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the analysis
that investigates the causal effect of RER shocks on civil conflict in SSA. Chapter
3 shows the causal effect of emergency food aid on civil conflict in SSA. Chapter
4 presents the causal effect of monetary policy regimes on FDI in the context of
developing countries. Chapter 5 and 6 considers how landlockedness and agricultural
commodity exchange affect export and import flows in Ethiopia. Finally, chapter 7
6
provides the distributional effect of cultural and deep-rooted historical factors on the
diffusion of technology in developing countries.
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Real exchange rate (RER) misalignment, which is the deviation of the actual
real exchange rate from its equilibrium, occurs frequently in developing countries.
In this paper, we show that civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa can be influenced
by RER misalignment. To do so, we construct an RER misalignment index whose
variation is driven by shocks to each country’s RER fundamentals. Based on a panel
of 35 countries from 1975 to 2006, we find that RER misalignment has a statistically
significant effect of increasing the incidence of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
Crucially, this effect is present even when rainfall and commodity price shocks –
two widely acknowledged factors of civil conflict in the region – are controlled for.
Thus, the stabilization of the real exchange rate may foster political stability in
sub-Saharan Africa by having preventive effects on conflict in the region.
Key Words: Civil Conflict, Real Exchange Rate Misalignment, Economic Shocks,
sub-Saharan Africa
JEL Codes: D74, E32, F31, F41, O11
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2.1 Introduction
One of the leading causes of human suffering and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan
Africa is civil conflict (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003;
Collier, 2008). In the last two decades, researchers have shown that economic related
determinants may affect civil conflict primarily by causing income to decline. The
idea is that income is negatively associated with civil conflict, possibly through the
opportunity cost hypothesis where individuals are more willing to fight if their income
is low (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Grossman, 1991), or the state capacity hypothesis
where low income countries have limited state revenue to combat insurgency and
thus reduce conflict. As such, civil conflict may arise from income reducing shocks,
such as negative rainfall shocks as shown by Miguel et al. (2004), Burke et al. (2009),
and Ciccone (2013), or negative commodity price shocks as shown by Brückner and
Ciccone (2010) for sub-Saharan Africa.
For the SSAs (sub-Saharan African countries in short), we demonstrate that a
new type of economic shock, which is related to the misalignment of the real exchange
rate (or RER, interchangeably), can explain civil conflict beyond the effects of rainfall
and commodity price shocks. Why would the real exchange rate matter for the SSAs?
One reason is due to the fact that the export industry is an important driver of growth
for developing countries (see, for example Krueger, 1998). For the SSAs, the export
sector accounts for more than a third of their GDP (Deaton et al., 1995; Deaton,
1999; Elbadawi et al., 2012).1 Because of their reliance on exports, the SSAs are
vulnerable to RER shocks, especially those that lead to an RER overvaluation, as
this will erode the comparative advantage of the exporting industry and acts as an
implicit tax on exporters (Ghura and Grennes, 1993). As such, these shocks could
lead to a loss of income and therefore heighten the risk of conflict.
The misalignment of the real exchange rate, which is common in the SSAs (Ghura
and Grennes, 1993; Elbadawi et al., 2012), is the deviation of the observed real
1Figure (2.4) in Appendix D which presents the time series plots of export as a percentage of
GDP shows the contribution of the export sector to the SSA economy.
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exchange rate from its equilibrium level.2 To study the effects of RER misalignment
on civil conflict, we build upon the vast international finance literature to construct
an RER misalignment index (Edwards, 1989; Goldfajn and Valdes, 1999; Elbadawi
et al., 2012). Based on a panel of 35 SSAs from 1975 to 2006, we find the following
results.
Firstly, RER misalignment is statistically significant for civil conflict in the
SSAs. In our baseline regression, we find that a one-standard deviation increase
(i.e. overvaluation) in the real exchange rate is associated with a 4 percentage point
increase in civil conflict incidence on average. Crucially, this effect is present even
after controlling for rainfall and commodity price shocks – two widely acknowledged
factors of civil conflict. Secondly, when we decompose the misalignment index into
RER over and undervaluations, we find that only RER overvaluations are statistically
significant for civil conflict, which suggests from a policy perspective that we should be
cautious about RER overvaluation. Finally, we employ system Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) and instrumental variable regressions to address potential concerns
about reverse causality. We still find that RER misalignment has explanatory power
for civil conflict in the SSAs beyond the effects of rainfall and commodity price shocks.
Importantly, the estimated effect sizes from the system GMM and IV regressions are
even stronger, which suggests that our baseline estimates are conservative about the
effect of RER misalignment on civil conflict. Hence, other than stabilizing the RER
volatility, it is important for central banks to manage and ensure that RER is not
overvalued.
Our paper is related to a well-established literature that investigates the effect
of income shocks on civil conflict. There are two prominent strands of research
in this area. The first, led by Miguel et al. (2004), Ciccone (2011), and Ciccone
(2013) show that negative climate shocks may reduce agricultural income, and thus,
increase the likelihood of civil conflict in the SSAs. The second, led by Brückner and
Ciccone (2010), Savun and Cook (2010), Bazzi and Blattman (2014), and Janus and
2Simply put, the equilibrium real exchange rate is the exchange rate that results in the
simultaneous attainment of equilibrium in the domestic (non-tradable goods) and external (current
and capital account) sectors of the economy (e.g. Nurkse, 1945; Edwards, 1989).
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Riera-Crichton (2015), use international commodity price shocks and terms of trade
shocks as sources of exogenous variations in income. The idea is that the exports of
the SSAs are usually not well diversified. As such, a fall in the international price of
commodities, especially the ones the SSAs’ export, may have large negative effects
on their income (which would then increase the risk of civil conflict). Recently, there
has been interest in whether non-traditional factors, such as exchange rate regimes
(Hull and Imai, 2013), may explain civil conflict. Our paper contributes along this
direction by examining if real exchange rate misalignment may explain civil conflict
beyond traditional factors such as rainfall and commodity price shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide some
background on studies that have looked the effect of real exchange rate misalignment
on economic growth and export in the SSAs. In Section 2.3, we discuss how our RER
misalignment index is constructed. In Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, we discuss the data
used, the estimating equation, and the estimation results. We offer some concluding
remarks in Section 2.7.
2.2 Background on Real Exchange Rate
Misalignment, Growth and Exports
2.2.1 Real Exchange Rate Misalignment and Economic
Growth
The negative RER misalignment on the economic performance of developing countries
are well-documented. In the literature, it has been found that developing countries
have frequently experienced large deviations of their actual real exchange rates from
their equilibrium levels (Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Elbadawi et al., 2012). Since
RER misalignment may negatively affect economic growth, and thus income, RER
misalignment could potentially affect civil conflict in the SSAs through the income
mechanism.
Several empirical studies have explored the effect of RER misalignment on
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economic growth in developing countries. One of the earliest to do so is Cottani
et al. (1990), who show that RER misalignment – in the form of overvaluation – may
strongly and negatively affect economic growth in Asian, Latin American and African
countries. Another early work is Ghura and Grennes (1993), who employ various
measures of RER misalignment to demonstrate (for the SSAs) that the negative effect
of misalignment on growth is a robust empirical phenomenon. More recently, Rodrik
(2008) finds that the channel through which RER overvaluation reduces growth in
developing countries comes mainly from the negative impact of overvalued currencies
on the tradable sector.3
Other studies on RER misalignment include Elbadawi et al. (2012), who examine
how RER misalignment affects economic growth and foreign aid received by the
SSAs. They find that while RER overvaluation leads to lower growth on average,
this negative effect is further exacerbated when a country receives more foreign
aid. Finally, Schröder (2013) shows that by explicitly taking into account of the
heterogeneity in how real exchange rates behave across countries (i.e. by estimating
the misalignment of the real exchange rate for each country), he finds that not only
may RER overvaluation reduce growth, it is possible for undervaluation to negatively
affect growth as well.
2.2.2 Real Exchange Rate Misalignment and Exports
Why would RER misalignment negatively affect economic growth? One common
argument is that RER misalignment, especially RER overvaluation, hinders the
performance of the export sector in developing countries. One of the earliest
evidence on the SSAs comes from Ghura and Grennes (1993), who show that RER
overvaluation may reduce the amount of exports produced, as it acts as an implicit
tax by reducing the profitability in producing exportable goods, both agricultural and
non-agricultural. Pick and Vollrath (1994) estimate the effect of RER misalignment
on the agricultural export sector performance in developing countries, and find this
3Rodrik (2008) shows that this relationship holds only for developing countries: the relationship
disappears when the sample is restricted to developed countries. Thus, he concludes that avoiding
RER misalignment can help to facilitate the economic convergence of developing countries with
developed countries.
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effect to be negative and statistically significant. Elbadawi et al. (1998) further
demonstrate that the negative effect of RER misalignment is present even after
controlling for RER volatility. Thus, the negative effects of RER misalignment on
exports extend beyond the negative effects of RER volatility.
For developing countries, the negative effects of RER misalignment on exports are
not limited to agricultural exports. Sekkat and Varoudakis (2000), for example, find
that manufacturing exports from the SSAs may shrink when the real exchange rates
of these countries become more overvalued. Similarly, Freund and Pierola (2012) find
that in developing countries, surges in manufacturing exports, defined as “significant
and sustained increase in export growth from one seven-year period to the next”
(p. 387 in Freund and Pierola, 2012), are preceded by large RER undervaluations.
Sekkat (2016) also finds that RER misalignment can affect export diversification in
developing countries.
In short, there is evidence that RER misalignment, especially RER overvaluation,
may negatively affect exports and growth. By reducing growth, RER misalignment
could potentially increase civil conflict incidence in the SSAs, which is to be
investigated here.
2.3 Deriving the Real Exchange Rate
Misalignment Index
We follow the procedure in Elbadawi et al. (2012) to construct our RER misalignment
index. Before going into details, we offer some intuition that underlies what the
procedure entails. The actual procedure will be discussed in detail in Sections 2.3.1
through 2.3.3.
The real exchange rate is misaligned if the observed RER is not equal
to the equilibrium RER. As such, we construct the RER misalignment index
(Misalignmentit) by taking the difference between the observed RER (RERit) and
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the equilibrium RER (REREit):
Misalignmentit = RERit −REREit . (2.1)
The equilibrium RER is the real exchange rate that simultaneously attains both
domestic equilibrium (i.e. the clearance of the non-tradable sector) and external
equilibrium (i.e. the present and future current account balances that are compatible
with long-run capital flows) (Nurkse, 1945; Edwards, 1989).4 These two equilibria are
each affected by their own set of domestic and external RER fundamentals, which
basically, are domestic and external factors that determine the real exchange rate
(see Section 2.3.2).5
To construct the RER misalignment index, we use a filter to decompose the
RER (both domestic and external) fundamentals into short-run (i.e. cyclical) and
long-run (i.e. trend) components.6 Then, we use the long-run components of the RER
fundamentals to construct the equilibrium RER. As such, the difference between the
observed RER and the equilibrium RER (i.e. the RER misalignment index) will
be driven only by the short-run components of (and therefore shocks to) the RER
fundamentals.
2.3.1 The Real Effective Exchange Rate
Concerning the real exchange rate, we follow Darvas (2012) and Sekkat (2016) to
use the real effective exchange rate, which measures the inflation adjusted value of a
country’s currency against a basket of currencies of the country’s trading partners.
To compute this, we need a price index for each country and its trading partners
(Chinn, 2006). Due to the availability of data, the most commonly used price index
4In other words, the equilibrium real exchange rate is “the value of the real exchange rate that
is consistent with the dual objectives of external and internal balance, for specified values of other
variables that may influence these objectives. The former refers to a situation in which the value
of the current account deficit is one that can be financed by a ‘sustainable’ level of capital inflows,
while the latter refers to a situation in which the market for non-traded goods is in a ‘sustainable’
equilibrium” (Montiel, 1999, p.219).
5Please see MacDonald (2000) for a brief review on the various theoretical and empirical models
of equilibrium real exchange rate determination.
6For the baseline, we have used the Hodrik-Prescott filter. We have also considered using the
Band-Pass filter as a robustness check (see Section 2.6.5).
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for this purpose is the consumer price index (CPI). As such, we calculate the real










where E(i, j) is the nominal bilateral exchange rate between country i and its trading
partner (country j) measured as the country j’s currency per unit of country i’s
currency; CPI is the consumer price index of the home country; CPI(j) is the
consumer price index of trading partner country j; and w(j) is the weight that reflects
the proportion of a country i’s total trade with its partner country j where these
weights sum to one over j, i.e.
∑N
j=1w(j) = 1 (N is the total number of trading
partners). According to Eq. (2.2), an increase in the real effective exchange rate index
indicates a real exchange rate appreciation of country i’s currency, and vice-versa.
2.3.2 The Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
To estimate the equilibrium RER, we first specify a model that links the real exchange
rate to the RER fundamentals. We follow the literature (see, for example, Edwards,
1989; Goldfajn and Valdes, 1999; Elbadawi et al., 2012) to model the real (effective)
exchange rate as
ln(RERit) = βi + β1 ln(TOTit) + β2NFAit + β3R
W
t + β4AIDit
+ β5 ln(PRODit) + β6 ln(GOVit) + β7OPENit + εit, (2.3)
where the external fundamentals are the terms of trade (TOTit), net foreign asset
(NFAit), international interest rate (R
W
t ), and foreign aid as a percentage of GDP
(AIDit); and the domestic fundamentals are productivity (PRODit) (that captures
the Balassa-Samuelson effect), the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (GOVit),
and trade openness (i.e. the ratio of export and import to GDP) (OPENit).
7
7For a discussion on why these variables are chosen for the real exchange rate model and what
their effects (sign-wise) on the real exchange rate are, please see Edwards (1989), Goldfajn and
Valdes (1999), and Elbadawi et al. (2012), which we follow here.
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A. Estimation
The equilibrium RER is estimated in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the
RER model expressed by Eq. (2.3). In the second step, we decompose the RER
fundamentals into short and long-run components, and feed the long-run (i.e. trend)
components into the estimated model to estimate the equilibrium RER. In doing
so, the variation in the misalignment index (see Eq. (2.1)) will be driven solely by
short-run shocks to the RER fundamentals. The details are as follows.
Step 1: To estimate Eq. (2.3), we employ three different econometric techniques
with error correction formulation that suits non-stationary heterogeneous panels with
large N and T : the Mean Group, the Pooled Mean Group and the Dynamic Fixed
Effect estimator.8 The Mean Group estimator is the most general estimator among
these three, in that it allows for potential differences in the intercept, the short-run
parameters (capturing short-run relationships), the long-run parameters (capturing
long-run relationships), and error variances across countries. The Pooled Mean Group
estimator is more constrained than the Mean Group estimator in that it restricts the
long-run coefficients to be equal across countries, but allows the intercept, short-run
coefficients and error variances to potentially differ as before. The Dynamic Fixed
Effect estimator is the most restrictive of the three, as it imposes constant short and
long-run coefficients across countries, and only allows for potentially heterogeneous
intercepts.
Concerning the Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group and Dynamic Fixed Effect
estimators, there are trade-offs between consistency and efficiency to consider. If
all the long and short-run parameters in the underlying data generating process are
heterogeneous, only the (most flexible) Mean Group estimator will be consistent.
However, if all the parameters are constant, all three estimators will be consistent
but the (most restrictive) Dynamic Fixed Effects estimator will be the most efficient.
The Pooled Mean Group estimator lies between the Mean Group and the Dynamic
Fixed Effects estimator in terms of the trade-offs between consistency and efficiency,
8Appendix B provides a brief discussion on the three estimators.
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in that it constrains only a subset of parameters (i.e. the long-run parameters) to be
constant, rather than allowing all the parameters to be heterogeneous like the Mean
Group estimator or most of the parameters to be fixed like the Dynamic Fixed Effects
estimator.
To model the short-run process in real exchange rates, we follow Pesaran et al.
(1999) in using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) to determine
which RER fundamentals should be modeled with a lag. We find that the terms of
trade, productivity, the international interest rate, and net foreign assets should be
modeled with one lag, while trade openness, government expenditure, and foreign aid
should be modeled without a lag (for this reason, there are no short-run coefficients
for trade openness, government expenditure and foreign aid).9
Table 2.1 reports our estimates of Eq. (2.3) based on the three approaches.
Concerning the long-run parameters, their signs are consistent with what theory
predicts (Elbadawi et al., 2012; Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Sekkat, 2016; Schröder,
2013), where on average, (a) an increase in the terms of trade, productivity,
government expenditure, international interest rate and net foreign asset result are
associated with an RER appreciation, (b) an increase in trade openness and foreign
aid inflow are associated with an RER depreciation. Concerning the short-run
parameters, productivity is the only variable that has a statistically significant effect
on the real exchange rate in all three regression models, where in the short run , an
increase in productivity is associated with an RER appreciation on average.
Step 2: To construct the equilibrium RER, we first employ the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter to decompose the trend and the cyclical components of the RER
fundamentals. The trend component of each fundamental is its permanent
component. It is sometimes called the “sustainable fundamental” (Goldfajn and
Valdes, 1999; Sekkat and Varoudakis, 2000; Elbadawi et al., 2012), as it is the
component in the fundamental that is sustained across time as opposed to the cyclical
components that die out more rapidly.
9The estimated parameters of the Mean Group and the Pooled Mean Group estimators are robust
to the choice of the lag length order if T is sufficiently large (Pesaran et al., 1999).
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Table 2.1: The Long-run and Short-run Estimates of the Real Exchange Rate Model
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation techniques
Mean Group Pooled Mean Dynamic Fixed
(MG) Group (PMG) Effects (DFE)
Long-run coefficients:
Terms of trade (in logs) 0.516* 0.330*** -0.011
(0.290) (0.076) (0.100)
Productivity (in logs) 0.237 0.235*** 0.337***
(0.199) (0.045) (0.066)
Government expenditure (in logs) 0.145 0.511*** 0.247***
(0.132) (0.060) (0.070)
Foreign aid -0.004 -0.008*** -0.003
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
Trade openness -0.004* -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
International interest rate -0.003 0.032*** 0.042***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009)
Net foreign asset 0.083 0.148*** 0.095**
(0.158) (0.048) (0.046)
Short-run coefficients:
Error correction coefficient -0.546*** -0.187*** -0.225***
(0.049) (0.034) (0.019)
D.(terms of trade, logs) -0.071 -0.066 -0.049
(0.053) (0.040) (0.034)
D.(productivity, logs) 0.122** 0.311*** 0.318***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.033)
D.(international interest rate) 0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
D.(net foreign asset) 0.099** 0.049 -0.017
(0.041) (0.032) (0.019)
Constant 2.822*** 0.568*** 1.221***
(0.481) (0.096) (0.186)
N 1050 1050 1050
Note: The dynamic specification of the real exchange rate model presented here is chosen using
the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), following Pesaran et al. (1999). * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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To estimate the equilibrium RER, we feed the long-run sustainable components of
the RER fundamentals, collectively represented by the vector FSit, into the estimated
version of the RER model expressed by Eq. (2.3):10
REREit = γ̃i + β̂
′
FSit. (2.4)
The vector FSit contains the sustainable components of the RER fundamentals and
β̂ is the factor loading. The parameter γ̃i is a scaled country specific intercept term,
which is given by





where RERi is the average observed RER and Fi is the vector of the average
sustainable RER fundamentals. The scaled intercept term, expressed by Eq. (2.5),
ensures that for each country, the RER misalignment index has an expected value
of zero. This zero expectation ensures that the actual real exchange rate will always
revert to its long-run equilibrium should they diverge, so that any deviation in the
actual real exchange rate from equilibrium represents a temporary than a permanent
misalignment.11
To proceed further, by substituting γ̃i from Eq. (2.5) into Eq. (2.4), we obtain a
second expression for the equilibrium RER as





This expression shows that for each country i, the equilibrium RER is equal to the
sum of the average RER and the weighted deviation of RER fundamentals from their
averages.
Further Remarks: For the baseline, we use the Pooled Mean Group estimates of
Eq. (2.3) to construct the equilibrium RER expressed by Eq. (2.6). This is because
the Pooled Mean Group estimator lies in between the Mean Group and the Dynamic
10Eq. (2.3) is estimated either by the Mean Group, Pooled Mean Group, or the Dynamic Fixed
Effects estimator.
11See Appendix C in Elbadawi et al. (2012) for more detail.
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Fixed Effects estimators in terms of the trade off between consistency and inefficiency.
Importantly, we find that our results (i.e. the effects of RER misalignment on conflict)
are not sensitive to the choice of using the Mean Group or Dynamic Fixed Effects
estimator when estimating the equilibrium RER.
2.3.3 The Misalignment Index
Once the equilibrium RER is computed in Step 2, we may take the difference between
the observed RER in Eq. (2.2) and the estimated equilibrium RER in Eq. (2.6) to
construct the RER misalignment index






i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
. (2.7)
Eq. (2.7) contains two parts. Part (I) is the difference between the actual RER
and its average value. Part (II) reflects the adjustment of the real exchange rate that
should occur in equilibrium. If the difference between the actual RER and its average
value exceeds the appreciation (or depreciation) that should occur in equilibrium, the
real exchange rate is overvalued. This is represented by Misalignmentit > 0. If the
difference between actual RER and its average value falls short of the equilibrium
appreciation (or depreciation), the real exchange rate is undervalued. This is
represented by Misalignmentit < 0.
Further manipulation of Eq. (2.7) reveals where the variation in Misalignmentit
comes from. Let FTit represent the vector of short-run transitory components of the
RER fundamentals and F
T
i their averages. We may decompose the RER fundamentals








i . If we substitute the
estimated RERit = γ̂i + β̂
′
Fit + ε̂it and its average RERi = γ̂i + β̂
′
Fi + ε̂i into Eq.
(2.7), we obtain another expression for RER misalignment as
Misalignmentit =β̂
′
[(Fit − FSit)− (Fi − F
S





i ] + (ε̂it − ε̂i). (2.8)
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Eq. (2.8) suggests that the variation in the RER misalignment index comes from
the weighted deviations of the RER short-run components from their averages and
short-run idiosyncratic RER shocks, represented by (ε̂it − ε̂i). Thus, our RER
misalignment index is driven only by the short-run transitory components of the
RER fundamentals as well as idiosyncratic shocks to the real exchange rate.
In Figure 2.1, we plot the average real exchange rate misalignment index for the
whole sub-Saharan African region in the given sample period. With the exception of
the large undervaluation that has occurred in recent years, the average real exchange
rate in the SSAs has been significantly overvalued at various times during the sample
period. In Appendix C, we plot the RER misalignment index for each country. We
find that the real exchange rate tends to be overvalued for larger countries such as
Angola, Chad, Central Africa republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Cote D’IVoire,
Equatorial Guinea, Uganda and Zambia, which incidentally are countries where civil
conflict is more common.
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Note: This figure plots the average RER misalignment index for sub-Saharan Africa for each year
by averaging the RER misalignment indices of the 35 SSAs in our sample.
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2.4 Data
Our panel data consists of 35 SSAs from 1975-2006, listed in Table A1 of Appendix
A. The variables used in this paper, their definitions and data sources are given in
Table A2 of Appendix A.
Our data on civil conflict comes from the joint armed conflicts dataset of the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research
Institute’s (PRIO) Centre for the study of civil war. The UCDP/PRIO (v.4-2015)
codebook defines civil conflict as conflict involving government or territory or both
where the use of armed force between two parties results in 25 or more battle-related
deaths. We focus exclusively on internal armed civil conflict, which is “conflict (that)
occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s)
without intervention from other states” (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015, p.9).
Our main dependent variable is the incidence of civil conflict. This is represented
by a dummy variable that indicates if a country for a given year is involved in a new
or ongoing war that has resulted in at least 25 battle related deaths per year. To
save space, we have considered but do not report the results related to the onset of
civil conflict, or for small versus large scale conflict.12
Table A3 in Appendix A provides the descriptive statistics on civil conflict
incidence. Over the sample period, civil conflict occurs in 21.30% of the country-year
observations, which suggests that the occurrence of civil conflict is rather common
and widespread in the SSAs. To see the link between civil conflict incidence and RER
misalignment in sub-Saharan Africa, we plot the the average conflict incidence against
the average RER misalignment index, over the sample period, for each SSA in Figure
2.2. Here, we find that there is a positive cross-sectional association between average
conflict incidence and average RER misalignment. The strong positive correlation
between the two implies that countries with large RER overvaluation have also
higher incidence of civil conflict. Angola and Uganda, in particular, have larger RER
12Civil conflict onset is represented by a dummy variable that indicates the year in which there
is a new civil conflict outbreak (Miguel et al., 2004) (the years in which there is an ongoing war are
coded as zero). Small scale conflict conflict is coded as 1 if country-year observations have 25-1000
deaths per year. Large scale conflict is coded as 1 if country-year observations have more than 1000
deaths per year.
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overvaluations and higher civil conflict incidences on average. Ethiopia, by contrast,
has a large average civil conflict incidence but a small average RER misalignment.
For countries such as Ethiopia, it is possible that the incidence of civil conflict is
influenced by other factors, such as rainfall shocks, as a large proportion of the labor
force (more than 85% for Ethiopia) works in agriculture.
Figure 2.2: Average civil conflict incidence and average RER misalignment for SSAs
Note: This figure shows the scatter plot of average civil conflict incidence and average
RER misalignment index for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
2.5 The Model
Our main estimating equation relates the incidence of civil conflict (conflictit) to the
RER misalignment index (Misalignmentit) plus a vector of control variables (Xit):
Conflictit = γ + βMisalignmentit + δ
′Xit + µi + µt + εit (2.9)
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where µi is the country fixed effect, µt is the year fixed effect, and εit is the error
term. We estimate Eq. (2.9) using OLS regression. For inference, we use robust
standard errors clustered at the country level.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Baseline Results
We first estimate Eq. (2.9) without covariates and report these results in Table 2.2
as our baseline. In Column (1), we estimate the model without fixed effects. In
Column (2), we include country fixed effects only. In Column (3), we include both
country and year fixed effects. In all three cases, we find that RER misalignment has
a positive and statistically significant effect (at the 5% level) on conflict incidence.
These results suggest two things. Firstly, the effect of RER misalignment on
conflict does not appear to be driven by unobserved country heterogeneity and
common trends. Secondly, the positive coefficient on the RER misalignment index
suggests an RER overvaluation is associated with a higher risk of conflict.
For example, based on Column (3), a one-standard deviation increase in the
misalignment index (i.e. one-standard deviation RER overvaluation) is associated
with a 4 percentage points increase in the probability of conflict on average. This
effect size appears to be nontrivial. For example, for Togo, a country with an RER
misalignment index around the SSAs’ average, the model predicts that the probability
of civil conflict would double from 4% to 8% if its RER misalignment index increases
by one standard deviation. Therefore, from a policy perspective, governments may
help to reduce the risk of civil conflict by reducing the misalignment of their real
exchange rates.
2.6.2 With Covariates
Controlling for macroeconomic factors Several macroeconomic factors may
affect the likelihood of civil conflict. In literature, it has been suggested that civil
conflict could be influenced by GDP per capita (Collier, 2008; Blattman and Miguel,
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Table 2.2: The Effect of RER Misalignment on Civil Conflict: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Incidence of civil conflict
Misalignment 0.137** 0.135** 0.121**
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
Country FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Constant 0.212*** 0.206*** 0.207***
(0.049) (0.002) (0.053)
N 1076 1076 1076
R2 0.0212 0.023 0.050
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2010), trade openness (i.e. total trade flows over GDP) (Magee and Massoud, 2011;
Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015), government expenditure (Fearon and Laitin, 2003),
total population (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009), foreign aid (De Ree and Nillesen, 2009;
Nunn and Qian, 2014), institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al., 2004;
Goldstone et al., 2010; Bates, 2008) and domestic policy (Hull and Imai, 2013).
Here, we show that RER misalignment is statistically significant for conflict despite
controlling for these macroeconomic factors.
Our data on GDP per capita, trade openness, government expenditure (as a
percentage of GDP), total population and foreign aid (as percentage of GDP) are
taken from the World Development Indicators. Concerning data on institutions,
we use the Polity2 score measure from the polity IV project data base (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2009). The Polity2 score variable ranges from -10 to +10. Positive
values of Polity2 indicate democracies while negative values represent autocracies.
A Polity2 score of zero indicates a political institution that is neither democratic
nor autocratic. For our regression, we follow Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Janus
and Riera-Crichton (2015) to construct an intermediate democracy dummy variable
that is equal to one when Polity2 scores falls in [-5, 5] range and zero otherwise.
Countries with Polity2 scores within [-5, 5] are those, according to Bates (2008), that
have “partial“ or “unconsolidated” democracies, where conflict incidence tends to be
disproportionately larger as well (see e.g. Bates, 2008). Finally, shifts in domestic
macroeconomic policies may also affect the likelihood of civil conflict. Following the
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civil conflict literature (Hull and Imai, 2013), we control for the inflation rate of
each country, which is available from the World Development Indicators, to capture
domestic macroeconomic policy changes.
In Table 2.3, we report the coefficient on the RER misalignment index only. In
the row “t− 1”, we report the coefficient on the RER misalignment index controlling
for the first lag of the macroeconomic factor(s) indicated in the column header (e.g.
GDP per capita in Column (1), Openness in Column (2), and all covariates mentioned
in the above in Column (8)). Similarly, in the row “t− 2”, we report the coefficient
on the RER misalignment index controlling for the second lag of the covariate(s),
and so on.
Whether we control for the first, second, third, forth or fifth lags of one or all
the covariates, we find that the effect of RER misalignment index on civil conflict
incidence is always positive and statistically significant at least at the 10% level.
Moreover, the coefficients on the RER misalignment index range from 0.110 (Column
(2)) to 0.150 (Column (8)), which are close to the two-way fixed effect estimate from
the baseline regression (see Column (3) of Table 2.2). Therefore, RER misalignment
has an effect on conflict beyond the effects of these macroeconomic factors at various
lag lengths.
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Table 2.3: The Coefficient of RER Misalignment Controlling for Additional Macroeconomic Covariates at Different Lags
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Covariates: GDP per capita Openness Gov. expend. Population Aid Int. democracy Inflation All covariates
Lag length: Dependent Variable: Civil conflict incidence
t− 1 0.130** 0.110** 0.136** 0.118** 0.118** 0.113* 0.132** 0.132**
(0.057) (0.050) (0.062) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052)
t− 2 0.138** 0.110** 0.128** 0.118** 0.116** 0.112* 0.138** 0.128**
(0.059) (0.050) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.052)
t− 3 0.149** 0.113** 0.123** 0.118** 0.117** 0.111* 0.145** 0.137**
(0.062) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.057)
t− 4 0.158** 0.117** 0.122** 0.118** 0.123** 0.112* 0.145** 0.150**
(0.065) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.060) (0.058)
t− 5 0.138** 0.118** 0.119** 0.118** 0.125** 0.115** 0.131** 0.122**
(0.061) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.053)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Controlling for rainfall and commodity price shocks It has been found that
the risk of civil conflict in the SSAs may increase with negative climate shocks (Miguel
et al., 2004; Burke et al., 2009; Hsiang et al., 2013) and negative shocks to the price
of commodities that the SSAs export (Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Hull and Imai,
2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). Here, we examine whether RER misalignment
has explanatory power on conflict once we control for rainfall and commodity price
shocks.
Concerning rainfall shocks, we use the growth in rainfall based on rainfall data
from the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP), following Miguel
et al. (2004), and Brückner and Ciccone (2010).13 Concerning commodity price
shocks, we construct a growth series based on the Brückner and Ciccone (2010)
index of export commodity prices defined as Commodity priceit =
∑19
c=1 κciPct for
country i in year t, where κ is the fixed export share of commodity c in country i,
and Pct is the period t price series of commodity c. The commodity price data used
by Brückner and Ciccone (2010) is obtained from the International Monetary Fund
(2009), and their fixed export shares on 19 primary commodities are obtained from
Deaton (1990).
Table 2.4 reports the regression results when we control for rainfall shocks (at
time t, t− 1 and t− 2) (Column (1)), commodity price shocks (at time t, t− 1 and
t − 2) (Column (2)), and both rainfall and commodity price shocks (Column (3)).
Despite doing so, we find that RER misalignment is statistically significant with a
similar effect size as the baseline estimate. This suggests that RER misalignment has
explanatory power on conflict beyond what may be explained by arguably two of the
most important factors in the literature: rainfall and commodity price shocks.
2.6.3 Overvaluation, Undervaluation and Civil Conflict
Up to now, our analysis assumes that RER overvaluation (i.e. Misalignmentit >
0) and RER undervaluation (i.e. Misalignmentit < 0) affect civil conflict
13We use version 2.0 of the GPCP rainfall data set, which is based on rainfall data collected from
satellites and rain gauges.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of RER Misalignment, Rainfall and Commodity Price Shocks
on Civil Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Incidence of civil conflict
Misalignment 0.170** 0.177** 0.174**
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Rainfall shock, t 0.029 0.030
(0.064) (0.063)
Rainfall shock, t− 1 -0.083 -0.082
(0.071) (0.070)
Rainfall shock, t− 2 -0.104* -0.106*
(0.057) (0.058)
Commodity price shock, t 0.086 0.085
(0.075) (0.074)
Commodity price shock, t− 1 -0.011 -0.015
(0.090) (0.092)
Commodity price shock, t− 2 0.080 0.083
(0.063) (0.063)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.259*** 0.240*** 0.235***
(0.052) (0.063) (0.063)
N 725 725 725
R2 0.058 0.058 0.063
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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symmetrically.14 However, RER overvaluation and undervaluation are different types
of RER distortions with possibly different effects on growth (Nouira and Sekkat, 2012;
Schröder, 2013).15
To investigate if the effect of RER misalignment is asymmetric, we split the RER
misalignment index into two parts – an RER overvaluation index defined as the
positive part of Misalignmentit, and an RER undervaluation index defined as the
negative part of Misalignmentit. We then repeat the baseline regressions by including
both of them as separate regressors, instead of a single RER misalignment index.
Table 2.5 shows that RER overvaluation has a positive and statistically significant
effect on conflict. However, RER undervaluation is statistically insignificant. The
coefficients on the RER overvaluation index, which range from 0.202 (Column (3)) to
0.210 (Column (2)), are also much larger than the coefficients on the baseline RER
misalignment index (see Table 2.2). Together with the fact that RER undervaluation
is statistically insignificant, this suggests that the effect RER misalignment as a whole
is driven mainly by the effect of RER overvaluation.
2.6.4 System GMM and IV Regression
RER misalignment is driven by shocks to the RER fundamentals. Here, we employ
two approaches to check if the effect of RER misalignment on conflict is merely
capturing the reverse causal effect.
Our first approach is to estimate a dynamic panel model using system Generalized
Method of Moments (system GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The idea of using
a dynamic panel model comes from the idea that if current conflict affects RER
misalignment in the next period, then one reduced-form approach of addressing this
reverse causal effect (from conflict to RER misalignment) is to include the lag of
14A bulk of the literature that studies the effect of RER misalignment on growth assumes that
the effect of RER undervaluation and RER overvaluation on growth is equal and opposite (see
Ghura and Grennes (1993), Elbadawi et al. (2012), Rodrik (2008), Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) for
example).
15For example, Nouira and Sekkat (2012) show that an increase in RER overvaluation has a
negative and statistically significant effect on growth, but find no statistically significant relationship
between undervaluation and growth. Schröder (2013) finds that an increase in RER overvaluation
has large negative effects on growth, but an increase in RER undervaluation reduces growth if and
only if the undervaluation persists for sufficiently longer time periods.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of RER Overvaluation and Undervaluation on Civil Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Civil conflict incidence
Overvaluation 0.205** 0.210** 0.202**
(0.081) (0.080) (0.082)
Undervaluation 0.038 0.029 0.006
(0.082) (0.084) (0.079)
Country FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Constant 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.188***
(0.053) (0.013) (0.057)
N 1105 1105 1105
R2 0.023 0.026 0.052
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
conflict as a control variable. As such, we employ system GMM to estimate the
following model
Conflictit = γ + δConflictit−1 + βMisalignmentit + δ
′Xit + µi + µt + εit. (2.10)
Our second approach is to employ an external instrument for RER misalignment.
To do so, we follow Habib et al. (2017) to construct a Bartik-style instrument (Bartik,
1991) by interacting (i) global capital flows and (ii) the country’s degree of de jure
financial openness. The idea is that capital flows are significantly influenced by global
factors (Forbes and Warnock, 2012) and an increase in capital inflow to a country
is typically followed by an appreciation in the country’s real exchange rate (Habib
et al., 2017). Habib et al. (2017) posit that capital flows, which are driven by global
push factors, generate exogenous variations in the real exchange rate. As such, their
instrument should in principle affect RER misalignment, given that it is a function
of the real exchange rate.
As a comment, like economic growth studied by Habib et al. (2017), conflict could
be directly affected by global factors (which drive capital flows). To eliminate the
confounding effects of such global factors, we use year fixed effects. Note that year
fixed effects will not partial out Habib et al.’s (2017) as it is both cross-sectionally
and time-varying. As such, following a similar argument as Habib et al. (2017), once
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country and year fixed effects are controlled for, it is reasonable to expect that the
Habib et al. (2017) instrument will not directly affect conflict except only through
its effect on RER misalignment.
Tables (2.6) and (2.7) present the system GMM and IV estimates, respectively.
In Table (2.6), the system GMM estimates show that RER misalignment has a
statistically significant effect on conflict (at the 1% level) despite controlling for the
lag of conflict, rainfall shocks and/or commodity price shocks. The system GMM
estimates of the effect size of RER misalignment are also larger than our baseline
estimates. This provides some comfort, in the sense that the baseline estimates are
possibly more conservative than what the true effect of RER misalignment may be.
In Table (2.7), the first stage results reported in Panel (B) show that Habib et al.’s
(2017) has a Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic that exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of
10, suggesting that it is an adequately strong instrument for RER misalignment. The
coefficient on Habib et al.’s (2017) instrument is also positive for RER misalignment.
This suggests that world capital inflows have, on average, a stronger influence in
misaligning a country’s real exchange rate the more financially open the country is.
The second stage results reported in Panel (A) affirm once more that RER
misalignment has a positive and statistically significant effect on conflict even after
controlling for rainfall and/or commodity price shocks. Interestingly, the IV estimates
produce a much larger effect size of RER misalignment than the non-IV estimates
do. For example, the effect of RER misalignment is more than three times larger
for the IV estimates (see Table 2.7) than for the baseline estimates (see Table 2.4).
This suggests that our baseline estimates are conservative about the actual effect
size of RER misalignment on conflict. Importantly, even based on these conservative
estimates, we find that the impact of RER misalignment is nontrivial.
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Table 2.6: RER Misalignment and Civil Conflict: System GMM Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Civil conflict incidence
Civil conflict incidence, t− 1 -0.499*** -0.501*** -0.500***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
RER misalignment 0.281*** 0.280*** 0.280***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Rainfall shock, t 0.078 0.072
(0.149) (0.147)
Rainfall shock, t− 1 -0.029 -0.033
(0.097) (0.097)
Rainfall shock, t− 2 0.010 0.001
(0.136) (0.136)
Commodity price shock, t 0.139 0.139
(0.143) (0.142)
Commodity price shock, t− 1 0.092 0.092
(0.123) (0.123)
Commodity price shock, t− 2 -0.058 -0.054
(0.104) (0.103)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
AR(2) 0.899 0.859 0.818
Hansen test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000
N 519 519 519
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** represent the level of
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The year fixed effects, the commodity
price shocks and the rainfall shocks are treated as strictly exogenous. The first year lag of civil
conflict incidence and the RER misalignment index are treated as endogenous. Moreover, the
Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions and the second order test for autocorrelation suggest
that the validity of the SGMM moment conditions are not rejected.
37
Table 2.7: RER Misalignment and Civil Conflict: An External Instrument Approach
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Dependent Variable: Civil conflict incidence
RER misalignment 0.703** 0.636** 0.599**
(0.337) (0.299) (0.299)
Rainfall shock, t 0.004 0.004
(0.074) (0.072)
Rainfall shock, t− 1 -0.093 -0.096
(0.086) (0.084)
Rainfall shock, t− 2 -0.114 -0.127*
0.069 (0.067)
Commodity price shock, t 0.098 0.096
(0.074) (0.074)
Commodity price shock, t− 1 0.030 0.025
( 0.081) (0.081)
Commodity price shock, t− 2 0.135* 0.138*
(0.078) (0.077)
Panel B: First-stage estimates
Dependent Variable: RER misalignment
World capital flows × 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012***
financial openness, t− 1 (0.003) (0.003 ) (0.004)
Coefficients on rainfall and
commodity price shocks are suppressed
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 11.627 12.860 12.726
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30
Observations 634 634 634
Pseudo R2 0.160 0.172 0.173
Note: Panel A presents the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Panel B reports
the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors reported in parenthesis. Other controls include the first year lags
of trade openness, inflation, per capita GDP, net capital inflows, and de jure financial openness. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.6.5 Further Robustness Checks
In this section, we provide additional robustness checks that detail the motivation
of each tests, and what we have observed from them. In each of these exercises, we
find robustly that RER misalignment is positively associated with the probability of
civil conflict.
Alternative estimation methods In section 2.6.1, we estimate Eq. (2.9) by
OLS regression (i.e. simple linear regression and fixed effects regression). Here, we
consider three alternative methods of estimating Eq. (2.9): the Probit, Random
Effects Logit, and the Fixed Effects Logit approach. All these estimation techniques
have been implemented before in this literature (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014).
For the Probit, Random Effects Logit, and Fixed Effects Logit approach, Columns
(1)-(3) of Table 2.8 present the estimates of the average marginal effect of RER
misalignment on the incidence of civil conflict. Based on these estimation methods,
we find that RER misalignment has a positive effect that is statistically significant at
the 1% level. Thus, we may conclude that the positive effect of RER misalignment on
civil conflict observed in the baseline regression is robust to the estimation methods
chosen.
Table 2.8: The Effect of RER Misalignment on Civil Conflict: Using Alternative
Estimation Methods
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation Technique: Probit Random Effects Logit Fixed Effects Logit
Dependent variable: Incidence of civil conflict
Misalignment 1.096*** 2.120*** 2.134***
(0.333) (0.612) (0.766)
Country FE No No Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes
Constant 1.455*** -2.785*** –
(0.260) (0.802) –
N 1076 1076 779
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses for
the probit and random Effects logit estimators. And bootstrap standard errors are reported for
fixed effects logit estimator. We report the average mariginal effects for the probit and the random
effects logit estimates. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
.
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Alternative RER misalignment index In Section A., we show that the
equilibrium RER, which is a required component in computing the RER misalignment
index, is constructed by using the parameters of the RER model (i.e. Eq. (2.3)). In
that section, we estimate these parameters by the Mean Group, Pooled Mean Group,
or Dynamic Fixed Effects estimator. For our baseline regression, we employ the
Pooled Mean Group estimator to estimate the parameters of the RER model, which
are then used in computing the equilibrium RER (and thus the RER misalignment
index).
Instead of the Pooled Mean Group estimator, we employ the Mean Group or
the Dynamic Fixed Effects estimator to compute the equilibrium RER, and thus, the
RER misalignment index (see Appendix B for a more detailed comparison of the Mean
Group, Pooled Mean Group and the Dynamic Fixed Effects estimator). As Table
2.9 demonstrates, using the RER misalignment index constructed from the Mean
Group or the Dynamic Fixed Effects estimator does not affect the sign and statistical
significance of the association between RER misalignment and conflict. In fact,
the alternative RER misalignment indices have the similar effect size and statistical
significance to the baseline RER misalignment index (see Table 2.2). Therefore, the
effect of RER misalignment on civil conflict is not affected by the econometric method
used when constructing the equilibrium RER, and thus, the RER misalignment index.
Band-Pass filter Recall, that to construct the RER misalignment index in Step
2 of Section (A.), we have used the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to decompose
the long-run (permanent) and the short-run (cyclical) components of the external
fundamentals.
In Table 2.10, we show that our results are robust to using the Band-Pass (BP)
filter. As Table 2.10 shows, the coefficient on the BP filter-based RER misalignment
index is statistically significant, with a value ranging from 0.123 in Column (3) when
both country and year fixed effects are included, to 0.133 when none of the fixed
effects are included. These values are close to the 0.121 to 0.137 range reported
in Table 2.2 for the coefficient on the baseline (HP filter-based) RER misalignment
index.
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Table 2.9: The Effect of RER Misalignment on Civil Conflict: Using Alternative
Misalignment Indices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equilibrium RER is estimated by: Mean Group estimator Dynamic Fixed Effect estimator





Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.211*** 0.104 0.210*** 0.098
(0.001) (0.063) (0.002) (0.063)
N 1062 1062 1062 1062
R2 0.009 0.049 0.009 0.049
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 2.10: The Effect of RER Misalignment on Civil Conflict: Using Band Pass
Filter
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Incidence of civil conflict
Misalignment 0.132** 0.133** 0.123**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Country FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Constant 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.205***
(0.052) (0.000) (0.054)
N 973 973 973
R2 0.017 0.017 0.045
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Sub-sample analysis and the Washington Consensus In 1990, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the US Treasury Department
came together to promote a set of policy prescriptions, collectively known as
the Washington Consensus, to help developing countries facing problems with
macroeconomic instability such as distortions to the real exchange rate (Williamson,
1990). Following these recommendations, many developing countries adopted reforms
packages and loans from institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Because
the real exchange rates of these recipient countries could be unstable prior to the
1990, but more stable after the reforms, it would be useful to check if our results
are driven by the association between RER misalignment and conflict only for a
sub-period within our sample.
To do so, we divide the sample into two shorter regimes before and after the
Washington Consensus and repeat our baseline regressions based on each of these
subsamples. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 2.11 report our estimates for the 1975-1990
period, and Columns (3)-(4) for the 1991-2006 period. For both sub-samples, we find
that RER misalignment has a positive and statistically effect (at the 1% level) on
civil conflict. Furthermore, the effect of RER misalignment on conflict appears to be
stronger during the post-Washington Consensus period. Therefore, the adverse effect
of RER misalignment on civil conflict can be observed for the whole sample period,
and does not appear to be mitigated by the Washington Consensus.
Table 2.11: The Effect of RER Misalignment on Civil Conflict: Sub-sample Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1975-1990 1991-2006
Dependent variable: Incidence of civil conflict
Misalignment 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.182*** 0.160***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.048) (0.050)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.173*** 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.218***
(0.010) (0.038) (0.011) (0.045)
N 516 516 560 560
R2 0.026 0.046 0.027 0.057
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
42
Controlling for the lags of RER misalignment In this exercise, we add
the one and two year lags of the RER misalignment index to the baseline
regressions.16 In these new regressions, Table 2.12 shows that only the coefficients
on the contemporaneous RER misalignment index are statistically significant; the
coefficients on the lagged RER misalignment are statistically insignificant. In the case
where both country and fixed effects are controlled for (Column (3)), the coefficient
on the contemporaneous RER misalignment index is 0.180, which is close to the
baseline estimate of 0.121 (Column (3) of Table 2.2).
16Note that such type regression specification (i.e. adding one or more lags) is strongly criticized
by recent civil conflict studies (see Ciccone (2013) and Chassang and Padro-i Miquel (2009), for
example) when the shock that affects civil conflict is a transitory shock. Transitory shocks (e.g.
rainfall growth shock) are mean reverting (stationary). The mean-reverting property of the shock
leads the coefficient of the contemporaneous value of the shock and the coefficient of its lag to have
opposite signs. For instance, when the first year lag of rainfall growth shock increases the likelihood
of civil conflict, then the contemporaneous rainfall growth shock should reduce civil conflict which
makes difficult to identify the effect the shock on civil conflict. The same critique applies to the
RER misalignment index as it is mean reverting as well.
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Table 2.12: The Effect of RER Misalignment and Its Lags on Civil Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Civil conflict incidence
RER misalignment, t 0.174** 0.184** 0.180**
(0.081) (0.084) (0.082)
RER misalignment, t− 1 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
RER misalignment, t− 2 0.010 0.001 0.003
(0.063) (0.062) (0.063)
Rainfall shock, t 0.030 0.031
(0.065) (0.063)
Rainfall shock, t− 1 -0.083 -0.081
(0.071) (0.070)
Rainfall shock, t− 2 -0.104* -0.106*
(0.058) (0.058)
Commodity price shock, t 0.087 0.085
(0.075) (0.074)
Commodity price shock, t− 1 -0.011 -0.015
(0.091) (0.092)
Commodity price shock, t− 2 0.080 0.084
(0.062) (0.062)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 723 723 723
R2 0.058 0.058 0.063
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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2.6.6 Small Conflict, Large Conflict and Conflict Onset
Our main dependent variable, the incidence of civil conflict, refers to the onset new
civil conflicts and the continuation of already existing conflicts that have resulted in
at least 25 battle related deaths. In this section, we first examine if the effect of
RER misalignment depends on the scale of the conflict. We consider small scale civil
conflict as conflict that has resulted in 25-1000 battle related deaths, and large scale
civil conflict as conflict that has resulted in more than 1000 deaths.
In Columns (1)-(2) of Table 2.13, we find that RER misalignment is statically
insignificant for small scale conflict. By contrast, for large scale conflict, Columns
(3)-(4) show the effect of RER misalignment is positive and statistically significant.
This suggests that the effect of RER misalignment on conflict comes mainly from
the association between RER misalignment and large conflicts, not small conflicts.
Besides the scale of the conflict, we consider the onset of new civil conflict with at
least 25 deaths in sub-Saharan Africa. Civil conflict onset is defined as the year where
the conflict has first started. In Column (5)-(6), we find that RER misalignment is
statistically insignificant for civil conflict. At face value, we may conclude that RER
misalignment mainly affects the continuation (i.e. persistence) of conflicts instead of
causing new conflicts to start.17
17The statistically insignificant response of civil conflict onset could also be related to the way
civil conflict onset is defined. In Fearon and Laitin (2003), Miguel et al. (2004), Ciccone (2011) and
Ciccone (2013), which we follow, conflict onset is a dummy variable coded as one for the first year
of a conflict episode, zero for the subsequent years of the same conflict episode and when there is
no conflict. If RER misalignment affects both conflict onset and conflict persistence, it would be
associated with both ones and zeros contained in the conflict onset dummy. This may cause the
statistical association between RER misalignment and the conflict onset dummy to be ambiguous,
and therefore insignificant, not because there is no association between RER misalignment and
conflict onset, but because of the way the civil conflict onset dummy is defined.
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Table 2.13: The Effect of RER Misalignment on Small Scale Conflict, Large Scale
Conflict, and Conflict Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variables: Incidence of Incidence of Onset of
small scale conflict large scale conflict civil conflict
RER Misalignment 0.056 0.051 0.079** 0.070* -0.000 -0.005
(0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.008) (0.008)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.120*** 0.148*** 0.086*** 0.059 0.019*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.053) (0.001) (0.037) (0.000) (0.004)
N 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076
R2 0.004 0.053 0.013 0.061 0.000 0.035
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in the parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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2.7 Conclusion
In developing countries, the misalignment of the real exchange rate is a common
empirical phenomenon. For policy makers, this is a concern as RER misalignment
may reduce economic growth. Recognizing that lower growth may lead to conflict,
we investigate if RER misalignment can explain civil conflict incidence in the SSAs.
To do so, we construct an RER misalignment index and find that RER misalignment
is statistically significant for the incidence of civil conflict in the SSAs, where a
one-standard deviation increase (i.e. overvaluation) in the RER is associated with
a 4 percentage points increase in the probability of civil conflict on average. This
effect is observed even after we control for rainfall and commodity price shocks – two
widely acknowledged factors of civil conflict – and a battery of robustness checks.
We conclude that RER misalignment, through its negative impact on growth, can
explain the incidence of civil conflict in the SSAs beyond the effects of negative
rainfall and commodity price shocks. Therefore, from a policy perspective, not only
does stabilizing the real exchange rates of the SSAs have economic benefits, it may
also contribute to political stability in the region by helping to reduce conflict. Hence,
other than stabilizing the RER, it is important for central banks to manage and ensure
that RER is not overvalued.
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Appendix A: List of Sample Countries, Data
Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Table A1: List of Countries in the Sample
Angola Benin Botswana Burundi
Cabo Verde Cameroon Central African Republic Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Cote d’Ivoire Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia Gabon Gambia, The Ghana
Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Madagascar
Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius
Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria
Rwanda Senegal South Africa Sudan
Togo Uganda Zambia
Note: The sample period extends from 1975-2006. Due to real exchange rate data
unavailability for some countries, the study is restricted to 35 SSAs.
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Table A2: Data Sources and Definitions
Variable Name Definitions Data sources
Real effective
exchange rate
CPI based REER constructed
based on the weights of 67 tra-
ding partners. An increase in
the index indicates appreciat-





The ratio of GDP per capita
(home country) to the OECD
average of GDP per capita




NFI is the ratio of net foreign
assets relative to GDP at
current prices












Net barter terms of trade index
is calculated as the percentage
ratio of the export unit value
indexes to the import unit value
indexes, measured relative to
the base year 2000.
WDI (2016)
Trade openness







GDP per capita is gross domestic
product divided by population
in constant 2005 US$
WDI (2016)
RER misalignment
Percentage difference between real
effective exchange rate and its
estimated equilibrium value
Authors’ calculation









as a share of GDP
WDI (2016)
Inflation rate
Consumer prices (annual %),
used as a proxy for domestic
macroeconomic policy
WDI(2016)
Export (% of GDP)
Exports of goods
and services (% of GDP)
WDI (2016)
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Misalignment 1086 0.029 0.333 -1.787 1.896
Incidence of civil conflict 1226 0.213 0.410 0 1
Inflation rate 1004 59.48 784.0 -17.64 23773
Commodity price growth (shocks) 789 0.028 0.210 -0.482 1.251
Rainfall level 789 969.0 481.3 96.11 2073
Rainfall growth (shocks) 789 0.021 0.210 -0.547 1.677
Terms of trade 1260 115.7 43.54 21.40 357.6
Government expenditure 1260 15.67 8.348 0 84.51
Foreign aid (% of GDP) 1260 11.59 11.56 -0.253 94.95
Trade openness 1260 70.50 49.32 0.046 531.7
GDP per capita 1163 1187 1825 113.7 13706
Intermediate institution 1260 0.264 0.441 0 1
Net foreign asset (% of GDP) 1260 -0.739 0.869 -5.410 10.10
International interest rate 1120 6.090 2.944 1.021 14.35
Gross saving (% of GDP) 1089 8.784 23.39 -241.9 84.78
Deposit rate 884 9.279 9.178 2 147.1
Net capital inflow 1142 0.049 0.707 -3.719 6.857
De jure capital account openness 1164 -0.873 0.838 -1.904 2.374
World capital flows 1260 1490 2050 48.50 9200
Export (% of GDP) 1310 30.64 19.17 2.52 124.39
Note that the world capital flows are in billion U.S. dollars.
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Appendix B: Mean Group, Pooled Mean Group and
the Dynamic Fixed Effects Estimator
In this appendix, we provide some further discussion on the Mean Group, Pooled
Mean Group and Dynamic Fixed Effects estimators that were employed to estimate
the real exchange rate model in Eq. (2.3) of Section (A.). In general, for the panel
of N countries and T time periods, we may model the real exchange rate model as
an autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) process with p lags for the real exchange









ijXi,t−j + µi + εit (2.11)
where RERit is the real effective exchange rate, Xit is a 7 × 1 vector of the real
exchange rate fundamentals that include the terms of trade, net foreign asset,
international interest rate, foreign aid, productivity, government expenditure, and
trade openness (see Section (2.3.2)). The parameter λij represents the coefficient on
the jth lagged of RERit, δij represents a 7× 1 vector of coefficients on the jth lagged
of the RER fundamentals, µi is the country fixed effect and εit is a white noise.
In non-stationary heterogeneous panel data models, the common procedure of












where λ∗ij = −
∑p




m=j+1 δim for j =
1, 2, ..., q − 1, and φi = −(1 −
∑p
j=1 λij) is the error-correcting speed of adjustment
term. If φi = 0, there is no long-run relationship between the model variables. If
φi < 0, any short-run deviation of the variables from their equilibrium relationship





18Following Pesaran et al. (1999), the lag length order of of RERit and Xi,t are determined by
the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) where the maximum lag length is set to be 1. As
Pesaran et al. (1999) also clearly demonstrated, the estimated parameters of the mean group and
the pooled mean group procedures are robust to the choice of the lag length order if T is sufficiently
large.
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represents the long-run coefficients. These parameters, also known as cointegrating
parameters, capture the long-run relationships between the variables in the model.
In Section (A.), we have applied three estimation techniques to estimate Eq.
(2.12), which are common in the dynamic heterogeneous panel literature (Pesaran and
Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1999; Blackburne and Frank, 2007). The first approach
is the Dynamic Fixed Effect estimator. This approach pools the time-series data of
each country and assumes that the long-run parameters, the short parameters and
the error variances are the same across countries. The only parameters that may vary
across countries are the intercepts (Blackburne and Frank, 2007).
The second approach is the Mean Group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995).
This approach assumes that the intercepts, the long-run parameters, the short-run
parameters and the error variances are potentially different for each country in the
panel. Therefore, concerning Eq. (2.12), the Mean Group estimator will estimate
this model for each country, and then average up the country-specific estimates.
The third approach is the Pooled Mean Group estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999).
This approach lies in between the Dynamic Fixed Effects and the Mean Group
estimators in terms of allowing for model heterogeneity. Specifically, the Pooled Mean
Group estimator allows the short-run parameters and error variances to potentially
vary across countries, just as the Mean Group estimator does, although not the
Dynamic Fixed Effects estimator. However, the Pooled Mean Group estimator holds
the long-run cointegrating vectors fixed, which is what the Dynamic Fixed Effects
estimator does, but not the Mean Group estimator.
As such, in terms of allowing the parameters to vary, the Mean Group estimator is
the most flexible while the Dynamic Fixed Effects estimator is the least flexible. If the
short and long-run parameters and the error variances are different across countries,
fixing any of these will yield inconsistent estimates. However, if these parameters
and error variances are identical, assuming otherwise will yield inefficient estimates
(Blackburne and Frank, 2007). Thus, in our paper, we adopt the Pooled Mean Group
estimator, which combines both pooling and averaging, and thus provides the best
compromise between consistency and efficiency.
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Appendix C: The Misalignment Index for
Individual Countries































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Angola Benin Botswana Burundi Cabo Verde Cameroon
Central African Republic Chad Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Cote d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia Gabon Gambia, The Ghana Guinea-Bissau Kenya
Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius
Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal



















Appendix D: Export as a Percentage of GDP for
Individual Countries
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Does non-U.S. Emergency Food
Aid Increase Civil Conflict in the
Recipient Countries?
Dessie Tarko Ambaw




Through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
U.S. is the largest provider of food assistance to poor countries that are facing a
hunger crisis or are affected by disasters. While the intention of USAID is noble,
recent studies have shown that U.S. emergency food aid has partly contributed in the
rise of civil conflict in conflict-prone recipient countries because it has been looted or
stolen in exchange for arms. In this paper, we show that non-U.S. emergency food
aid does not have a statistically significant effect on civil conflict in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA). To address the potential endogeneity of food aid allocation that biases
OLS estimates, we employ the number of affected people by the natural disasters
in the other sub-Saharan Africa countries as an instrument for emergency food
aid. Unlike the previous literature, we find that non-emergency food aid has no
a statistically significant effect on increasing civil conflict in the region suggesting
non-U.S. food aid is still an important international development policy tool to fight
hunger and suffering in developing countries.
Key Words: Food Aid, Civil Conflict, Instrumental Variable Estimation,
sub-Saharan Africa
JEL Codes: D74, F35, H84, O19, Q11, Q18
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3.1 Introduction
Although emergency food assistance has helped to alleviate hunger and malnutrition,
critics are concerned that it may also lead to increased conflict in conflict-prone
regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Humanitarian aid, for example, could be
intercepted by militias to support insurgency and therefore foster conflict. However,
empirical evidence that food aid leads to more conflict has been tenuous at best. In
a recent study, Nunn and Qian (2014) found that U.S. food aid could increase civil
conflict in a large sample of aid-receiving developing countries. Concerned that this
effect could be driven by specific countries, Chu et al. (2017) then replicated Nunn
and Qian’s (2014) and show that food aid has a homogeneous effect on conflict across
countries, which suggests that Nunn and Qian’s (2014) findings are robust. However,
using a different empirical approach, USAID (2014) and Christian and Barrett (2017)
showed that that U.S. food aid was not statistically significant at all, which raises
the question on whether food aid has a quantitatively important impact on conflict.1
Empirically, it is difficult to identify the effect of food aid on conflict as the
allocation of food aid is likely to be endogenous. Firstly, food aid is endogenous
as there is a tendency for aid agencies to allocate more food aid to conflict-prone
regions. Thus, conflict might influence food aid. Secondly, there could be common
factors (such as the occurrence of economic crisis) that drive both conflict and food
aid in the same direction. Thus, the empirical association between food aid and
conflict could coincidental. Finally, food aid data is likely to contain measurement
error. If this error is classical, the least squares estimates of the effect of food aid on
conflict would be attenuated.
As an identification strategy, Nunn and Qian (2014) developed a Bartik-style
(Bartik, 1991) instrumental variable (IV) for contemporaneous U.S. wheat aid. The
Bartik IV typically interacts a time-varying macroeconomic factor, which plays the
1The sample countries considered in USAID (2014) and Christian and Barrett (2017) are exactly
similar to Nunn and Qian (2014). However, the former two paper extends Nunn and Qian (2014)
in different ways. For example, USAID (2014) excludes the 1970-1973 data and controls additional
variables. Christian and Barrett (2017) also argue that the non-parallel trend problem may cause
the exclusion restriction assumption in Nunn and Qian (2014) to be violated. As such, using placebo,
randomization inference, and Monte Carlo simulation tests, they find that food aid does not have
any statistical significant effect on conflict.
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role of a treatment variable, with a country-specific cross-sectional exposure to that
factor, which measures treatment intensity. In Nunn and Qian (2014), the Bartik
IV is constructed by interacting the amount of U.S. wheat aid in the previous year
(the macroeconomic factor) with each country’s propensity of receiving U.S. wheat
aid (the cross-country exposure variable). Concerns about the endogeneity of the
Bartik IV usually arise because the exposure variable could be correlated with the
unobserved country heterogeneity. This issue, as Nunn and Qian (2014) argued, could
be dealt with by using country fixed effects. However, Christian and Barrett (2017)
countered that their Bartik IV might still be invalid: if there are non-linear and
non-parallel trends in the cross-sectional exposure variable, the use of fixed effects
might be insufficient (see, also, Bazzi and Clemens, 2013).
Thus, while Bartik IVs are easy to construct, there are issues concerning their
validity that cannot be easily addressed. In this paper, we propose a new non-Bartik
IV to estimate the causal effect of emergency food aid from Development Assistant
Committee (DAC) countries on the civil conflict of SSA countries. To construct
our instrument for the emergency food aid of the SSA country in question, we
use information related to natural disasters that have occurred in the other SSA
countries. These include geophysical disasters (such as earthquake and volcanic
eruption), meteorological disasters (storm and extreme temperature), hydrological
disasters (flood and landslide), climatological disasters (drought and wildfire) and
biological disasters (epidemic and insect infestation). The occurrence of natural
disasters is exogenous. When some countries are struck with natural disasters, food
aid could be diverted away from non-affected countries, especially if these disasters
affect a large number of people. As such, to identify the effect of food aid, we exploit
the exogenous variation in a country’s food aid associated with the number of natural
disaster affected people in foreign countries.2 Our identification strategy, therefore,
relies on the assumption that controlling for the relevant observables, the number of
disaster-affected people in foreign countries only affects civil conflict in the domestic
2The emergency database (EM-DAT) defines the number of affected people as “People requiring
immediate assistance during a period of emergency, i.e. requiring basic survival needs such as food,
water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance”.
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country through its effect on the emergency food aid the latter receives.
Based on a panel of 30 SSA countries from 1995 to 2015, we find that emergency
food aid does not have a statistically significant effect on the incidences of civil conflict
(small scale conflict) and civil war (large scale conflict). Thus, the argument that
increasing the quantity of food aid to war torn developing countries increases the
capability of rebel groups to fight the state may not be true for non-U.S. DAC
countries emergency food aid to SSA. Our baseline results are not dependent on
whether spatial and temporal conflict spillovers are accounted for in the model.
Additional, we find our results to be robust in a battery of other sensitivity checks.
There is now a large literature that looks at the effectiveness of foreign aid for
economic development in developing countries, which our paper is related to. For
example, Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007), Crost et al. (2014) and Galiani et al.
(2017) studied the effect of aid on economic growth and civil conflict and their
findings, taken together, are not conclusive about whether aid may either reduce or
improve economic outcomes. Our paper is related to the literature by focusing on the
effect of emergency food aid on civil conflict. Methodologically, our paper is related
to recent research that uses exogenous shocks to construct an instrument for aid. For
example, Werker et al. (2009) employed oil price shocks to study the effect of oil-rich
donor countries aid on the economic growth of aid recipient developing countries, but
found that foreign aid did not have significant effects on growth. Similarly, Nunn
and Qian (2014) constructed their Bartik IV for aid, and found that U.S. wheat
aid increases the incidence of conflict in a large set of food aid recipient developing
countries. Our study contributes to the literature by proposing a novel, non-Bartik
IV for food aid, which is driven by exogenous shocks arising from natural disasters.
The reminder part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the
data and the summary statistics of the study. Section 3.3 lays out the empirical




Our dataset covers 30 sub-Saharan African emergency food aid recipient countries
for the period between 1995 and 2015. In this section, we will first describe the
dependent and explanatory variables used in the paper. Next, we will discuss how
our instrumental variable (IV) is constructed. Finally, we will present the descriptive
statistics and explore some data visualization.
Civil conflict: The data on civil conflict comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) armed conflicts dataset. UCDP defines civil conflict as conflict
involving government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two
parties results in 25 or more battle-related deaths. The study focuses exclusively
on internal armed civil conflict, which is defined as “conflict (that) occurs between
the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without
intervention from other states” (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015, p.9).
The first main dependent variable of the study is the incidence of civil conflict.
The incidence of civil conflict is an indicator variable which equals to 1 if there is
conflict with 25-1000 battle related deaths in a given country during a given year.
The second dependent variable of the study is civil war incidence which is an indicator
variable that equals to 1 if there is conflict with more than 1000 battle related deaths
in a country for a given time period and zero otherwise (Miguel et al., 2004; Nunn
and Qian, 2014).
Emergency food aid: Our data on emergency food aid data is taken from the
OECD Stat database. We consider the emergency food aid data from Development
Assistant Committee (DAC) countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) except U.S. food aid. In other words, we focus on the
29 DAC countries, which excludes the U.S.3 OECD stat database documents the
emergency food aid value in terms of million U.S. dollars.
3The list of the 29 DAC countries are presented in Table A1 of the appendix.
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Natural disaster: The natural disaster data comes from the emergency event
database (EM-DAT), which is established by the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). The number of people affected by natural
disasters is the information we use for constructing the instrument for emergency food
aid (see Section 3.3 for more details). However, other control variables such as total
number of deaths, total homeless and total resource damage are also extracted from
the EM-DAT website. The study employs the number of natural disaster affected
people in foreign countries as an instrument (IV) for emergency food aid to estimate
its effect on civil conflict in food aid recipient countries. According to EM-DAT, the
natural disasters that are considered for computing the number of disaster affected
people include earthquake, volcanic eruption, extreme temperature, storm, flood,
landslide, drought, wildfire, epidemic, and insect infestation.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Civil conflict incidence 630 0.284 0.451 0 1
Civil war incidence 630 0.09 0.287 0 1
Affected people 630 339057.61 1435932.155 0 23000000
Homeless 630 4555.008 23094.698 0 282975
Total Damage 630 14681.481 204709.265 0 5000000
Total deaths 630 186.289 928.349 0 20011
Emergency food aid from DAC 630 7.133 15.175 0 147.685
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables. The data shows
that the SSA is one of the highly conflict affected regions in the world, where
civil conflict incidence occurs in the 28.4% of country-year combinations and civil
war occurs in 9% the country-year combinations. Thus, Table 3.1 also reports the
summary statistics for the different effects of natural disaster in the SSA countries.
For example, the country-year average number of people affected and killed by natural
disasters were 339,058 and 186 in the region, respectively. These figures suggest that
natural disasters are one of the major causes of human suffering in sub-Saharan
African countries. Moreover, more than 7 million USD average emergency food aid
is given to the SSA from the 29 DAC countries due to natural disasters.
To first explore the association between conflict and emergency food aid, we first
visualized their scatter plots. Figure 3.1 plots the relationship between small scale
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Note: This figure plots the average civil conflict incidence and the average value of emergency food
aid in the 30 sample SSA countries.
civil conflict incidence and DAC emergency food aid to the region. Here, we can
see that higher levels of emergency food aid are associated with greater civil conflict
incidence in the SSA.
This positive association is also consistent with Figure 3.2, which shows that civil
war incidence and emergency food aid are positively correlated in the SSA. Finally,
we provide a simple scatter plot of emergency food aid and the number of natural
disaster affected people in other SSA countries to explore the relationship between
disaster casualties and the allocation of emergency food aid in the region. As Figure
3.3 shows, notwithstanding a few outlying countries (such as Sudan), an increase
in the number of natural disaster affected people in the foreign country is strongly
negatively associated with the shipment of food aid to a given SSA country. Thus,
the severity of natural disasters in foreign countries, reflected by the number of people
affected by these disasters, could cause food aid to be diverted away from the domestic
aid recipient.
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Note: This figure plots the average civil war incidence and the average emergency food aid in the
30 sample SSA countries.
3.3 Methodology
To identify the causal effect of emergency food aid on conflict, we estimate the
following equations with the two stage least square (2SLS) approach:4
Conflictit = β(FoodAid)it +XitΓ + ϕt + ψi + µit (3.1)
FoodAidit = α(ForeignAffected)it +XitΓ + ϕt + ψi + εit (3.2)
where Conflictit is an indicator variable which equals 1 if there is conflict with
25-1000 battle related deaths in country i during year t. FoodAidit is the value of
emergency food aid (the endogenous variable) from DAC countries. ForeignAffectedit
is the number of people affected by natural disasters in other SSA countries. ϕt and
ψi denote the year and country fixed effects; while µit and εit are the error terms for
the second and the first stage equations of the 2SLS system, respectively.
4Implicitly we have used the linear probability model (LPM) to estimate Eq. (3.1) as it allows
to control for unobserved country characteristics that may lead a country to be more conflict-prone.
Moreover, the LPM approach suitable to simplify the interpretation of the estimated coefficients.
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Figure 3.3: The Number of People Affected by Natural Disaster in Other Countries
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Average number of natural disaster affected people in other countries
linear fit 95% CI
Note: This figure plots the average value of emergency food aid and the average number of natural
disaster affected people in other SSA countries.
We also re-estimate Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2) with 2SLS regression using civil
war incidence as the dependent variable. Civil war incidence is an indicator variable
that is equal to 1 for a conflict episode resulting in more than 1000 battle related
deaths in country i and year t; and 0 otherwise. This allows us to estimate the
effect of emergency food aid on the incidence of large scale civil conflict. In all
the specifications, we have controlled country specific time trends. Besides that
Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors
are used in the 2SLS analysis.
Potential identification concerns: We employ the 2SLS regression approach as
it is difficult to identify the effect of food aid on civil conflict with the OLS estimation
approach. The primary reason for this problem is reverse causality: civil conflict may
increase the need for emergency food aid, implying that the relationship between
food aid and conflict is bi-directional. To disentangle the causal effect of food aid on
conflict, we propose to use the number of natural disaster affected people in other
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SSA countries as an instrument for emergency food aid received in a country. The
idea is that there is competition for food aid among these countries. Countries that
are struck by natural disasters may therefore receive more aid at the expense of the
unaffected SSA countries. In this regard, natural disasters in neighboring countries
are negative shocks to the amount food aid a country receives.
Figure 3.4 shows the positive relationship between average number of natural
disaster affected people in other SSA countries and the average food aid they receive.
The positive relationship suggests that there is indeed competition for food aid among
SSA countries which implies the plausibility of employing natural disaster affected
people in other SSA countries as an instrument for domestic emergency food aid.
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Note: This figure plots the average emergency food aid in other SSA countries and the average
number of natural disaster affected people in other SSA countries.
The basic exclusion restriction of the study is that the number of natural disaster
affected people in the other SSA countries affects civil conflict in the home country
only through the emergency food aid the latter receives. There may, nonetheless,
be some concerns about the identification assumption imposed here. Firstly, some
natural disasters may affect large geographical areas (i.e. more than one country).
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When other countries suffer from natural disasters, the country in question may
suffer from the same disasters as well. Natural disasters, however, may directly affect
conflict. Therefore, to isolate the influence of natural disasters occurring in other
countries from the influence of natural disasters occurring in the home country, we
control for the latter, which is the number of affected people, the number of deaths
and total damage in the country due to the occurrence of natural disasters.
Secondly, there could be unobserved country heterogeneity that affects both
conflict and the occurrence of natural disasters in the country. For example, the
location of a country – such as having rugged mountain or bad climate – may affect
how disaster-prone the country is (Buhaug et al., 2009), as countries with rugged
maintains could be prone to earthquakes and land slides, and those covered by desserts
could be affected by heat wave or sand storms. To address the confounding influence
of unobserved country heterogeneity, we employ country fixed effects. We believe this
is reasonable as geographical characteristics can be treated as time invariant relative
to the period of this study.
Thirdly, there could be crowding out (or crowding in) of emergency food aid
on domestic crop production and food import. For instance, an increase in the
quantity of emergency food aid may generate a secondary effect where domestic cereal
production or food import is reduced. This crowding out effect, in turn, may in turn
lead to civil conflict. Concerning this issue, we may estimate the effect of food aid
on food production and food import using the number of natural disaster affected
people in the other countries as an IV for food aid. The estimated coefficients of
emergency food aid should be close to zero and statistically insignificant if food aid
does not crowding-out (crowding-in) food production or food import, which we have
found to be true (see Section 3.4.4).
Finally, food aid may also crowd-out other forms of aid (Nunn and Qian, 2014)
that may increase (De Ree and Nillesen, 2009) or decrease (Grossman, 1992) the risk
of civil conflict. For example, food aid may reduce other forms of aid from the 29
DAC sample countries or from the US and other non-DAC donor countries. In order
to check the likelihood of such crowding-out effects, we estimate the effect of food aid
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on DAC countries official development assistance (ODA) and total ODA that comes
from all donors. To disentangle the net effect of food aid on the other forms of aid
from DAC or on the other donor countries aid, we employ the number of natural




Table 3.2: The Effect of Food Aid on Civil Conflict Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable: Civil conflict incidence
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid 0.0031** -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0074) (0.0071)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disasters -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0017***
affected people in other countries 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 23.32 23.32 25.62
Controls:
Total damage Yes No No Yes
Total number of homeless people Yes No No Yes
Total deaths Yes No No Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes No Yes Yes
Instrumental variable No Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Observations 630 630 630 630
Pseudo R2 0.0590 0.0033 0.0033 0.0131
Note: Panel A shows the OLS and the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation.
Panel B shows the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for the 2SLS analysis. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4.1 Baseline Results
Emergency food aid and civil conflict incidence: Table 3.2 presents the
baseline estimates of the effect of emergency food aid on civil conflict incidence,
where we report the OLS estimates in Column (1) and instrumental variable (IV)
estimates in Columns (2)-(4). In Column (2), we control country fixed effects and
year fixed effects. In Column (3), we include a country specific time trend. In
Column (4), we control for the effect of domestic natural disaster on the incidence of
domestic civil conflict. For inference, we report the kernel-based heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors.
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In Panel A, the OLS regression shows that emergency food aid has a positive and
statistically significant effect on civil conflict incidence. However, when an instrument
for emergency food aid is used, the latter does not have a statistically significant effect
on civil conflict incidence. Hence, there is no statistical evidence that emergency food
aid from DAC countries (except U.S.) could cause civil conflict incidence in the SSA.
Our instrument for food aid is also strong, which lends credibility to the above
second stage estimate. Specifically, the fist stage results of the 2SLS estimation are
reported in Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B. Here, we find that emergency food aid
is negatively associated with the number of natural disaster affected people in the
other SSA countries, and this association is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap F (KPF) statistic is larger than 10 in all specifications,
suggesting that our IV is not weak.
Emergency food aid and civil war incidence: Table 3.3 presents the estimated
coefficients for the effect of emergency food aid on civil war incidence. Here, both the
OLS and 2SLS estimates show that emergency food aid do not have a statistically
significant effect on the incidence of emergency civil war in the SSA. These results
are caused by weak IV, as Panel B shows that the instrument (the number of natural
disaster affected people in the other countries) is not only statistically significant for
emergency food aid (i.e. the endogenous variable), but also has the KP F-statistic
that exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (below which, there is evidence of weak
IV). Thus, there is again no statistical evidence that food aid from DAC countries
affects the incidence civil war in the SSA.
What do these results imply? Firstly, they raise questions about whether food
aid does have important effects on conflict, which is what Nunn and Qian (2014)
and Chu et al. (2017) have concluded. Secondly, if food aid only has weak effects
on conflict at best, then policymakers could continue to employ food aid as tool for
helping to fight hunger and suffering in developing countries.
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Food Aid on Civil War Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): Civil war incidence
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid 0.0011 0.0049 0.0049 0.0040
(0.0008) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0044)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disasters -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0017***
affected people in other countries 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 23.32 23.32 25.62
Controls:
Total damage Yes No No Yes
Total number of homeless people Yes No No Yes
Total deaths Yes No No Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes No Yes Yes
Instrumental variable No Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Observations 630 630 630 630
Pseudo R2 0.0466 0.0104 0.0104 0.0415
Note: Panel A shows the OLS and the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation.
Panel B shows the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for the 2SLS analysis. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.4.2 Robustness Checks
Table 3.4: Using the First Lag of Disaster Affected People as an IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): Civil conflict incidence Civil war incidence
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid 0.0023 0.0014 0.0062 0.0062
(0.0108) (0.0113) (0.0068) (0.0070)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
Lag of the number of natural disasters -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011***
affected people in other countries 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 10.29 9.69 10.28 9.69
Controls:
Total damage No Yes No Yes
Total number of homeless people No Yes No Yes
Total deaths No Yes No Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Observations 600 600 600 600
R2 0.1237 0.1266 0.1237 0.1266
Note: Panel A shows the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Panel B shows
the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for the 2SLS analysis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Lag of affected people in other countries as IV: In some cases, an increase
in emergency food aid demanded by other SSA countries may not immediately reduce
the amount of emergency food aid in the home country (due to pledges to give aid
and commitment purposes by donors). Therefore, the contemporaneous number of
foreign disaster affected people may only be weakly associated with the amount of
emergency food aid received.
As a robustness check, we use the previous year (i.e. t − 1) natural disaster
affected people in the other SSA countries as an IV for contemporaneous (period
t) emergency food aid and report the new 2SLS estimates in Table 3.4. Just
like our baseline estimates, Panel A shows that emergency food aid increases the
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incidence of civil conflict and civil war in the SSA; but the estimates are statistically
insignificant. Therefore, whether or not we use contemporaneous or lagged number
of foreign disaster affected people as an instrument does not overturn the statistical
insignificance of food aid on civil conflict.
Table 3.5: Controlling Lag of Conflict as an Additional Control Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): Civil conflict incidence Civil war incidence
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid 0.0028** -0.0010 0.0002 0.0024
(0.0014) (0.0077) (0.0008) (0.0046)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disaster -0.0016*** -0.0016***
affected people in other countries 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 22.477 21.967
Controls:
Lag dependent variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total damage Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total number of homeless people Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total deaths Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental variable No Yes No Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Observations 600 600 600 600
R2 0.2481 0.1450 0.3332 0.1543
Note: Panel A shows the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Panel B shows
the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for the 2SLS analysis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Controlling for lag conflict: Thus far, we have not controlled for the possibility
that civil conflict is persistent. Here, we control the fist lag of civil conflict to capture
the persistence and dynamics of conflict in the SSA. Table 3.5 presents the OLS
and the 2SLS estimates when the first lag of conflict is controlled for. The OLS
estimates show that emergency food aid increases civil conflict incidence but not civil
war incidence. However, when we address the endogeneity problem (Column (2) and
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Column (4)), emergency food aid has no statistically significant effect on both large
scale and small scale civil conflict. Therefore, the observed effect of food aid on
conflict in the baseline result is not an artifact of omitting the first lag of conflict in
the regression equations.
3.4.3 Falsification Tests
The basic identification assumption –that we employ to isolate the effect of food aid
on conflict– in our baseline result states that as the number of natural disaster affected
people in period t increases in other SSA countries, then the amount of emergency
food aid received by the unaffected or less favorite affected countries should shrink
in period t as these countries compete for food aid.
In this section, we present a falsification test to examine the validity of the
identification strategy. The idea is that if our identification strategy is correct, then
the effect of future natural disasters in other SSA countries should not affect the
amount of contemporaneous (period t) emergency food aid in the SSA. As such, we
employ the period t+1 and t+2 number of natural disaster affected people in the SSA
to instrument period t emergency food aid, and we expect the first stage regression
estimates on the IV’s coefficient to be statistically insignificant.
Table 3.6 reports the estimates for the falsification tests. Columns (1) and (2)
present the falsification tests when the number of affected people in t + 1 affected
people is used as instrument of contemporaneous emergency food aid. Columns (3)
and (4) report the estimates when the number of affected people in t + 2 is used
as an instrument instead. As the first stage estimates show, the effects of future
(i.e. period t+ 1 and t+ 2) natural disaster affected people do not have a statistical
significant effect on contemporaneous emergency food aid in the SSA. Moreover, the
estimated coefficients are also very small in magnitude. Hence, the falsification test
results provide some evidence on the validity of the identification strategy employed
for our baseline regression.
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Food Aid on Civil Conflict Incidence: Falsification Test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): Civil conflict incidence Civil war incidence
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid -0.0102 -0.0204 -0.0161 -0.0045
(0.0253) (0.0358) (0.0184) (0.0189)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid (t)
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disasters 0.0005 0.0004
affected people in other countries, (t+ 1) 0.0003 0.0003
The number of natural disasters 0.0004 0.0004
affected people in other countries, (t+ 2) 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 2.25 1.336 2.25 1.336
Controls:
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Observations 600 600 600 600
R2 0.1183 0.1182 0.1183 0.1182
Note: Panel A shows the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Panel B shows
the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for the 2SLS analysis. Centered R2 is reported for the
first stage regression of Panel B. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.4.4 Crowding Out Effects
Table 3.7: Food Aid and Conflict: Crowding Out Food Production and Import
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): Food import Cereal production
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid 0.0221* 0.0060 7628.909 -26880.48
(0.0119) (0.1043) (6473.161) (23287.14 )
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disaster -0.0015*** -0.0015***
affected people in other countries 0.0004 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 13.835 18.115
Controls:
Total damage Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total number of homeless people Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total deaths Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental variable No Yes No Yes
Number of countries 27 25 30 30
Observations 392 390 588 588
R2 0.0159 0.1450 0.0182 0.1540
Note: Panel A shows the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Panel B shows
the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for the 2SLS analysis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Food aid, cereal production and food import: Emergency food aid may affect
conflict by influencing domestic cereal production and food import. For example, the
quantity of food aid declines in a country if the effect of natural disasters increase in
the foreign country. Lower emergency food aid may increase food import or domestic
cereal production. As such, the availability of large quantity of food in the country
may intern reduce or increase (when food is used to finance military equipments)
domestic conflict. In order to check the effect of food aid on food import and food
production, we re-estimate Eq. (3.1) using OLS and 2SLS estimation techniques
where the dependent variable is replaced by food import and food production.
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Table 3.7 presents the estimated results. Except the OLS estimate in Column
(1), all the other coefficients are statistically insignificant. The statistically significant
estimate in Column (1) may be because of endogeneity problem (as a result of reverse
causality, omitted variable or measurement errors). When we address the endogeneity
problem using an instrumental variable (see Column (2)), the effect of food aid on food
import becomes statistically insignificant. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is also
greater than 10 for the two 2SLS regression models suggesting that our instrument is
not weak. Therefore, this implies that emergency aid may not crowd-out (crowd-in)
domestic cereal production and food import in the SSA.
Food aid and other forms of aid: Food aid may also affect civil conflict
by crowding-out other forms of aid such as official development assistance (ODA).
Several empirical studies have shown that foreign aid may increase (Grossman, 1992)
or decrease (De Ree and Nillesen, 2009) the risk of civil conflict in the aid recipient
countries. As such, foreign aid may increase or decrease the incidence of conflict if it
is crowded out by food aid. We test the effect of food aid on ODA from the 29 DAC
countries and U.S. as well as on net ODA from all donor countries.
The estimated 2SLS results are reported in Table 3.8. As the estimated coefficients
in Panel A illustrate, emergency food aid does not have any statistically significant
effect on ODA from different donor countries. This suggests that food aid does not
have a crowding-out effect on other forms of aid. As such, our baseline results (in
Table 3.2 and 3.3) are not driven by factors other than emergency food aid from the
29 DAC countries.
3.4.5 Additional Robustness Checks
Alternative sample: Up to now our analysis focuses on all the 30 sample SSA
countries. However, observing Figure 3.3, we notice that some outlier countries
might have derived our baseline results. For example, the relationship between
emergency food aid and foreign disaster affected people looks positive for Sudan
which contradicts our identification assumption between the two variables. Hence,
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Table 3.8: Food Aid and Conflict: Crowding Out Other Forms of Foreign Aid
(1) (2) (3)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): U.S. ODA Other DAC ODA Net ODA
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid 3402437 -4648318 403444.4
(2721117) (11600000) (15800000)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disaster -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015***
affected people in other countries 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 17.694 17.694 18.206
Controls:
Total damage Yes Yes Yes
Total number of homeless people Yes Yes Yes
Total deaths Yes Yes Yes
GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country specific time trend Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30
Observations 573 573 590
R2 0.1525 0.1525 0.1540
Note: Panel A shows the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Panel B shows
the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for the 2SLS analysis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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we check the sensitivity of the baseline results by excluding Sudanese data from the
analysis. Table 3.9 presents the estimated results. Observing our preferred two-stage
estimates in Column (2) and Column (4) show that emergency food aid does not
have a statistically significant effect on both civil conflict and civil war incidence in
the SSA. Hence, there is no evidence that our baseline results (Table 3.2 and 3.3) are
driven by outliers in the dataset.
Table 3.9: Using Alternative Sample Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): Civil conflict incidence Civil war incidence
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid 0.0019 -0.00033 0.0024*** 0.0032
(0.0015) (0.0068) (0.0009) (0.0040)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disaster -0.0018*** -0.00176***
affected people in other countries 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 29.261 29.261
Controls:
Total damage Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total number of homeless people Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total deaths Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumental variable No Yes No Yes
Number of countries 29 29 29 29
Observations 609 609 609 609
R2 0.0431 0.1527 0.0512 0.1527
Note: Panel A shows the second stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. Panel B shows the
first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimation. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4.6 Spatial Conflict Spillover in sub-Saharan Africa
So far, we do not consider civil conflict spillover from one country to its neighbor as
the sub-Saharan African countries are assumed to be interdependent of each other
in terms of spreading conflict. However, several anecdotal accounts show that civil
conflict has a tendency to spillover from one country to the other (Bosker and de Ree,
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2014). The main channels for the cross-country spillover of conflict are refuge inflows,
high degree of ethnic separation (which tends to increase the creation of alliances
among armed groups who are located in different countries), poor institutional
environment and the presence of abundance natural resource stock (Carmignani and
Kler, 2016a). As these channels are pervasive in the SSA, conflict spillover is likely
to be more frequent and persistent in the SSA than elsewhere (Carmignani and
Kler, 2016a,b; Bosker and de Ree, 2014). Despite these explanations, several SSA
countries also experience higher risk of civil conflict independent of what happens in
their neighbor (see e.g. Gleditsch, 2007) making the strength of civil conflict spillover
ambiguous.
To consider the spatial dimension of war and to test the sensitivity of our baseline
results for spatial conflict contagion, we include a spatially lagged dependent variable
that captures the spatial spillover of conflict among SSA countries on the right hand
side of Eq. (3.1) and (3.2). Hence, following Carmignani and Kler (2016b), our
spatial-lag second stage regression equation is specified as:
Conflictit = ρWyConflictit + β(FoodAid)it +XitΓ + ϕt + ψi + µit (3.3)
Where Conflictit is an indicator variable which equals to 1 in country i and period t
if 25-1000 battle related deaths are recorded for civil conflict incidence or if more than
1000 battle related deaths are recorded for civil war incidence; and 0 otherwise. ρ
denotes the coefficient of the spatial-lag variable, Wy represents the spatial weighting
matrix for country i and lag year y and hence describe the spatial dependent structure.
Therefore, WyConflictit represents the year y spatially lagged conflict spillover on
country i and period t, where i 6= j. We follow Kondo (2017) to construct spatial
weighting matrix and to generate the spatial lagged variables. We generate the
first order and the second order spatially lagged conflict measures of civil conflict
incidence and civil war incidence. Appendix (B) presents the Moran scatter plots that
visualize the relationship between Conflictit and WyConflictit. The plots show a
strong positive correlation between Conflictit and W2Conflictit but the relationship
between Conflictit and W1Conflictit is very weak.
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Table 3.10: Food Aid and Conflict (War) Incidence: with Spatial Interdependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (Panel A): Conflict War Conflict War
Panel A: Second-stage estimates
Emergency food aid -0.0011 0.0041 -0.0061 0.0061
(0.0071) (0.0043) (0.0069) (0.0039)
Spatial lag of incidence (t− 1) 0.0036 0.0422
(0.0459) (0.0483)
Spatial lag of incidence (t− 2) 0.3881*** 0.5235***
(0.0474) (0.0449)
Dependent Variable Emergency Food Aid
Panel B: First-stage estimates
The number of natural disasters -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017***
affected people in other countries 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 26.069 25.617 24.679 25.549
Controls:
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
Observations 630 630 630 630
R2 0.1475 0.1470 0.1483 0.1467
Note: Panel A and Panel B show the second and the first stage estimates of the 2SLS
estimation. Other controls include total deaths, total homeless and total damage in the country.
Kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are used for
the 2SLS analysis. Centered R2 is reported for the first stage regression of Panel B. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.10 presents the estimated results. In Columns (1) and (3), we control
the first and the second spatial lags of civil conflict incidence, respectively. Whereas
in Columns (2) and (4), we control the first and the second spatial lags of civil
war incidence, respectively. We also control all the potential covariates that may
affect the incidence of conflict. As Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A show the first
spatial lag conflict measures do not have a statistically significant effect on the risk
of contemporaneous civil conflict (civil war) incidence. On the contrary, Columns
(3) and (4) demonstrates that the second spatial lags of conflict has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the incidence of contemporaneous conflict suggesting
conflicts in the neighboring country spillovers after two years. However, despite
the large positive and statistically significant effect of the spatial second lag conflict
measures; the sign, the magnitude and the statistical significance of the emergency
food aid coefficients are close to the baseline estimates. Hence, the estimates that we
find in the baseline tables (i.e. Table 3.2 and 3.3) are not an artifact of omitting the
spatial interdependence of conflict among the SSA countries.
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3.5 Conclusion
Emergency food aid is provided to alleviative hunger and suffering in poor countries.
However, the effectiveness of food is questioned in recent years in achieving its
objective. Food aid is also accused to increase conflict incidence when provided
to conflict prone developing countries. This paper investigates the causal effect of
emergency food aid on civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. We find evidence that
food aid from DAC countries (except U.S. food aid) does not exacerbate civil conflict
in the SSA. The findings suggest that humanitarian aid is still a useful international
policy tool to alleviate hunger and suffering in disaster affected developing countries.
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Appendix A: List of Donor and Recipient Countries
Table A1: The List of Development Assistant Committee (DAC) Donor Countries
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Czech Republic Denmark Finland France
Germany Greece Hungary Iceland
Ireland Italy Japan Korea
Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway
Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia
Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom
Note: As noted, we exclude U.S. in our analysis. Our study covers the period between 1995 and
2015.
Table A2: The List of Aid Recipient Sample sub-Saharan African Countries
Algeria Angola Burundi Cameroon
Central Africa R. Chad Congo D.R. Congo
Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia
Guinea Guinea-Bissau Ivory Coast Kenya
Lesotho Liberia Libya Mali
Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigeria
Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia
Sudan Uganda
Note: The sample aid recipient countries of the study are chosen based on the availability of data.
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Appendix B: Moran Scatter Plot of Conflict
Incidence
Figure 3.5: Moran’s Scatter Plot - Civil Conflict Incidence
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Figure 3.6: Moran’s Scatter Plot - civil War Incidence
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Chapter 4
Is Inflation Targeting or the Fixed
Exchange Rate More Effective for
Attracting FDI into Developing
Countries?
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This paper investigates which monetary policy regime –inflation targeting or the
fixed exchange rate– is more effective for attracting FDI inflows into developing
countries. Using propensity score matching and the difference-in-differences
estimator, we find no evidence that adopting an inflation targeting regime would be
more effective than adopting a fixed exchange rate, and vice-versa, in encouraging
FDI inflows.
Key Words: Inflation Targeting, Fixed Exchange Rate, FDI
JEL Codes: C21, E52, E58, F21, F31
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4.1 Introduction
There is some concern that the uncertainty of economic policy – in particular, of
monetary policy – may lead to less inward FDI into developing countries (Rodrik
(1991), Pindyck (1991), and Wang et al. (2014)).1 To reduce this uncertainty, many
countries have turned to targeting inflation or adopting a fixed exchange rate as
their monetary policy regime. Although there is evidence that both are effective
for encouraging inward FDI,2 whether or not one policy is more effective than the
other is unclear. Having some guidance on this issue is especially important from
the perspective of a developing country seeking to commit itself to one policy regime
over the other.
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating which policy regime
– inflation targeting or the fixed exchange rate – is more effective for attracting
FDI inflows into developing countries. The main estimation issue here arises
from the possibility that the policy regimes adopted by countries could be
self-selected. To address this issue, we implement propensity score matching and
the difference-in-differences estimator. We find no evidence that inflation targeting
or the fixed exchange rate is more effective than the other in encouraging FDI inflows.
4.2 Data
This study uses a panel data on 46 developing countries (listed in Table A1 of the
Appendix) that adopt either inflation targeting or a fixed exchange rate between 1990
to 2006. Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics of the variables that are used in
this study.
1Developing countries here mostly refer to middle income counties but not lower income or least
developing countries.
2See, for example, Abbott et al. (2012) for fixed exchange rates and Tapsoba (2012) for inflation
targeting.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Inflation targeting 0.139 0.346 0 1 850
Exchange rate targeting 0.567 0.496 0 1 818
FDI (% of GDP) 3.379 3.943 -2.757 36.072 768
Trade openness 83.409 59.05 13.753 430.358 808
Broad money growth 48.091 279.34 -45.473 6384.916 784
Real GDP per-capita 5429.592 5315.048 464.871 31514.371 796
Country size 0.402 0.664 0 5.22 797
CBG turnover rate 0.192 0.394 0 1 814
Fiscal balance -0.973 4.119 -18.402 20.338 443
Financial openness 0.483 0.351 0 1 774
School enrollment 77.192 19.029 20.381 109.177 681
Taxes (% of revenue) 21.624 12.236 1.598 64.302 471
Political constraint 0.334 0.198 0 0.688 825
Government expenditure 14.58 5.046 2.976 29.996 794
Mobile subscriptions 18.476 28.6 0 145.677 850
Telephone subscriptions 18.485 12.983 0.588 57.463 850
Inflation rate 62.09 386.745 -4.023 7481.664 744
4.3 Methodology
Without loss of generality, we consider inflation targeting as the treatment. To
estimate the treatment effect (of inflation targeting) on FDI, we need to address
the issue of self-selection by countries into the inflation targeting or fixed exchange
rate regime. If this self-selection can be modeled as the dependence of the regime
choice on certain observable covariates and time invariant unobservable factors that
matter for FDI, we may address this issue by implementing propensity score matching
(PSM) and the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator.
The PSM approach addresses the issue of self-selection that arises from the
correlation between the policy choice and the country’s observed characteristics.
The validity of this approach depends on satisfying the conditional independence
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assumption (CIA), which states that conditioning on certain observables as
summarized by the propensity score, a country’s unobservable characteristics are
orthogonal to its policy choice. To implement the PSM approach, we estimate the
probability (i.e. the propensity score) that a country adopts a certain policy regime
conditional on a set of observables:
P (Yit = 1|Zit) = Φ(γ ′Zit) (4.1)
where Yit is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if country i adopts an inflation
targeting regime in period t and 0 if it adopts a fixed exchange rate regime, Zit is a set
of observables that may affect country i’s probability of choosing to target inflation
over a fixed exchange rate, and Φ is the standard normal cdf .
Next, we use the estimated propensity scores to match countries that adopt
inflation targeting (the treated group) with countries that adopt a fixed exchange
rate (the comparison group), so that if the CIA assumption holds, the treatment (i.e.
inflation targeting) will be as good as randomly assigned. In this paper, we apply
three different techniques – nearest-neighbor, kernel, and stratification – to match the
two sets of countries. Following which, we calculate the average treatment effect of
inflation targeting as the difference in the means of FDI inflows between the inflation
targeting and fixed exchange rate countries.
Besides the PSM approach, we employ the DiD estimator to estimate if on average,
the adoption of inflation targeting would generate larger FDI inflows than if a fixed
exchange rate was adopted. This is achieved by estimating
FDIit = βInflation Targetingit + δ
′Xit + µi + µt + εit (4.2)
where FDIit is the net FDI of country i in year t as a percentage of GDP (used
throughout our empirical analysis), Xit is a vector containing the set of FDI
determinants, µi and µt represent the country and year fixed effects respectively.
The treatment effect of inflation targeting is captured by the coefficient (β) on
Inflation Targetingit, where Inflation Targetingit is equal to 1 if country i adopts
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inflation targeting in time t and 0 if otherwise (i.e. adopts a fixed exchange rate).
We follow the literature in choosing the benchmark covariates Zit and Xit for
the PSM and DiD approaches respectively, although we have found that our main
conclusion is unaffected by using the same set of covariates for both approaches as
well.3 All the variables used here, their definitions, and source are listed in Table A2
of the Appendix.
Table 4.2: Probit Estimates of the Likelihood of Adopting Inflation Targeting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmark (+) CBG (+) Fiscal (+) Financial (−) Hyper-
Covariates Model Turnover Rate Balance Openness Inflation Episodes
Inflation Lag −6.289∗∗∗ −6.308∗∗∗ −14.511∗∗∗ −13.556∗∗∗ −13.556∗∗∗
(2.177) (2.188) (4.125) (4.064) (4.064)
Trade Openness −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.006∗ −0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Broad Money Growth −0.027∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.024∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Real GDP Per-Capita 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country Size 0.201∗ 0.197∗ 1.373∗∗∗ 1.296∗∗∗ 1.296∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.106) (0.277) (0.284) (0.284)
CBG Turnover Rate −0.132 −0.215 −0.244 −0.244
(0.251) (0.337) (0.340) (0.340)
Fiscal Balance −0.127∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Financial Openness −0.499 −0.499
(0.453) (0.453)
Constant 0.092 0.133 −0.372 −0.247 −0.247
(0.309) (0.314) (0.451) (0.457) (0.457)
Observations 407 397 247 244 241
Pseudo R2 0.310 0.307 0.440 0.442 0.439
Standard errors in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.4 Results
4.4.1 The Propensity Scores Matching Estimates
Column (1) of Table 4.2 reports the effect that various observable characteristics
have on a country’s likelihood of choosing to target inflation (as opposed to a fixed
3See, for example, Lin and Ye (2012) and Tapsoba (2012) for a discussion on the covariates choice
for the two approaches. We have also tried using the same set of covariates for Zit and Xit for both
PSM and DiD approaches, e.g. all the covariates found in Column (4) of Table 1 and Column (4)
of Table 3, and found that our main conclusion about the effectiveness of inflation targeting versus
adopting a fixed exchange rate for attracting FDI remains the same.
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exchange rate).4 We find that the probability of adopting inflation targeting reduces
with inflation, trade openness, and broad money growth, but increases with real GDP
per-capita and country size.
Table 4.3 reports the matching estimates of the treatment effect of inflation
targeting on FDI. For the benchmark model, this effect is statistically insignificant
regardless of the matching techniques used. As a robustness check, we vary the set
of covariates used in constructing the propensity scores by adding to the benchmark
covariates, CBG (Central Bank Governor) turnover rate, fiscal balance and financial
openness in a successive manner. Following which, we omit hyperinflation episodes
and find that in all instances, the treatment effect of inflation targeting (over adopting
a fixed exchange rate) remains statistically insignificant for FDI.
Table 4.3: Matching Estimates of the Treatment Effect of Inflation Targeting on
FDI
Matching Methods
Nearest Neighbor Kernel Stratification
Matching Matching Matching
Benchmark Model −0.996 0.107 0.203
(0.817) (0.456) (0.526)
(+) CBG Turnover rate −0.138 0.140 0.114
(0.787) (0.464) (0.499)
(+) Fiscal Balance 0.331 0.458 0.768
(0.919) (0.793) (0.725)
(+) Financial Openness −0.333 0.622 0.470
(1.108) (0.754) (0.753)
Exclude Hyperinflation Episodes −0.333 0.622 0.470
(1.076) (0.701) (0.775)
Bootstrap standard errors are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.4.2 The Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Column (1) of Table 4.4 reports the benchmark DiD result and finds that the
coefficient on Inflation Targeting is statistically insignificant. Hence, once again, there
is no evidence that inflation targeting would outperform the fixed exchange rate in
attracting FDI. In addition, as Columns (2)-(4) show, the statistical insignificance of
4We have checked that covariates are balanced across treatment and comparison groups.
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inflation targeting is not sensitive to varying the set of control variables, even if these
control variables matter for FDI. Therefore, the problem of omitted variable bias,
even if it exists, is unlikely to be so severe that it overturns our main finding – i.e.
inflation targeting is not more effective than fixing the exchange rate for encouraging
FDI inflows.
Table 4.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Treatment Effect of Inflation
Targeting on FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Net FDI (% of GDP)
Inflation Targeting 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade Openness 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Per-Capita GDP Growth 0.022 0.019 0.035 0.136l
(0.062) (0.059) (0.069) (0.086)
School Enrollment 0.010 0.009 0.023 0.017
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Taxes -0.049** -0.049** -0.057*** -0.050**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
Political Constraint -3.962*** -4.079*** -3.771*** -2.806**
(1.405) (1.239) (1.280) (1.305)
Government Expenditure 0.064 0.062 0.055 0.068
(0.063) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066)
Financial Openness 2.814*** 2.747*** 2.719*** 2.246***
(0.742) (0.741) (0.781) (0.823)
Mobile Subscriptions 0.004 0.012 0.023
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019)




Constant 2.993 2.975 2.289 0.957
(1.935) (1.957) (2.054) (2.072)
N 226 226 226 209
R2 0.409 0.409 0.414 0.426
Bootstrap standard errors are in the parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.5 Conclusion
Although there is evidence that countries can encourage FDI inflows by targeting
inflation or adopting a fixed exchange rate, it is unknown if one policy is more effective
than the other. We offer some clarification on this issue by showing that as long as
one of these policies is pursued, there is no perceivable advantage in adopting inflation
targeting over a fixed exchange rate (and vice-versa) for attracting FDI.
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Table A1: List of Countries
Inflation Targeting Countries
Brazil Chile Colombia Czech Republic Hungary
Israel Korea Mexico Peru Philippines
Poland South Africa Thailand
Fixed Exchange Rate Countries
Algeria Argentina Belarus Bulgaria Cape Verde
China Costa Rica Croatia Dominican Republic Egypt
Estonia Georgia Guatemala Hong Kong Indonesia
Iran Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Latvia
Lebanon Lithuania Mauritius Morocco Paraguay
Russia Slovak Slovenia Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia
Ukraine Uruguay Venezuela
Note: Countries classified under Fixed Exchange Rate Countries adopted a fixed exchange rate
throughout the sample period (1990 to 2006). Countries under Inflation Targeting Countries
adopted the inflation targeting regime for one year or more during the sample period.
104
Table A2: Variable Definitions and Their Sources
Variable Definition Source
Broad Money Growth Annual broad money WDI
growth
CBG Turnover Rate Central bank governor Dreher et al. (2008)
turnover rate
Country Size GDP as a percentage WDI
of world GDP
FDI Net foreign direct (% of GDP) WDI
investment flows
Financial Openness An index of Chinn and Ito (2007)
financial openness
Fiscal Balance Cash surplus/ deficit WDI
(% of GDP)
Government Expenditure Government expenditure WDI
(% of GDP)
Inflation Lag The first order lag WDI
of ln(1+CPI inflation/100)
Inflation Targeting An inflation targeting Goncalves and Salles (2008)
dummy
Mobile Subscriptions Mobile cellular subscriptions WDI
(per 100 people)
Per-capita GDP Growth Annual growth rate of WDI
GDP per-capita
Political Constraint Index measuring POLCON Database
political constraints
School Enrollment Gross secondary WDI
school enrollment rate
Taxes Taxes on income, profits WDI
and capital (% of revenue)
Telephone Subscriptions Fixed telephone subscriptions WDI
(per 100 people)
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It is argued that landlocked countries are usually less developed due to
landlockedness being a significant barrier to trade. Empirically, however, there is
little evidence on how large the causal effect of landlockedness is, as exogenous
variations in landlockedness useful for addressing this question are rare. In this
paper, we exploit a novel natural experiment when Ethiopia’s became a de facto
landlocked country following a conflict with Eritrea in 1998. Because landlockedness
primarily affects land and sea freight than air freight, this “closing in” of Ethiopia
should affect the trade of bulky, low-valued goods more strongly than the trade
of light, high-valued goods. To estimate the effect of landlockedness, we employ
two approaches: the triple difference-in-differences approach and the synthetic
control approach. The triple difference-in-differences approach enables us to use
a span of fixed effects to identify the “treatment” effect of landlockedness on
trade. The synthetic control approach provides us with a data-driven method
to obtain a control group that mirrors Ethiopia’s pre-intervention trend as
closely as possible. Our empirical results reveal that landlockedness has a large
negative impact on Ethiopia’s exports and imports: on average, being landlocked
reduces Ethiopia’s ocean-borne exports and imports by about 43-80% and 67-71%,
respectively. We also find that the landlockedness shock has a persistent effect on
trade, suggesting that the negative influence of landlockedness is not easily overcome.
Key Words: Landlockedness, Trade Cost, Ethiopia, Triple-difference Approach
JEL Codes: C21, F14, F15, O10, P33
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5.1 Introduction
It is well-known that landlocked countries tend to be less developed than their coastal
neighbors. One explanation is that landlockedness is a significant barrier to trade,
which stifles the development of countries with landlocked geography (Raballand,
2003; Faye et al., 2004; Arvis et al., 2010). For example, among developing countries,
landlocked developing countries have only a third of the import share of coastal
developing countries (World Bank, 1998), and they export less than half of the
per-capita volume of their coastal counterparts (Faye et al., 2004). Consequently,
they do not trade as much, landlocked developing countries usually have lower levels
of socio-economic development as well. Currently, about half the population in these
countries live on less than US$2 per day and about 1 in 10 newborns are not expected
to live past the age of five.
Given the poverty levels faced by many landlocked developing countries,
economists have sought to understand how serious and persistent the problem of
landlockedness might be. Unfortunately, this issue is also an extremely difficult
one to shed light on. Although landlocked developing countries tend to be poorer,
it is unclear if this is due to landlockedness itself, other geographical attributes,
unobserved institutions that are somehow correlated with landlocked geography, or
other factors. Currently, research on the effects of landlockedness are mostly carried
by estimating the coefficient on the landlocked dummy in cross-country regressions
with cross-sectional data (e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001; Raballand, 2003; Coulibaly
and Fontagné, 2006; World Bank, 2014). This estimated coefficient, as researchers
have acknowledged, may not reflect the causal effect of landlockedness, since it could
be confounded by the effects of other time-invariant country characteristics (Carrere
and Grigoriou, 2008; Paudel et al., 2014). Although these confounding effects could
be eliminated by employing panel regressions with country fixed effects, the trouble is
that landlockedness is itself time-invariant. Thus, its effect will be purged by country
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fixed effects along with other time-invariant confounders.1 Consequently, even though
it is intuitive that landlockedness adversely affects trade, there are no causal estimates
to show how serious (or not) this problem actually is.
In this paper, we provide the first natural experimental evidence on the causality
and persistence of the effect of landlockedness on trade. Our natural experiment
comes from the sudden transition of Ethiopia from a de-facto coastal country to a
de facto landlocked one in 1998. Eritrea had been a province of Ethiopia.2 In 1991,
however, pro-independence rebel forces initiated combat and defeated the Ethiopian
forces, and Eritrea’s independence was secured following a referendum two years
later. Despite the de jure separation, there was a protocol of understanding between
the government of Ethiopia and the newly-formed state of Eritrea for Ethiopia’s
free and unrestricted use of the Eritrean port of Assab (IMF, 1997; Faye et al.,
2004; Briggs and Blatt, 2009; Connell and Killion, 2010). As stated under the
intergovernmental transit and port service agreement and customs arrangement of
the protocol of understanding, both governments had agreed that Ethiopia would be
granted continued free access to the port of Assab with its own customs branch office.
Under this agreement, Ethiopia’s imports and exports through the port of Assab,
which accounted for 95 percent of the country’s trade throughput (Briggs and Blatt,
2009; Connell and Killion, 2010), were exempted from Eritrean customs duties and
related charges (IMF, 1997). As such, even though Ethiopia was de jure landlocked,
the port of Assab was practically a de facto Ethiopian port within Eritrea.3
This arrangement, however, fell apart in 1998 when war broke out between Eritrea
and Ethiopia due to border related issues.4 The escalation of this border-dispute had
“taken everybody by surprise, including Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi”
1To quantify the impact of landlockedness, existing studies typically use a time invariant dummy
variable – an indicator of landlockedness - that takes a value of one if a country is landlocked.
However, the country fixed effect will partial out the time invariant landlocked indicator, causing
the effect of landlockedness to be unidentified.
2Eritrea was a colony of Italy from 1998-1941. Following the independence from Italy, British
took over the administration from 1941-1952. Eritrea become an autonomous region of Ethiopian
and become again province of Ethiopia in 1952 and 1961 respectively.
3Ethiopia was a de jure landlocked country with coastal access since 1993, but a de facto coastal
country until 1998.
4Both countries disputed over the control of the border town of Badme.
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(Abbink, 1998). Due to this conflict, the port of Assab, which is Ethiopia’s main
commercial outlet to the world, was immediately closed. From that moment on,
Ethiopia became truly landlocked. Besides Ethiopia, no other sovereign states in
modern times had gone from being a coastal to a landlocked country.
Empirically, we employ two estimation methods to study the treatment
effect of landlockedness on trade for Ethiopia. First, we employ a triple
difference-in-differences (DDD) approach to estimate the impact of landlockedness
on the bilateral trade of Ethiopia within a gravity model. Our triple-differencing
approach exploits three sources of variation: country variation (landlocked
country–Ethiopia– and coastal country–Kenya), product variation (bulky oceanborne
freight and light airborne freight) and time variation (before and after “de facto”
landlockedness).5 To estimate our gravity model, we used 13 years disaggregated
bilateral trade data of the treated and the control countries along with more than
30 common major trading partners of the two countries. The data ranges from 1993
to 2005. In addition, to address the sensitivity of gravity model to the number
of variables included in the regression,6 we control a large set of exporter-year,
exporter-product and product-year fixed effects (Magee, 2008; Cheong et al., 2017).
Second, we employ the synthetic control approach to study the impact of
landlockedness on the aggregate exports and imports of Ethiopia. This method
enables us to obtain a data-driven counterfactual, known as a synthetic control,
as a weighted average of all the coastal countries in Africa for which data are
available.7 Unlike the conventional approach of choosing a single comparison
group, the weighting of the potential control groups (i.e. other coastal African
countries) enables the weighted average, which is the synthetic control, to achieve
5We define the export of four major ocean-borne products including coffee, leather, vegetable
and hide & skin as ‘treated’ and airborne–gold–as ‘control’ commodity. Similarly, we define twelve
major ocean-borne imports as ‘treated’ and airborne – medicine and pharmaceutical—as ‘control’
products
6According to Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008), gravity model is sensitive to the
number of variables included in the regression.
7We use 34 coastal countries altogether to construct the synthetic control. The list of coastal
African countries are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo
Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Arab Republic of Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, The
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Africa, Tanzania, Togo and Tunisia.
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a pre-intervention trend that mirrors Ethiopia’s even more closely (See, for example,
Abadie et al., 2010; Cheong et al., 2017). More importantly, the synthetic control
is data-driven, in the sense that the weights used to construct it are not arbitrarily
imposed, but are chosen (based on some loss criteria) so that its characteristics and
those of Ethiopia are as similar to each others’ as possible.
Our empirical results show that Ethiopia’s export and import products are
strongly affected by landlockedness. Specifically, landlockedness on average reduces
Ethiopian’s exports of coffee, leather, crude vegetable and hide & skin by about 43%,
49%, 80% and 72%, respectively. In addition, it reduces Ethiopian’s ocean-borne
imported goods, such as petroleum, fuel and fertilizer, by 71%, 68.6% and 66.9%,
respectively. These large reported effects are robust to various robustness checks,
such as placebo test and sub-sample analysis.
To further investigate how persistent the negative effect of landlockedness is, we
estimate the size of the treatment effects across years. We find that the effect of
landlockedness on Ethiopia’s export and import products is not short-lived, but is
persistent, to the extent this effect is stronger further down the years for certain goods.
The synthetic control method also provides evidence that after the landlockedness
shock, there is an increasing divergence between the aggregate exports and imports
of Ethiopia and those of the synthetic control. As such, the negative effect of
landlockedness on trade is not merely a level effect, but also has an effect on slowing
down trade relative to the counterfactual.
Our work is most closely related to the literature that looks at the effect of
geographical barriers on trade, especially landlockedness, on the export and import.
For example, Radelet and Sachs (1998) studied the effect of geographical isolation and
shipping cost on manufactured export and found that the manufacturing exports of
landlocked countries are significantly lower than that of coastal countries. Similarly,
Limao and Venables (2001), Raballand (2003), Coulibaly and Fontagné (2006),
Carrere and Grigoriou (2008), Paudel et al. (2014) and World Bank (2014) argued
that landlockedness had a negative impact on trade. To estimate the effect of
landlockedness, they estimated the coefficient on a time-invariant landlocked country
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dummy contained in a cross-sectional cross-country regression. The problem with
these results is that they lack a causal interpretation, since it is not possible to
disentangle the effects of landlockedness from the effects of other time-invariant
country factors, as country fixed effects will partial all of them out. Our work
overcomes these issues by providing the first natural experimental evidence on the
effects of landlockedness that are estimated from a panel model with a rich fixed
effects structure.
Our work is also broadly related to the literature that studies the relationship
between trade cost and international trade. Trade economists have long been
concerned about the source of trade costs and how they affect trade. A vast
literature has attempted to estimate the causal effects of policy barriers (tariffs and
non-tariff barriers), transportation (freight costs, time costs), and the effects of the
costs associated with the use of different currencies on exports and imports (see
Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004; Disdier and Head, 2008; Christ and Ferrantino,
2011; Djankov et al., 2010; Hummels and Schaur, 2013; Silva and Tenreyro, 2010).
In this regard, our paper speaks to this literature by establishing results on the effect
of landlockedness, which is a geographical barrier of trade.
The reminder part of the paper is structured as follows. Section (5.2) provides
the historical background information about how Ethiopia becomes landlocked in
1998. Section (5.3) discusses the model specification and the estimation method of
the study. Section (5.4) describes our data sources and the descriptive statistics of
the key variables. Section (5.5) presents the main findings as well as the various
robustness checks of the paper; and finally section (5.7) concludes.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Ethiopia’s Access to the Port of Assab
The port of Assab had been Ethiopia’s main gateway to the global market. Since the
early 1980s, infrastructure additions and reconstructions had been made to improve
the port. These included the widening of its harbor, the addition of warehouses
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Table 5.1: Time-line for the Independence of Eritrea and the Border War with
Ethiopia.
1991 · · · · · ·•
Ethiopian rebels and
Eritrea defeat the central
government of Ethiopia.
1993 · · · · · ·• Eritrea becomes
independent state.
1998 · · · · · ·•
Eritrean-Ethiopian border
war and Ethiopia become
de facto landlocked.
2000 · · · · · ·• End of Eritrean
Ethiopian war.
and container berth, the construction of shipyards with ship building capabilities,
and the expansion of road transportation infrastructure with the assistance of World
Bank, African Development Bank, Norway and China (Fair, 1988). The port had a
well-functioning transportation infrastructure, and was connected by 624 km highway
to Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. At some point in time, it had even
accounted for 95 percent of the country’s main ocean-borne export and import cargo
throughput (Connell and Killion, 2010; Murphy et al., 2013).8
Up to the early 1990s, Ethiopia had sovereignty over Assab. However, this changed
when the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF ) and Ethiopian rebel forces from
secessionist and dissident groups initiated combat against Ethiopia to establish their
full independence and shared government power. After three decades of war against
successive governments of Ethiopia, the EPLF and Ethiopian rebel forces defeated
the Ethiopian central government forces in 1991 (see the time-line in Table 5.1). The
defeat of the then government of Ethiopia was followed by a successful referendum
for independence among the people of Eritrea, which led to Eritrea’s independence in
27 April,1993 (Pool, 1993). Because all of Ethiopia’s coastline are located in Eritrea,
8Until the federation of Eritrea in 1952, Ethiopia was landlocked country. Its routes to external
world was the 780 km railway from Djibouti constructed in 1917. Following federation and then
annexation of Eritrea, Ethiopia became a coastal country until 1998.
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Ethiopia became de jure landlocked and thus lost sovereignty over Assab when Eritrea
declared independence.
However, notwithstanding the loss of its coastline, Ethiopia did not become
de facto landlocked. This is because there was an agreement (a protocol of
understanding) between the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the
state of Eritrea for Ethiopia’s free and unrestricted use of the port of Assab. As
stated under an intergovernmental transit and port service agreement and customs
arrangement, both governments agreed that Ethiopia would be granted continued free
access to the port of Assab with its own Ethiopian customs branch office, and the
imports and exports of Ethiopia would remain exempt from Eritrean customs duties
and related charges (IMF, 1997; Faye et al., 2004; Connell and Killion, 2010). Thus,
the port of Assab was used almost exclusively for export-import trade to Ethiopia’s
capital city Addis Ababa, the population of Assab was predominantly Ethiopian, the
telecommunication system was connected with Ethiopia, and the economy of Assab
was entirely built on businesses from Ethiopia (Connell and Killion, 2010).9 As such,
Assab essentially remained an Ethiopian town within Eritrea.
5.2.2 Eritrean-Ethiopian War and the Landlockedness of
Ethiopia
This arrangement over the use of port of Assab fell apart on May 6, 1998 when
Ethiopia and Eritrea went into war over a border dispute. From then on, the
port of Assab was immediately closed to Ethiopia and the country became de facto
landlocked. With the “closing in” of Ethiopia, it is now the most populous landlocked
country in the world, with a population size fast approaching 100 million. Since
becoming de facto landlocked in 1998, Ethiopia’s has redirected its trading routes to
a neighboring country, Djibouti, which now handles the great majority of Ethiopia’s
trade. Unlike trading through the port of Assab, Ethiopia’s trade flow is subjected
to fees for using the sea ports of other countries and to other related costs associated
9Morvover, Port of Assab was purchased by Rubattinio shopping company, Italian company, in
1869 from two Ethiopian sultans prior to the establishment of Eritrea as a region. Hence, Port of
Assab can be considered as historical property of Ethiopia.
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with the crossing of another sovereign country (Lorton, 2000; Begashaw, 2008).
As discussed, we are primarily interested in the impact that landlockedness might
have on development, with trade as the key focus here. Why, then, do we look towards
Ethiopia to address this question? Firstly, Ethiopia is the only sovereign country in
modern times that had been both coastal and landlocked. Secondly, the availability
of trade data before and after the landlockedness for Ethiopia (without Eritrea)
enables us to study the causal effect of landlockedness on trade with Ethiopia as an
example. Finally, the timing of Ethiopia’s de facto landlockedness was unanticipated:
not only did Ethiopia become de facto landlocked, the circumstance that led to its
landlockedness caught “everybody by surprise” (Abbink, 1998).10 Thus, from an
econometric perspective, the landlockedness of Ethiopia was a plausibly exogenous
shock, which we could use to identify the causal effect of landlockedness.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical framework estimates the impact of landlockedness on trade using the
gravity model. In its simplest form, the traditional gravity model assumes that trade
flows between country i and country j are positively related with the economic size of
the two countries and negatively related with their distance.11 The most widely used
standard gravity equation comes from Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). They
show that besides economic size and distance, multilateral resistance terms could
also determine trade flows between countries, and these can be controlled for by
exporter and importer fixed effects. In this study, we augment the Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003) gravity model by adding an indicator variable that measures
the effect of landlockedness on trade, and then apply a triple difference-in-differences
10Abbink (1998) wrote that The violent Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute which erupted on May
6 1998 has taken everybody by surprise, including Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi.
11Theoretical explanation for the gravity model are provided by (Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1998)
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estimation approach.12 Thus, we estimate the following equation:
Tijkt = exp(β1 Treati ∗Bulkyk ∗ Postt + µit + µik + µkt)εijkt (5.1)
where Tijkt is either the 3-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)
level of import or export flow from country i to country j at time t; Treat is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 for Ethiopia and 0 for Kenya; Bulky is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 for bulky (ocean freight goods) and 0 for light goods that
are transported by air freight; Post is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after 1998
and 0 otherwise. Following the recent literature on gravity models (see, for example,
Magee, 2008; Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Cheong et al., 2017), we also include
a large set of interacted fixed effects, where µit denotes the export-year fixed effects
that subsume the typical gravity regressors (such as changes in exporter’s income),
and µik and µkt represent the exporter-product and the product-year fixed effects,
respectively. Finally, εijkt is the idiosyncratic error term of product j traded between
countries i and j at time t. We estimate Eq. (5.1) for different sets of import and
export sectors. The coefficient on the triple interaction term (β1) measures the net
impact of landlockedness on trade.
Estimation Issues We discuss two key empirical issues and how we take care of
them. The first issue comes from that fact that if there are many zeros in the bilateral
trade data (which there are), our estimated gravity equation could be biased and
inconsistent. This stems from the practice of transforming the gravity equation (e.g.
Eq. (5.1) into its log-linear version first, and then estimate the log-linearized gravity
equation by OLS. However, to accommodate the modeling of bilateral trade in its log
form, we need to drop all country-pair observations with zero trade, since the log of
zero is undefined. Consequently, this could cause severe sample attrition.
One stop-gap approach of handling the zero trade problem is to add one dollar
to the value of trade (Tijkt + 1) before taking the log transformation. However, this
procedure is ad-hoc and may still yield inconsistent estimates (Silva and Tenreyro,
12Silva and Tenreyro (2010) employs the difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect
of currency union on trade through a gravity model framework.
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2006). Moreover, trade data are usually heteroskedastic (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
The expected value of the log-linearized error term in the gravity equation is likely to
be a function of economic size, distance and other multilateral resistance variables,
which makes OLS regression inappropriate. To address this issue, we follow Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) to estimate Eq. (5.1) using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator. The PPML estimator estimates Eq. (5.1) in its multiplicative
form. Thus, it has the advantage of retaining zero trade values and provides consistent
estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity.13
The second issue comes from the fact that the effect of landlockedness of Ethiopia
could be confounded by the potential effect of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Recall that
Ethiopia became (both de jure and de facto) landlocked after it went into war with
Eritrea in 1998. Since both the border war and the landlockedness of Ethiopia occur
at the same time, it may be challenging to identify the net effect of landlockedness
on trade flows using a pure difference-in-differences analysis.
To address this problem, we take advantage of the variation in the traded products
that landlockeness can affect. The idea is the following. The war with Eritrea
should affect both ocean-borne and airborne trade of Ethiopia, but landlockedness
should affect only ocean-borne trade but not airborne trade. Thus, the change in the
trend of ocean-borne trade before and after 1998 should capture the effects of both
landlockedness and the war, but the change in the trend of airborne trade before
and after 1998 should only capture the effects of the war (i.e. not landlockedness).
As such, we could use the latter to partial out the effects of war in the trends of
ocean-borne trade. For this reason, we include airborne commodities (light and
expensive products) as an additional ‘control’ group. In doing so, we will have
contrast between commodities, countries and time, and therefore, we will estimate the
effect of landlockedness on trade by implementing the triple difference-in-differences
approach that compares the difference between the export or import of bulky versus
light goods of Ethiopia, to the difference in the export or import of bulky versus light
13The dependent variables (that include disaggregated import and export) are used without log
transformation but the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as elasticities (Silva and Tenreyro,
2006; Paudel and Burke, 2015).
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goods of Kenya, before and after 1998.
Besides dealing with the confounding effects of war, the triple-differencing
approach also has the advantage of enabling us to partial out differences in trends
that have nothing to do with landlockedness. For example, our estimates could be
capturing the effects of systematic shocks to ocean-borne and airborne goods that
are not associated with the landlockedness. If we include the ocean-borne trade of
Kenya as an additional control group, we could partial out the potential divergence
of trends in ocean-borne and airborne trade caused by systematic shocks.
More generally, by exploiting variations at the country, year and product levels as
our triple-differencing approach does, we could include a rich set of fixed effects, such
as exporter-year, exporter-product and product-year, to better identify β. These fixed
effects ensure that we are not attributing the influence of year-specific commodity
or country traits (shocks) to landlockedness. For example, following Ethiopia’s
landlockeness, exporter of bulky commodities may enjoy new infrastructure such
as roads that may affect bulky and light commodities differently. Such potential
confounder, however, could be controlled for by product-year fixed effect. Similarly,
the two exporting countries-Ethiopia and Kenya may experience country-specific
institutional or policy changes during the treatment period. To partial out the effects
of country-specific policies or shocks, as well as the effects of all country-specific
factors for trade, we could control for exporter-year fixed effects.14 Finally, the
possibility of referential trade policies on products may affect exports differently.
Such confounding effects could also be dealt with by exporter-product fixed effects.
5.4 Data
The data for this analysis is taken from the UN Comtrade database. We use bilateral
export and import data of bulky (ocean-borne) and light (airborne) commodities
of Ethiopia and Kenya between 1993 and 2007.15 The import and export data are
14The country-year fixed effects also capture the effect of exporters’ change in GDP, income per
capital, population and other gravity variables.
15We use 33 major trading partners of Ethiopia and Kenya to construct the bilateral panel data
set. We also use the data from 1993-2010 for the synthetic control regression.
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constructed using mirror data as these are likely to be more accurate in a developing
country context (Paudel and Burke, 2015).16 The data used in the analysis is at the
one-digit (aggregated) and three-digit (disaggregated) Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC).
For ocean-borne exports, we consider four major ocean-borne export products
including coffee, leather, vegetable and hide & skin, which will be our “treated”
goods. For the airborne exports, we consider gold, which will be our “control” good.
For ocean-borne imports, we consider fertilizer, fuel, petroleum, chemicals, iron
and steel, metal, industrial machines, special machines, rubbers, transportation,
textile, dyeing, perfume, and miscellaneous manufacturing materials. Like before,
these ocean-borne imports will be our “treated” goods. For airborne imports, we
consider light commodities such as medicine and pharmaceutical products, which will
be our “control” goods. Data on the exports and imports of these goods for Ethiopia
(without Eritrea) prior to the closure of Assab port are available for 1993-1997.
5.5 Triple-Differencing Analysis
5.5.1 Landlockedness and Export
A. Baseline
Table 5.2 presents the triple difference-in-differences estimation results for the
different major export products. Columns (1)-(4) report the effect of landlockedness
on coffee, leather, crude vegetable (that includes natural gums, resins, cut flowers,
gum resins and other similar export products), and hide and skin export, respectively.
For these results, we have included exporter-year, exporter-product and product-year
fixed effects into the model. For inference, we report robust standard errors that are
adjusted for two-way clustering by exporter and product.
Column (1) reveals that landlockedness has a large negative and statistically
significant effect on Ethiopia’s coffee export. Specifically, the estimated coefficient
16Export from Ethiopia and Kenya is constructed from the import by largest trading countries.
Similarly, the import from Ethiopia and Kenya are constructed form Export reported by major
trading partners
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Table 5.2: The Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × Bulky × Post -0.561*** -0.681*** -1.589*** -1.271***
(0.014) (0.091) (0.050) (0.130)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.022 0.069 0.041
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and
zero for Kenya’s export products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne exports and zero for light
(air-borne) export product (i.e. export of gold); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise.
Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (5.1).
Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
on the triple interaction term shows that coffee exports are reduced by about 43%
following the landlockedness of Ethiopia, on average.17 This 43% reduction in coffee
exports is significant: coffee faming provides the livelihood income of 15 million
Ethiopians (Moat et al., 2017) and coffee exports account for a quarter (i.e. 25%)
of Ethiopia’s export earnings. Hence, through a back-of-the-envelop calculation, a
43% reduction in coffee exports translates into a 11% (i.e. 25% × 43% ≈ 11%)
decline in total export earnings. This is just coffee alone: the total negative effects
of landlockedness are likely to be much larger.
Columns (2), (3) and (4) also show that lack of access to the Assab port reduces
Ethiopia’s export of leather, crude vegetable, and hide and skin by 49%, 80% and
72%, respectively. All these estimates are statistically significant at 1%. Overall, the
negative effects of landlockedness observed here appears to be larger than the negative
effects reported in the previous studies. These studies usually estimate the effect of
landlockedness by estimating the coefficient on the landlocked dummy. As such, they
cannot deal with confounding factors like country fixed effects. For example, Limao
and Venables (2001) finds that a median landlocked country trades 28% less than a
17The formula to compute the effect of a dummy variable in a PPML model is (eθi − 1)× 100%,
where θi is the estimated coefficient of dummy variable i (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
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maritime country. In addition, Paudel et al. (2014) shows that landlocked developing
countries (LLDCs) export about 25% less than other least developing countries. By
contrast, our study shows that for the ocean-borne goods considered, landlockedness
has caused exports to decline by about 50% or more.
B. Placebo test for export
Next, we conduct a placebo test for our baseline results in Table 5.2. The placebo test
evaluates the effect of landlockedness on export before Ethiopia actually became a de
facto landlocked country in 1998. If our identification strategy in Table 5.2 is valid,
then landlockedness should not have any statistically significant effects before 1998.
As such, we employ 1996 as a false treatment year (i.e. placebo), and present the
triple-differenced estimate of its effect on the four major export items of Ethiopia in
Table 5.3.18 Across all columns, we find that the placebo is statistically insignificant.
Thus, there is good evidence that our baseline estimate is capturing the effect of
landlockedness and not other coincidental events.
Table 5.3: Placebo: the Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.110 -0.380 0.169 -0.648
(0.322) (0.328) (0.326) (0.490)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 600 600 600 600
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.083 0.024 0.058
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero for
Kenya’s export products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne exports and zero for light (air-borne) export
product (i.e. export of gold); and Post is 1 for 1996 and 1997; and 0 for 1993 to 1995. Poison
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (5.1). Importer
country level clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
18Therefore, the pre-treatment period is from 1993-1995 and the false treatment period is from
1996-1997.
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C. The dynamic effect of landlockedness on export
Previously in Section A., we estimate the average effect of landlockedness on exports
during the treatment period. However, such an estimate does not tell us if the
negative effects of landlocked is short-lived or persistent.19 In this section, we
investigate how persistent the negative effect landlockedness is. To do so, we interact
the triple-difference term with year dummies (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010), and
compare the exports in each treatment year with the exports in the pre-treatment
years to track the evolution of the effect of landlockedness on exports overtime.
In Table 5.4, we report the year-by-year effects of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s
coffee exports (Column (1)), leather exports (Column (2)), crude vegetable exports
(Column (3)), and hide & skin exports (Column (4)). All the coefficients of
the quadruple interaction term show that the average effect of landlockedness is
persistent. Thus, the effect of landlockedness does not appear to be short-lived.
That being said, there is also no evidence that the negative effect of landlockedness
is becoming stronger over time.
D. Restricting the sample countries
To obtain the results reported earlier, we have used data on thirty three major trading
partners of both the treated country (i.e. Ethiopia) and the control country (Kenya)
to investigate the effect of landlockedness on export. It is well known that estimates
from the gravity model are potentially sensitive to the sample of countries included in
the analysis (Haveman and Hummels, 1998; Magee, 2008).20 As a robustness check,
we re-estimate the model using data on exports with Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s top 20,
15 and 10 trading partners.
In Table 5.5, we only include the top 20 most important trading partners of the
two countries. As before, we find that landlockedness has a negative and statistically
significant effect on the exports of Ethiopia. These results continue to hold when
19There is a presumption that landlockedness has long-lasting negative impacts on trade and
economic development (Arvis et al., 2010; World Bank, 2014).
20Haveman and Hummels (1998) shows the effect of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) on trade
is sensitive to change in sample of countries used in the analysis: the impact of of RTA varies when
the sample of countries in the regressions is changed.
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Table 5.4: The Dynamic Effect of Landlockedness on Export
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DDD × D 1998 0.318*** -0.651*** -0.524*** -0.138***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 1999 0.534*** 0.787*** -0.624*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2000 -0.767*** -0.904*** -1.321*** -1.191***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2001 -2.236*** -1.792*** -1.692*** -1.638***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2002 -3.129*** -2.951*** -2.836*** -2.589***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2003 -1.959*** -1.406*** -1.916*** -1.625***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2004 -2.044*** -1.263*** -2.098*** -2.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2005 -1.716*** -0.546*** -1.748*** -2.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1560 1560 1560 1560
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.069 0.019 0.040
Note: DDD≡ Treat ∗ bulky ∗ Post. Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s
export products and zero for Kenya’s export products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne exports and
zero for light (air-borne) export product (i.e. export of gold); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero
otherwise. D year is a dummy variable that equals 1 for that specific year and zero otherwise.
Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (5.1). Importer
country level clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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restrict our sample to the top 15 or 10 trading partners (see Table A1 and Table
A2 in Appendix A). Hence, the impact of landlockedness on export is similar to the
baseline in terms of sign and statistical significance, and is not sensitive to the number
of trading partners considered in the analysis.
Table 5.5: The Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export: Top 20 Partner
Countries
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.650*** -0.722*** -1.653*** -1.222***
(0.017) (0.089) (0.051) (0.130)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1430 1430 1430 1430
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.026 0.067 0.047
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s export products and zero for
Kenya’s export products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne export and zero for light (air-borne) export
product (i.e. export of gold); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (5.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
125
5.5.2 Landlockedness and Import
A. Baseline
In this section, we look at the effect of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s ocean-borne
imports. For each of the major imports, we re-estimate Eq. (5.1) by replacing the
dependent variable, which was exports, with the imports from the major trading
partners. The key variable of interest is once again “Treat×Bulky×Post” and the
coefficient on the triple-interaction term measures the the effect of landlockedness on
Ethiopia’s ocean-borne imports.
In Columns (1)-(16) of Table 5.6, we find that all the coefficients of
“Treat × Bulky × Post” are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that
landlockedness reduces the major imports. The difference in the magnitude of the
estimates across the product types indicates the presence of heterogeneity in how
landlockedness affects imports. For example, landlockedness severely affects the
import of petroleum, mineral fuel and fertilizer,21 but has a smaller impact on the
import of general industrial machinery, machinery specialized for particular industries
and inorganic chemicals.
21According to the point estimates, landlockedeness reduces the import of petroleum, fuel and
fertilizer by 71%, 68.6% and 66.9%, respectively.
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Table 5.6: The Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material Chem related Dyeing Perfume Inorganic chem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × bulky × Post -1.106*** -1.161*** -1.264*** -0.389*** -0.256*** -0.370*** -0.135*** -0.085***
(0.028) (0.081) (0.086) (0.018) (0.007) (0.018) (0.016) (0.028)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.078 0.079 0.125 0.272 0.165 0.152 0.171
Types of import item
Rubber Textile yarn Metal Iron steel Mis manu Special machinery Indus machinery Road vehicle
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.674*** -0.399*** -0.329*** -0.239*** -0.257*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.085***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.048 0.080 0.040 0.101 0.064 0.084 0.051
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for Kenya’s import products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne imports and zero for
light (air-borne) import products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (5.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
127
Similarly, landlockedness has also a detrimental effect on the import of foreign raw
materials and intermediate inputs in manufacturing sector. In our regression, we find
that landlocked status reduces import of rubber, steel, textile yarn and dyeing by 49%,
21%, 32.9% and 30.9%, respectively. This reduction may have a large implication
for firms in the manufacturing sector as technology may diffuse through the used of
imported intermediate inputs. Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), for example, show that
foreign inputs improves productivity through learning, variety and quality effects.
Amiti and Konings (2005) also argue that importing foreign intermediaries raise firm’s
productivity.
Overall, the strong adverse effects on almost all major imports support the
argument that landlockedness is indeed a serious impediment to access global markets
(see, for example, Limao and Venables, 2001; Faye et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2010;
Christ and Ferrantino, 2011).
B. Placebo for import
The key identification assumption in our estimation is that in the absence of
landlockedness, there should be no difference in the trends between the imports of
ocean-borne and airborne cargo. Using import data from 1993 to 1997, we perform
a falsification test, in which we assume that Ethiopia was landlocked in 1996 (i.e.
a placebo) instead of 1998. Table 5.7 presents the estimation results, where the
coefficients on the triple-interaction term are statistically insignificant. This suggests
that the effect on imports post-1998 is not a placebo effect.
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Table 5.7: Placebo: the Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post 0.316 0.347 0.312 0.119
(0.364) (0.274) (0.300) (0.195)
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 560 560 560
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.056 0.062 0.074
Types of import item
Chem related Metal Road vehicle indust machinery
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × bulky × Post 0.286* 0.200 0.143 0.400
(0.168) (0.277) (0.241) (0.256)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 560 560 560
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.043 0.068 0.072
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for
Kenya’s import products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne imports and zero for light (air-borne) import
products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1996 and zero
before 1996. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(5.1). Importer-product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C. The dynamic effect of landlockedness on import
Table 5.8 presents the year-by-year effects of landlockedness on imports. The strong
negative effect of landlocked status on import does not disappear; instead the impact
of landlockedness increases significantly over time for certain goods. For example,
landlockedness has reduced the import of fertilizer from 14% to 88.6%; mineral fuel
from 41.7% to 71.7% and petroleum from 41.6% to 71.6%. For fertilizer, petroleum
and mineral fuel, the impact of landlockedness during the last year of our sample
(88.6%, 71.7% and 71.6%) is larger than the average effect of landlockedness measured
over the previous eight years period (68.6%, 71% and 66.7%, from Table 5.6). This
is consistent with the presumption that landlockedness has persistent negative effect
on trade.
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Table 5.8: The Dynamic Effect of Landlockedness on Import
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel import Petroleum Chem material Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DDD × D 1998 -0.151*** -0.541*** -0.538*** -0.374*** -0.243*** -0.135*** -0.343*** -0.227***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 1999 -1.070*** -0.241*** -0.236*** -0.061*** -0.167*** -0.133*** 0.397*** 0.193***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2000 -1.010*** -0.584*** -0.581*** -0.121*** -0.272*** -0.288*** -0.038*** -0.050***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2001 -2.110*** -1.211*** -1.210*** -0.559*** -0.352*** -0.513*** -0.683*** -0.309***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2002 -1.372*** -1.447*** -1.478*** -0.825*** -0.549*** -0.448*** -0.905*** -0.391***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2003 -1.320*** -1.251*** -1.589*** -0.474*** -0.413*** -0.153*** -0.522*** -0.337***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2004 -1.848*** -1.433*** -1.434*** -0.941*** -0.496*** -0.602*** -0.867*** -0.356***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DDD × D 2005 -2.173*** -1.263*** -1.259*** -1.329*** -0.618*** -0.818*** -1.507*** -0.797***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.065 0.066 0.124 0.272 0.048 0.050 0.101
Note: DDD ≡ Treat ∗ bulky ∗ Post. Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s imports and zero for Kenya’s imports;
bulky is 1 for ocean-borne import and zero for light (air-borne) import product; and Post is 1 after 1998 and zero otherwise. D year
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for that specific year and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is
employed to estimate Eq. (5.1). Importer country level clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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D. Restricting sample countries
We re-estimate our model by restricting the number of trading partners. Table
5.9 reports the triple-difference analysis using only 20 main trading partners and
shows that the sign and statistical significance of the triple interaction term are
unchanged from the baseline. In Table B1 and B2 of Appendix B, we conducted
further robustness checks by restricting the sample to 15 and 10 main trading partners
and find that our results are not sensitive to the selection of major trading partners
for the analysis.
Table 5.9: The Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods: with Top 20
Partners
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post -1.306*** -1.416*** -1.537*** -0.447***
(0.036) (0.121) (0.128) (0.021)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040
Pseudo R2 0.242 0.096 0.097 0.151
Types of import item
Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.341*** -0.556*** -0.272*** -0.387***
(0.011) (0.025) (0.016) (0.017)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040
Pseudo R2 0.329 0.057 0.072 0.124
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for
Kenya’s import products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne imports and zero for light (air-borne) import
products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1996 and
zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(5.1). Exporter-product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.6 Synthetic Control Analysis
For the previous results, we have used Kenya, a neighboring coastal country, as
a comparison. In this section, we implement the synthetic control approach, a
data-driven approach that enables us to construct comparison group from the set
of possible comparisons that mirrors Ethiopia’s pre-intervention trend as closely as
possible. To construct the comparison group, we take weighted sum of the export





where T̂t is the synthetic control for annual aggregate Ethiopia’s export (import)
in year t. Tjt is the period t aggregate annual export (import) of the 34 coastal
African countries; and ωj is the weight to coastal country c (note that:
∑
ωj = 1 and
ωj ≥ 0). The weights are calculated by minimizing the mean squared errors of the
export (import) of the landlocked country (Tit) with the coastal country (Tjt) in the
pre-landlocked period (i.e. from 1993-1997) as follows:
ωj = arg min
1997∑
t=1993
(Tit − ωjTjt)2 (5.3)
Figure 5.1 plots the aggregate annual exports of Ethiopia and the synthetic
control. The export of the synthetic control nearly perfectly matches the export
of Ethiopia before 1998 (the start of the treatment period). However, after Ethiopia
becomes both de facto and de jure landlocked, the total exports of the synthetic
control increase dramatically and reaches at its highest level in 2007 (during the
start of the great financial crisis period), while for Ethiopia, total exports decline
immediately after being landlocked and remain low for a long-period of time. A
benefit of using the synthetic control approach is that it provides a visual examination
of the progress of the effect of the treatment (i.e. landlockedness). As shown in Figure
5.1, the difference in the exports of Ethiopia and the synthetic control has widen over
time since 1998. This, again, suggests that landlockedness has a long-lasting effect.
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Figure 5.1: The Effect of Landlockedness on Aggregate Export
Note: This figure shows the synthetic control plot of the effect landlockedness on
Ethiopia’s total export. Ethiopia’s export is the treated group and we take the
export of 34 African coastal countries in the potential control group. The treatment
period starts in 1998 –as shown by the vertical dotted line.
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Similarly, Figure 5.2 shows the impact of landlockedness on Ethiopia’s imports.
The dotted line plots the total imports for the synthetic control and the unbroken line
plots the total imports of Ethiopia. Just as before, the imports of the synthetic control
and Ethiopia are nearly identical before the treatment. However, from 1998 onwards,
Ethiopia’s imports have lagged far behind the synthetic control’s. This suggests that
landlockedness has a negative effect on the volumes of Ethiopia’s imports. Although
the divergence is not as large as that for exports, the effect of landlockedness on
import is nonetheless persistent across time.
Figure 5.2: The Effect of Landlockedness on Aggregate Import
Note: This figure shows the synthetic control plot of the effect of landlockedness on
Ethiopia’s total import. Ethiopia’s import is the treated unit and the import of 34
African coastal countries as the potential control group. The treatment period starts
in 1998 –as shown by the vertical dotted line.
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5.7 Conclusion
Landlocked developing countries are among the poorest of developing countries. The
limited participation in the international markets, due to typical high cost of trade,
is often presumed to be one of the main contributors towards poverty experienced
by these countries. In this chapter, we estimate the impact of landlockedness on
trade and examine how it evolves over time. To do so, we use the natural experiment
of Ethiopia becoming de facto landlocked following its war with Eritrea in 1998.
We find that landlockedness has a negative and statistically significant effect on the
export and import of ocean-borne products. Moreover, we find that the negative
effects of landlockedness on both exports and imports are long-lasting. From a policy
perspective, it will be important for the international community to provide assistance
to landlocked developing countries given that the negative effects of landlockedness
are large and persistent.
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Appendix A: Landlockedness, Export and Import:
Restricting the Partner Countries
Table A1: The Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export: Top 15 Partner
Countries
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.658*** -0.745*** -1.676*** -1.243***
(0.016) (0.093) (0.051) (0.142)
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1430 1430 1430 1430
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.026 0.067 0.047
Note: Treat is a dummy that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exports and zero for Kenya’s exports;
bulky is 1 for ocean-borne and zero for light export; and Post is 1 after 1998 and 0 otherwise.
Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2: The Effect of Landlockedness on Disaggregated Export: Top 10 Partner
Countries
Types of export item
Coffee Leather Crude Vegetable Hide & skin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.341*** -0.909*** -2.165*** -1.241***
(0.021) (0.088) (0.078) (0.142)
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.026 0.065 0.060
Note: Treat is a dummy that equals 1 for Ethiopia and zero for Kenya’s exports; bulky is 1
for ocean-borne exports and zero for light export; and Post is 1 after 1998 and 0 otherwise.
Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix B: Landlockedness and Import:
Restricting the Partner Countries
Table B1: The Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods: with Top 15
Partners
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.726*** -1.792*** -1.804*** -0.452***
(0.047) (0.168) (0.167) (0.023)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 780 780 780 780
Pseudo R2 0.294 0.111 0.110 0.184
Types of import item
Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.265*** -0.512*** -0.294*** -0.414***
(0.012) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 780 780 780 780
Pseudo R2 0.329 0.068 0.089 0.140
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for
Kenya’s import products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne import and zero for light (air-borne) import
products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after 1996 and
zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq.
(5.1). Exporter-product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B2: The Effect of Landlockedness on Different Import Goods: with Top 10
Partners
Types of import item
Fertilizer Fuel Petroleum Chem material
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.852*** -0.783*** -0.783*** -0.399***
(0.132) (0.082) (0.080) (0.047)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 520 520 520 520
Pseudo R2 0.393 0.255 0.255 0.244
Types of import item
Chem related Textile yarn Road vehicle Mis manu
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × bulky × Post -0.201*** 0.026 -0.292*** -0.451***
(0.030) (0.041) (0.024) (0.040)
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 520 520 520 520
Pseudo R2 0.434 0.072 0.127 0.171
Note: Treat is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s import products and zero for
Kenya’s import products; bulky is 1 for ocean-borne import goods and zero for light (air-borne)
import products (i.e. import of medicine and pharmaceutical products); and Post is 1 after
1996 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to
estimate Eq. (5.1). Exporter-product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Would developing countries benefit from having a commodity exchange? We
consider this question by studying its effects on coffee exports in Ethiopia. Coffee
farming is the most important agricultural activity in Ethiopia, as it supports the
livelihood of 15 million farmers and generates a quarter of the country’s export.
In April 2008, the government of Ethiopia introduced the Ethiopian Commodity
Exchange (ECX) to provide reliable market information and storage facilities to
farmers, especially coffee producers, and to help them engage in the export industry.
Using a triple-differencing (DDD) approach, we find that the introduction of coffee
trading through the ECX has led to a significant increase in Ethiopia’s coffee export.
We also find that the ECX has led to export coffee into new foreign markets. Our
paper is related to recent initiatives by governments and international organizations
to introduce agricultural commodities exchanges in developing countries. We provide
quasi-natural experimental evidence to show that such initiatives can help to reduce
market-related barriers of trade faced by these countries.
Key Words: Commodity Exchange, Ethiopian Coffee Export, Triple Differences
JEL Codes: D47, Q13, F14, F6
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6.1 Introduction
Many developing countries rely on the exports of agricultural commodities sector
as a main source of national income (Reardon and Timmer, 2007; World Bank,
2008; Gollin, 2010).1 However, in these countries, there are also structural
issues that prevent markets for agricultural commodities from functioning well.
For example, agricultural producers require reliable price information, sound
contractual agreements, and extended marketing chains, which these countries
lack (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005; Mutenyo, 2011; Gabre-Madhin, 2012)(Tiffin
and Irz, 2006; Byerlee et al., 2009; Islam, 2016). Moreover, they also require
strong institutions to protect themselves from being exploited by intermediaries
(Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2006; Goyal, 2010). Without
strong institutions, the profitability of farmers, their incentives to produce, and
consequently their export earnings could be curtailed (UNCTAD, 2009; Goyal, 2010).
It has been argued that these structural challenges can be addressed with the
help of an agricultural commodity exchange, which is a centralized market place
where sellers and buyers meet to transact commodities in an organized fashion
(UNCTAD, 2009). Modern commodity exchange platforms, for instance, may
eliminate exploitative intermediaries, provide more transparency on the prevailing
market price to farmers, and ultimately, promote agricultural production and exports.
For this reason, governments and international organizations have worked together
to introduce agricultural commodities exchanges in their own countries, which they
hope would reduce such market-related barriers.2 Empirically, while it seems intuitive
that commodity exchanges would help the agricultural commodities sectors, we do
not have strong evidence that developing countries would benefit from having a
commodity exchange, especially when it is an advanced market mechanism.
In this paper, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment to study how having a
1Different studies illustrate that agriculture is the primary source of income in developing
countries. For example, 65% of the labor force is employed in agriculture (World Bank, 2008).
Moreover, for African and South Asian countries, the share of agricultural output to GDP exceeds
40% and agricultural export constitute 15-30% of GDP (World Bank, 2008; Gollin, 2010).
2For example, UNCTAD is working with the African Union, with national governments and the
private sector to develop agricultural commodity exchanges. Many emerging countries such as India,
Brazil, China, Malaysia and the South Africa have also introduced modern commodities exchanges.
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commodity exchange affects coffee exports in Ethiopia. In April 2008, the Ethiopian
government introduced a commodities exchange market, called the Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange (ECX), to replace the country’s traditional coffee auction
floor.3 The ECX provides several services to facilitate coffee transactions. For
instance, it provides daily market information through electronic display boards
(ticker boards) to coffee producing villages, where information are disseminated using
Interactive Voice Response (IVR), message services (SMS) and through the ECX’s
website. It also provides warehouses across the country that facilitate storage and
quality testing. Finally, the ECX facilitates standard trading contracts and payments
through its partner settlement banks. These services raise the profitability of coffee
farming and motivate the farmers to produce larger quantities of higher quality coffee
for the export market.
To estimate the effect of the ECX on the coffee exports of Ethiopia, we implement
a triple difference-in-differences (DDD) approach within a gravity framework. For
identification, the triple differencing approach has certain advantages over the
standard difference-in-differences (DD) approach. If we implement the latter,
we could only compare the treatment and control between commodities (for the
same country) or between countries (for the same commodity). For example, a
commodity-level DD would look at the exports of coffee (the treatment) and non-ECX
commodities (the control) from Ethiopia and compare how their trends before and
after the establishment of the ECX. However, such a comparison may falsely attribute
the effects of macroeconomic shocks on coffee to the ECX, if these shocks and the ECX
occurred at the same time. Similarly, a country-level DD approach would consider
the exports of coffee from Ethiopia (the treatment) and Kenya (the control) and
compare the response of their coffee exports before and after the establishment of the
ECX. However, such a comparison may also falsely attribute a response in Ethiopia’s
coffee exports, caused by factors such as institutional reforms and infrastructural
improvements, to the ECX.
3Ethiopian coffee farmers are now required to sell their coffee at designated primary markets,
where only certified buyers are allowed to make purchases. Similarly, coffee processors must receive
approval to use designated warehouses, where their products are graded based on whether they are
suitable for the export market or are only for sale in the domestic market.
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The triple-differencing approach addresses these issues by comparing the difference
between the exports of coffee (an ECX product) and a non-coffee product (a non-ECX
product) of Ethiopia to the difference between the exports of coffee and a non-coffee
product of Kenya.4 Because the triple difference exploits country-commodity-year
variations in exports, we may employ fixed effects with more complex structures
to deal with potential confounders that a standard DD approach cannot deal with.
Here, we follow Magee (2008) and Cheong et al. (2017) to include the full set of
country-pair, exporter-year, exporter-product, product-year, and importer-year fixed
effects into our gravity model.5
Our estimates show that as a policy, the establishment of the ECX has been
an effective means for promoting exports. Specifically, Ethiopia has seen an 84%
increase in coffee exports on average after the ECX was established. This impact is
twice as large as the impact of joining regional trade agreements, trade concessions,
and importer tariff reductions.6 Our estimates also show that the establishment of
the ECX does not have spillover effects on non-ECX products, in the sense that
while the ECX has led to a significant increase in Ethiopia’s coffee export, there is
no evidence that it has reduced the exports of a non-ECX commodity. Finally, our
results show that the ECX not only affects coffee exports along the intensive margin,
but it also has a statistically significant impact on coffee exports along the extensive
margin.
This paper makes two contributions. Firstly, it speaks to the debate on whether
a commodity exchange is effective for promoting exports in developing countries.
Besides Ethiopia, commodity exchanges have been actively promoted and developed
in other African countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, and Uganda
4We consider Kenya as a control country since this country is the largest coffee Arabica exporter
in Africa. Kenya has also no functional agricultural commodities exchange.
5According to Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008), the gravity model is sensitive to
the choice of different covariates. Magee (2008) demonstrate that controlling a whole set of fixed
effects in the gravity model allows to capture the different determinants of trade. For example,
importer-exporter fixed effects helps to capture all unobserved time-invariant factors that affect the
bilateral trade between two countries. Similarly, importer-year fixed effects capture all time-invariant
and time-varying characteristics of the importer country, such as GDP per capital and population.
6For example, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) show that export may increase by as much as
40% due to US trade concession policy for Africa (also known as AGOA), and Cheong et al. (2017)
shows that Pakistan export increases by around 45% following a temporary removal of tariff.
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(Sitko and Jayne, 2012). Hence, the performance of these commodity exchanges on
raising agricultural export deserves systematic investigation using quasi-experimental
approaches. For Ethiopia, the ECX potentially affects over 4.2 million smallholder
farmers and more than a quarter of the countrys export earnings,7 but its effect on
export is not empirically investigated. While a commodity exchange seems to be
useful for promoting exports, some have argued that an exchange is an advanced
market mechanism that only functions well in industrialized countries.8 The differing
views on this issue, however, are based mainly on anecdotal evidence. Therefore, our
paper hopes to provide some statistical evidence to shed light on this issue.
Secondly, our paper contributes to the literature methodologically by providing
quasi-natural experimental evidence on the impact of the commodity exchange in the
developing countries context. The original ECX project was aimed at facilitating the
exchange of food grains including wheat, maize and beans. However, the world food
crisis adversely affected the domestic grain market, and led to a tripling of prices.
The slowdown of trading food grains, which is an external shock, resulted in the
introduction of coffee trading into the exchange. Therefore, the introduction of coffee
in the ECX platform was not pre-meditated, but was driven by events that affected
food supply.9 It is in this regard that the ECX is the best quasi-natural experiment
for studying the impact of a commodity exchange in the developing countries context.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides background
on Ethiopian Commodities Exchange. Section 6.3 describes the empirical strategy.
Section 6.4 describes the data. Section 6.5 and section 6.6 present the results, and
finally section 6.7 concludes.
7See Minten et al. (2014) and Craparo et al. (2017) for more detail.
8For example, Sitko and Jayne (2012) have shown that the performance of agricultural commodity
exchanges in Africa is poor because of the limited success in attracting financial institutions to the
modern market platform, conflict of interest among brokers, and the high fixed costs of trading
in the commodity exchanges. In fact, Van der Mheen-Sluijer (2010) has expressed doubts on the
ECX’s success in achieving the demands of coffee importers. Ethiopian coffee exporters were also
complaining about issues of price-meddling by government authorities (Ferreira et al., 2017).
9A program is endogenous when the program itself is non-random and/or when the program
participants are non randomly selected
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6.2 Background
A. Coffee Market in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has a long history in coffee production and is now the largest coffee producer
in Africa.10 Coffee is also the main export commodity of Ethiopia. It contributes to
nearly 25 percent of the country’s total export and supports the livelihood of more
than 15 millions of people (Moat et al., 2017). Therefore, policy makers in Ethiopia
look towards coffee production as a means of raising smallholders income, government
revenue, and foreign currency (Petit, 2007).
Prior to 1991, the coffee market in Ethiopia was regulated by the government
through its agency, Ethiopia Coffee Market Corporation (ECMC). During this time,
the government tightly controlled the trade and price of coffee. Farmers in the main
coffee growing area were given a certain quota to supply coffee, at a fixed price, to
the government (through the ECMC). The Central Bank of Ethiopia also sets the
minimum export price while the Ministry of Coffee and Tea determined the domestic
price (Petit, 2007; Gemech and Struthers, 2007; Andersson et al., 2017).
Following the dismantling of Ethiopia’s socialist regime in 1991, the transitional
government undertook market reforms that affected coffee production and marketing.
For example, the ECMC was closed, the coffee market was deregulated, and license
fees and tariffs for coffee trading were reduced. The export price controls and local
coffee price floors were also abolished (Petit, 2007). All these reforms were made to
encourage and expand the private sector’s participation in the coffee market, and to
stimulate production and improve export earnings from coffee (Gemech and Struthers,
2007).
However, while these reforms had led to a larger number of private firms in
the coffee trade, little had changed in the marketing and distribution of coffee and
other agricultural products (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2006). In fact, prior to the
establishment of the ECX, coffee farmers often did not know what the prevailing retail
price in different markets and the price offered by wholesalers or exporters were. This
10For example, Ethiopia is believed to be the origin of coffee Arabica.
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gave rise to exploitative intermediaries or middlemen, who were well informed about
the market price, to buy coffee from smallholders farmers at lower prices and sell them
to wholesaler or exporters at higher prices. The lack of reliable price information in
other markets had also limited the farmers’ bargaining power in price negotiation.
Moreover, the farmers also faced high risk of default as there were limited legal
means of enforcing contracts. For example, Gabre-Madhin (2012) showed that 67%
traders faced contractual default. To manage such risk, trade was limited to short
distance markets and confined to network of family members, friends and ethnic
connection, which made the sector unprofitable to invest in (Gabre-Madhin, 2001).
Therefore, weak infrastructure and market institutions, which affected the marketing
and distribution of coffee, had limited the potential scale of coffee production and
export in Ethiopia (Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005).
B. The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
The establishment of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) was preceded by
a series of events unrelated to the coffee industry. In 2000 and 2001, Ethiopia had
a bumper crop, mostly grains, which led to a 60 to 80 percent drop in price of
these surplus goods (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). Because of weak market systems and
transportation costs, the surplus agricultural production were not transported and
distributed to regions that had relatively less supply, which curtailed farmers’ profits
of harvesting grains in those years. As such, many were unable to pay for fertilizers,
which led to a cut-back on fertilizer use,11 and consequently, a significant decline in
agriculture production in the following year (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). This series of
events culminated into a major food crisis, which subjected 14 million Ethiopians to
potential famine, highlighted the need for Ethiopia to adopt a modern agricultural
commodities marketing and distribution system (Gabre-Madhin, 2001).
Faced with such risk, the Ethiopian government launched a modern market system
– the ECX – in 2008. The ECX started with a spot trading and “open outcry” bidding
system, which was appropriate for the level of technology and institutional system
11Farmers were unable to pay for fertilizer. Thus, fertilizer use was reduced by 27 percent.
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of the country at that time. The original ECX project was aimed to facilitate the
trading of food grains including wheat, maize and beans. However, the world food
crisis adversely affected domestic grain price, causing it to rise by 200 percent in June
2008. The slowdown of food grains trade resulted in the introduction of coffee to the
exchange and the suspension of Ethiopia’s traditional coffee auction floor.12
Coffee trade has benefited from three main services provided by the ECX. Firstly,
the ECX provides daily market information through electronic display boards (ticker
boards) to coffee producing villages. In addition, information is disseminated using
Interactive Voice Response (IVR), short message services (SMS) and through the
ECX website. Secondly, it provides warehouses for storage and to facilitate quality
testing of coffee supplied by coffee producing villages. Thirdly, the ECX facilitates
standard trading contracts and payments through its partner settlement fbanks. The
main rationale for introducing the ECX is to avoid exploitative intermediaries (i.e.
the middlemen), increase farmers’ revenue and production, ultimately, to raise export
earnings.
The ECX is successful in many aspects. For example, after the ECX was
established, coffee farmers were able to receive up to 70% of the final export price
than the 38% they had received prior to the ECX (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). In 2011,
the total value of the ECX trade reached USD 1.1 billion and the ECX expanded its
number of warehouses to 55 with a total capacity of 250,000 tons.
The ECX had also settled USD 20 million or more on T+1 (next day) basis
with no single default. They also now disseminate market price information through
their outdoor electronic ticker boards located in 32 rural sites, through their website
that attracts visitors from over 107 countries, and directly to their 256,000 mobile
subscribers, radio, TV and print media (Gabre-Madhin, 2012). The ECX enables
farmers to make both production and marketing decision on the basis of information.
In particular, they will help farmers know the quality grading of their product
12With the help of international donors such as Agency for International Development, the
Canadian International Development Agency, the World Bank, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, the United Nations Development Programme, World Food Program
and the European Union, Eleni Gabre-Madhin was the main driving force behind the successful
establishment of the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (Gabre-Madhin, 2012; Andersson et al., 2017).
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and the price premium they will earn from improving the quality of their coffee
(Gabre-Madhin, 2012). All of these services may help to promote production and
increase export earnings.
6.3 Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the impact of the establishment of the Ethiopian Commodities Exchange
(ECX) on coffee export, we estimate the following triple difference-in-difference
(DDD) specification within a gravity framework:
Exportijkt = exp[β1Treati×ECXk ×Postt + µit + µik + µkt + µij + µjt]εijkt (6.1)
where Exportijkt is export value of coffee from country i to country j during year t.
Country i denotes either Ethiopia or Kenya; whereas country j represents the top
trading partners of Ethiopia or Kenya.13 Treati is in an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 if the country is Ethiopia (the “treated” country) and 0 for Kenya (the
“control” country). ECXk is an indicator variable that takes a value 1 for coffee (the
ECX commodity) and 0 for non-ECX commodities including flower, fruit & vegetable,
spices, leather and hide & skin. Postt is a binary variable that switches from 0 before
2008 to 1 from 2008 on wards for both countries and products.
In our model, we take advantage of the disaggregated nature of our export data to
include a rich set of fixed effects that accounts for differences across time, countries
(i.e. importers and exporters) and products (i.e. ECX and non ECX products). In
Eq. (6.1), µit is a set of export-year fixed effects that subsume the typical gravity
regressors (such as such as importer and exporter GDP and multilateral resistance
terms); µik is exporter-product fixed effects that captures, for example, exporters
preferential trade policies on products that may affect commodity exports differently;
µkt is a set of product-year fixed effects that controls for potential commodity specific
13The thirty-three major trading partners of the two country are Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Egypt Arab Rep., France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran Islamic Rep.,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania,
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States.
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time varying factors; µij represent the exporter-importer fixed effects to account for
unobserved factors such as bilateral distance, language etc. The remaining term,
εijkt, is the error term.
The coefficient of interest (i.e. β1) captures the average impact of the ECX on
coffee exports of Ethiopia. To estimate Eq. (6.1), we use Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimation proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The PPML
approach has several methodological advantages over the common OLS estimation,
which involves the log-linearization of Eq. (6.1) and then estimating the parameters
of the log-linearized model. Firstly, log-linearizing the gravity equation will alter
the properties of the error term, such that the conditional expectation of the log
of the error term (i.e E(lnεijct)) will be a function of the regressors, which could
cause the estimates to be inconsistent (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Secondly, the
log-transformation of the gravity equation requires data with zero bilateral trade to
be dropped. For a typical developing country such as Ethiopia, there are many zero
bilateral trade values. Thus, we will lose a large amount of data if drop the zeros.
Importantly, the zeros are themselves informative. If we parse our bilateral trade data
to those with positive values, this could generate a sample section problem that could
bias our OLS estimates. For these reasons, it will be more appropriate to estimate
the multiplicative form of the gravity equation using the PPML approach (Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006, 2010).
Threats to Identification of the ECX: We highlight some concerns related to
identifying the impact of the ECX on the exports of coffee in Ethiopia. While some
of this concerns are common to all impact evaluation analysis, some are specific to
the ECX program.
Obtaining a Counterfactual : The first challenge in estimating the impact of the
ECX on the coffee exports of Ethiopia is to identify the appropriate counterfactual
group. We consider a neighboring country, Kenya, as the control since it is the
second largest African country that produces and exports Coffee Arabica but does not
have a commodity exchange. However, country-level difference-in-differences model
may falsely attribute a change in Ethiopia’s coffee export, caused by factors such
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as institutional reforms and infrastructural improvement, to the ECX. To address
this concern, we add non-ECX commodities ( flowers, fruits and vegetables, hide
and skin, leather and spices) as an additional control group. Hence, we estimate the
impact of the ECX on coffee exports using the triple differences (DDD) approach.
The triple difference approach by comparing the difference between export if coffee
(and ECX product) and other products ( non-ECX products) of Ethiopia to the
different between the exports of coffee and other commodity product of Kenya.
Because triple difference exploits country-commodity-year variations in exports, we
are able to control fixed effects to deal with potential confounding factors (Frazer and
Van Biesebroeck, 2010).
Parallel Trends : One of the main assumption for the validity of our identification is
that the change in export over time would have been the same across coffee and other
commodities, in the absence of the EXC. Using coffee exports data between 2003 to
2007, we perform a placebo test that falsely assumes 2006 as the starting period of
the ECX. In addition, we test the parallel trend assumption by comparing trends in
the exports of non-ECX commodities in Ethiopia and Kenya using data for the whole
sample period (2003-2013). The trends in the exports of non-ECX commodities of
both countries should follow the same trend regardless of the ECX.
Idiosyncratic or Covariate Shocks : The second issue comes from the fact that when
estimating β1, there are potential confounding factors. During the sample period,
there could be improvements in infrastructure, irrigation and trade facilitation that
could increase production and exports of coffee in Ethiopia. Without addressing this
possibility, we may falsely attribute these potential benefits to the ECX itself. To
address this issue, we include product-year fixed effects in Eq. (6.1) that partial out
all confounding time-varying or invariant factors affecting coffee exports.
In addition, the two coffee exporting countries– Ethiopia and Kenya – may
experience other institutional or policy reforms during the treatment period that
affects their coffee exports differently. To address this concern, we include
exporter-year fixed effects in Eq. (6.1) that capture the effects of aggregate shocks
on coffee export. These dummies also capture changes in GDP, income per capita,
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population and other aggregate variables that affect coffee exports in both countries.
We have also added exporter-product fixed effect to control for the possibility
of exporters preferential trade policies on product types that may affect different
products export differently.
Importers of Ethiopian coffee may also experience positive or negative
idiosyncratic shocks that affect Ethiopia’s coffee export. If these potential shocks
coincide with the ECX, the estimated effect of the ECX on exports may not reflect the
true impact. To address this issue, we include importer-year fixed effects in Eq. (6.1)
that eliminate the confounding effects of shocks to the importing countries. Similarly,
we also include the exporter-year fixed effect, as it takes care of all exporter specific
factors of exports – observed or unobserved, time-varying or time-invariant – such as
the exporter’s institution, GDP, per capita income and population. Furthermore, we
include importer-exporter fixed effects to partial out all characteristics between the
importer and exporter that affect how much they trade.
6.4 Data
We use data on exports of Ethiopia and Kenya to their common major trading
partners (Appendix A provides the full list of the major trading partners of the
two countries) for the period between 2003 and 2011. The export flow data is taken
from the UN Comtrade data base. If export flow is not reported in a given year,
it is set be zero during that particular year. For the model capturing the extensive
margin, we create a dummy dependent variable that is equal to 1 for non-zero exports
and 0 if otherwise.
Table 6.1 presents the summary statistics of the data. Columns (1) and
(2) report the mean and standard deviation of Ethiopia’s exports of agricultural
commodities including coffee, flower, spice and fruit and vegetable. Furthermore,
Columns (3) and (4) present the mean and standard deviation of Kenya’s exports
of the same commodities. The summary statistics shows that the average coffee
exports of Ethiopia ($441,503,400) is higher than the average coffee exports of Kenya
($96,931,500) for the 2003-2013 period. Moreover, Ethiopia average exports of hide
157
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics
Ethiopia Kenya
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Product (1) (2) (1) (2)
Coffee 441503.4 241646.6 96931.5 59316.7
Flower 54109.8 30328.3 367741.9 250960
Fruit and vegetable 95992.1 41469.3 221969.8 104748.9
Hide and skin 9438.3 9211.7 3889.9 3744.1
Leather 48349.8 23024.9 20358.9 9208.5
Spices 82825.5 1152.8 4895.7 3516.8
All agricultural products 169862.6 213051.9 120638.1 160419.5
All manufacturing products 26049.02 22284.46 24199.5 23330.3
Note: All the summary statistics values are in thousands (‘000) of US dollar. All agricultural
products include coffee, flower, spices and fruit & vegetable. Similarly all manufactured
products include leather and hide & skin.
& skin, leather and spices are larger than Kenya. The last two rows of Table 6.1
report the average exports of agricultural and manufactured products of the two
countries. The average export values indicate that Ethiopia and Kenya generate
nearly equal amount of of revenue from the exports of agricultural and semi-processed
manufactured goods in the sample period.
Figure 6.1 presents the time series plots of coffee exports for Ethiopia and Kenya
during 2003-2013. The blue dotted line shows the quantity of coffee exports for
Ethiopia and the red dotted line shows the quantity of coffee exports for Kenya.
These two plots show that the trends in coffee exports before the introduction of the
ECX were quite similar for both countries. However, the trend of Ethiopia’s coffee
exports shows a significant increase following the establishment of the ECX. This




Table 6.2 presents the triple difference (DDD) estimates of the impact of the ECX
on Ethiopia’s coffee export, based on Eq. (6.1). In Column (1), we include the
exporter-year, exporter-product, and product-year fixed effects. In Column (2) we
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Note: This figure shows the aggregate exports of coffee for Ethiopia and Kenya in
thousands of 60 kg bags.
add importer-exporter fixed effects. In Column (3), we include all the above fixed
effects. In all specifications, exporter-product clustered robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
In all specifications, the coefficient of interest (i.e. Treatment × ECX × Post) is
positive and statistically significant at 1%. In particular, the ECX increase Ethiopia’s
coffee exports by 84%.14 From the policy perspective, this large effect has significant
implication for the following reasons. Firstly, coffee exports accounts a quarter
(i.e. 25%) of Ethiopia’s export earning. Hence, the 84% increase in coffee exports
represents a 21% (i.e. 25%×84% ≈ 21%) boost in total export for Ethiopia. Secondly,
coffee faming provides a livelihood for 15 million Ethiopians (Moat et al., 2017). We
would therefore expect an increase in coffee exports to have a positive social economic
impact in Ethiopia. Finally, the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that market
reform in developing country could have higher effect than joining regional trade
14The formula to compute the effect of a dummy variable in a PPML model is (eβi − 1)× 100%,
where βi is the estimated coefficient of dummy variable i (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
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Table 6.2: The Impact of the ECX on Coffee Export: Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.616***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.721 0.771
Note: Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (6.1).
Treatment is an indicator variable that is equal 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and 0 for
Kenya’s exported products; ECX is 1 for coffee exports and zero for the other five exported
products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post is 1 after 2008
and zero otherwise. Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
agreements, trade concessions, and importer tariff reductions. For example, Frazer
and Van Biesebroeck (2010) show that US trade concession policy for Africa (also
known as AGOA) increases export by about 40% and Cheong et al. (2017) finds that
temporary removal of tariff following a natural disaster increases Pakistani export
by around 45%. These responses are only about one-half of the increase in coffee
exports, which follows from the introduction of coffee to the ECX platform.
6.5.2 Robustness Checks
In this section we examine the robustness of our results by performing five checks
consists of placebo test, alternative estimation method, alternative control groups
and assessments based on restriction of trading partners in the gravity model.
A. Placebo test
The main assumption required for the internal validity of our triple differenced
approach is the parallel trend assumption. This assumption requires that both treated
and control groups have the same trends if the treatment had not occurred. Hence,
we examine whether or not the exports of coffee (the treated group) and the other
commodities (the control group) had parallel trends before the introduction of the
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ECX, we falsely assume 2006 to be the treatment year (i.e the introduction of the
ECX) and estimate the model using only pre-treatment data ranges from 2003 to
2007 (because there is no treatment during these years).
Table 6.3 presents the results from the placebo test. In Column (1), we control
for the exporter-year, exporter-product and product-year fixed effects. In Column
(2), we control for importer-exporter fixed effects. In Column (3), we control for all
the interactive fixed effects. The estimated coefficients of the placebo tests are all
statistically insignificant. This suggests that there are nothing else, besides the ECX,
that had caused the ECX and non-ECX products to have divergent trends.
Table 6.3: The Impact of ECX on coffee exports with False Treatment Year
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post-2005 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 1584 1584 1584
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.697 0.704
Note: Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (6.1).
Year 2006 is used as false treatment period to check the validity of our identification strategy.
Hence, Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and
zero for Kenya’s exported products; ECX is 1 for coffee exports and zero for the other five exported
products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post − 2005 is
1 for 2006 and 2007 and zero otherwise. Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B. Alternative estimation method
The question of how to estimate gravity model is not trivial. Our baseline
results in Table 6.2 are based on Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML)
estimation. This approach provides consistent estimates in the presence of conditional
heteroskedasticity caused by log-linearizing the gravity model. However, its downside
is that it is a nonlinear regression approach; thus, it is not suitable for estimating
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models with a large number of fixed effects (Magee, 2008).15 To check if our baseline
result is an artifact of the estimation approach chosen, we re-estimated the model
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which allows us to control for many
fixed effects in the model.
Table 6.4: The Impact of the ECX on Coffee Exports: OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 1.170*** 1.170*** 1.170***
(0.141) (0.143) (0.148)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
Note: OLS is used to estimate Eq. (6.1) using log(1 + Exportijkt) as the dependent variable.
Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and zero for
Kenya’s exported products; ECX is 1 for coffee exports and zero for the other five exported
products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post is 1 after 2008
and zero otherwise. Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The OLS results, provided in Table 6.4, show that the coefficients on Treatment×
ECX × Post are positive and statistically significant at 1% level.16 Therefore, there
is no evidence that the statistical significance of our baseline results is dependent on
the estimation method chosen.
C. Restricting the control (non-ECX) commodities
In the baseline results, our control group (non-ECX commodities) consists of both
agricultural items (flower, spices, fruit and vegetable) and non-agricultural items
(leather, hide and skin) that are not traded via the ECX. However, there may be
a concern that factors such as agricultural policy may affect the exports of coffee
and agricultural commodities more uniformly than the exports of non-agricultural
commodities. Thus, by including non-agricultural commodities into our regression,
15For example, although it is infrequent, the PPML estimator automatically excludes some of our
fixed effects (due to collinearity) in our baseline model which might be a bit concerning.
16Notably, the OLS estimates are quite large compared to the PPML estimates of Table 6.2.
This results are consistent with the evidence documented by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) that OLS
overestimates the effect of trade attributes in gravity model due to misspecification issues.
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Table 6.5: Using only Agricultural Goods as Control Group
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 0.661*** 0.661*** 0.661***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 2376 2376 2376
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.735 0.787
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and
zero for Kenya’s exported products; ECX is 1 for coffee exports and zero for the other three
agricultural exported products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, and spices); and Post is 1 after
2008 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to
estimate Eq. (6.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
this may accentuate the contrast between coffee and non-coffee exports after the ECX
was established. Therefore, the non-agricultural commodities in our control group
could be responsible for the statistical significance of the ECX.
To reduce such potential contrast between coffee and non-ECX commodities, we
restrict the control group to agricultural commodities only. Table 6.5 shows that
the impact of ECX on coffee exports remains positive and statistically significant at
1% significance level. This suggests that our baseline results are not driven by the
inclusion of non-agricultural commodities into the control group.
D. Varying the sample of trading partners
In the baseline regressions (Table 6.2), we have used data on bilateral coffee and
non-coffee exports of Ethiopia and Kenya to 33 major trading partners. One concern
about the gravity model is that its estimates are potentially sensitive to the sample of
trading partners included in the analysis (Magee, 2008). For example, Haveman and
Hummels (1998) have shown that the effect of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) on
trade is sensitive to the sample of trading partners used in the analysis. When the
number of the sample countries is changed, the effects of RTA vary dramatically as
well.
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Here, we explore if our baseline results are robust to the use of different sample
countries. As a robustness check, we have re-estimated our model using the top 20, 15
and 10 trading partners and with all the interactive fixed effects (i.e. exporter-year,
exporter-product, product-year, importer-exporter and importer-year fixed effects).
In Table 6.6, Columns (1)-(3) present the estimation results associated with the use
of the top 20, 15 and 10 trading partners, respectively. Based on these results, we
find that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of the triple interaction term
increases when we reduce the number of trading partners. In addition, the estimated
coefficients of the triple interaction term are positive and statistically significant at
least at 5% significance level. This suggests that the statistical significance of the
ECX for exports is not driven artificially by the sample of countries
Table 6.6: The Impact of ECX on Coffee Export: Using Different Top Trading
Partners
(1) (2) (3)
Top 20 partners Top 15 partners Top 10 partners
Treatment × ECX × Post 1.046*** 1.177*** 1.190**
(0.252) (0.216) (0.589)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer Yes Yes Yes
Importer × Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2160 1590 1060
Pseudo R2 0.793 0.800 0.867
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and zero
for Kenya’s exported products; ECX is 1 for coffee exports and zero for the other five exported
products (i.e. flower, leather, hide & skin, fruit & vegetable, and spices); and Post is 1 after
2008 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to
estimate Eq. (6.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
E. Alternative definition of the treatment year
The Ethiopia Commodities Exchange was established in April 2008 and launched
its operation by trading wheat, maize and beans. However, the world food price
crisis that affected Ethiopia’s grain market has led the ECX to introduce coffee trade
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into the exchange.17 Hence, we address this concern by re-defining the treatment
year as 2009 instead of 2008 and assess the impact of the ECX. Table 6.7 shows the
triple-difference results when we assume 2009 as a beginning of the treatment year.
The estimated coefficients in Columns (1)-(3) show that the ECX has a positive and
statistically significant effect on coffee export. Compared to the baseline results (when
2008 is defined as the treatment year), the coefficients of the triple interaction term
in Table 6.7 only vary slightly. Thus, whether we use 2008 or 2009 as the treatment
year will not affect our conclusion about the statistical significance and impact of the
ECX.
Table 6.7: The Impact of ECX on Coffee Export: an Alternative Treatment Year
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post2009 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.543***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.720 0.771
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and zero
for Kenya’s exported products; ECX is 1 for coffee exports and zero for the other five exported
products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices, leather, and hide & skin); and Post2009 is 1 after
2009 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to
estimate Eq. (6.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
6.6 Further Analysis
6.6.1 Does the ECX Matters for the Export Extensive
Margins?
The previous results primarily focus on the effect of the ECX on the intensive margin
(i.e. volume) of coffee exports. However, the establishment of the ECX may also
17After a serous of intensive discussions with the government and other stake holders, in July
2008 a law was passed to trade and export coffee through ECX.
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increase the number of destinations, the extensive margin, to which coffee is exported.
In this section, we examine the effect of the ECX on the extensive margin of coffee
exports. Following Cheong et al. (2017), we re-estimate Eq. (6.1) using the PPML
estimator, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if
positive trade flows occur to a certain product-destination-year and zero otherwise.
Table 6.8: The Effect of ECX on Coffee Export: Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × ECX × Post 0.095** 0.095** 0.095**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes Yes
Importer × Year No No Yes
Observations 3564 3564 3564
Pseudo R2 0.231 0.319 0.345
Note: Our dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if positive trade flows occur
to a certain product-destination-year and zero otherwise. Treatment is an indicator variable that
equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and zero for Kenya’s exported products; ECX is 1 for
coffee exports and zero for the other five exported products (i.e. flower, fruit & vegetable, spices,
leather, and hide & skin); and Post is 1 after 2008 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to estimate Eq. (6.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6.8 reports the DDD results on how ECX affects the extensive margin of
coffee exports. As the coefficients in Columns (1) to (3) show, regardless of the
fixed effects used in the gravity model equation, the introduction of coffee in the
Ethiopian agricultural exchange system increases the probability of coffee exports
to new destinations by about 10%. The estimated coefficients are also statistically
significant at least at the 5% level. This suggests that besides the intensive margin,
a commodity exchange could also increase the extensive margins of the commodity
trade.
6.6.2 ECX and the Exports of Non-ECX Commodities
Our baseline triple-differenced estimate may overestimate the impact of the ECX
on coffee exports if the exports of non-ECX commodities (the the “control”) are
negatively affected by the ECX. For example, if the ECX leads coffee production
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more profitable, farmers of other agricultural commodities may switch to coffee
production. As such, we examine whether the ECX has such spillover effects on
exports of non-ECX commodities in Ethiopia. In carrying out this analysis, we use
the following regression specification:
Exportijkt = exp[β1Treati × Productk × Postt + µit + µik + µkt + µij + µjt]εijkt
(6.2)
where Exportijkt indicates the exports of non-ECX product k (i.e. flower, fruit &
vegetable, spices and hide & skin) from country i to country j at time t. µij, µit,
µik, µkt, and µjt represent the importer-exporter, exporter-year, exporter-product,
product-year and importer-year fixed effects respectively. Our coefficient of interest
in this DDD model is β1. If ECX does not have any spillover effects, β4 will be
statistically insignificant.
Table 6.9: The Effect of the ECX on the Exports of non-ECX Commodities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flower export Fruit & Veg.
Treatment ×Product× Post -0.102 -0.102 -0.075 -0.075
(0.073) (0.073) (0.092) (0.092)
Fixed Effects
Exporter × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter × Importer No Yes No Yes
Importer × Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 2970 2970 2970 2970
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.836 0.062 0.836
Note: Treatment is an indicator variable that equals 1 for Ethiopia’s exported products and
zero for Kenya’s exported products; Product is 1 for Flower exports (Column (1) and (2)) or for
fruit and vegetable exports (Column (3) and (4)) and zero for the other four non-ECX exported
products (i.e. spices, leather, and hide & skin, flower or fruit & vegetable); and Post2008 is 1 after
2008 and zero otherwise. Poison pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to
estimate Eq. (6.1). Exporter-Product clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (6.9) presents estimates of Eq. (6.2). The coefficient of interest (Treatment
× Product ×Post) is statistically insignificant, suggesting that ECX does not have
effect on the exports of non-ECX commodities (flower and fruit & vegetables). Thus,
there is evidence that the ECX only affects coffee exports, and that the estimated
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effect of the ECX on coffee exports reported in the baseline is not accentuated by




The establishment of a agricultural commodities exchange in developing countries is
often justified by arguments that it would motivate farmers to produce more and
eventually to export. However, such arguments are mainly based on anecdotes,
not empirical evidence. In this paper, we look at the issue of whether developing
countries would benefit from having a commodity exchange. To do so, we study the
effects of ECX on coffee exports in Ethiopia. Using a triple-differencing approach,
we find that the establishment of the ECX has led to an increase in Ethiopia’s coffee
exports by about 84%. To put things into perspective, the impact of the ECX
on exports is twice the impact of joining regional trade agreements (Magee, 2008)
or trade concession policies such as AGOA (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010) and
temporary removal of tariff following a natural disaster (Cheong et al., 2017) on trade.
Therefore, a commodity exchange is worth considering for developing countries with
a large agricultural sector, as the case of ECX suggests that the benefits of having a
commodity exchange could be substantial.
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Appendix A: List of Trading Partners
Table A1: List of Trading Partners of Ethiopia and Kenya in the Sample
Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria
Canada China Egypt Arab Rep. France
Germany Greece India Iran Islamic Rep.
Israel Italy Japan Korea Rep.
Kuwait Malaysia Morocco Netherlands
Pakistan Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia
South Africa Sweden Switzerland Thailand
Turkey Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom
United States
Note: We consider the exports of Ethiopia and Kenya for their 33 common trading partners. The
sample period extends from 2003-2011.
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Recent studies show that genealogically distant populations tend to differ more
in a variety of characteristics transmitted intergenerationally, such as language,
appearance, norms, values, customs, beliefs, and habits. Differences in these traits
between countries and the world technology frontier, the US, can deter the exchange of
ideas and reduce opportunities for learning, adoption of technologies, and innovations.
Most of these studies, however, have often focused on country-level data and little
is known at a micro-level analysis. In particular, whether genetic distance from the
world technology frontier influences firm productivity in laggard countries or not is yet
to be established. Building on earlier study by Comin and Hobijn (2010), we propose
a theoretical framework highlighting the mechanism through which genetic distance
from the world leader acts as a barrier to technology adoption in laggard countries,
thus influencing negatively firms’ productivity in those countries. There are some
challenges in testing this theory empirically. First, the treatment variable (genetic
distance) is measured at country-level while the outcome variable (firm productivity)
is available at firm-level, which renders the standard panel data method useless in
identifying the causal effect since the treatment is dropped out after a within-type
transformation. Second, there is a substantial heterogeneity across the distribution
of firms’ productivity so that a mean-type regression analysis such as the two-stage
least squares method is not appropriate. Using a novel method on quantile treatment
models with group-level unobservables recently proposed by Chetverikov et al. (2016),
we show that the impact of genetic distance on firm productivity is consistently
negative and near inverted U-shaped across the distribution of firms’ productivity.
Clearly, firms operating in a country genealogically far from the technology leader
tend on average to have lower level of productivity but it is often the case that two
countries, one with a very low technology adoption and the other with a moderate or
relatively high technology adoption can be impacted identically by the same shock
on current genetic distance. This may justify why some countries that appear closer
to the US have not benefited from technology adoption compared with their peers
that are genealogically far from the US, or vis-versa.
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7.1 Introduction
Many empirical studies document substantial and persistent measured productivity
differences across countries— e.g., see Hsieh and Klenow (2010) and the review by
Syverson (2011). Such differences are also observed across firms within a country,
even at a narrowly defined industry code (e.g., four-digit SIC); Syverson (2004).
Studies aiming to explain these differences often focus on the aggregate productivity
growth— the source of almost all per capita income differences across countries into
various micro-components, with the intent of better understanding the sources of
such growth (Hall and Jones, 1999; Foster et al., 2001; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009,
2010). It is well known that various factors– such as geography, luck, institutions,
culture, and policies– can explain income differences across countries through their
direct influence on human/physical capital and total factor productivity (TFP); see
Hsieh and Klenow (2010). Most of these theories have been assessed empirically
with success (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Bove and Gokmen, 2017; Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2016; Jäggi et al., 2018) with country-level data. However, we know little
on why do firms differ so much in productivity across countries.
Earlier studies that addressed differences in productivity across countries includes
Hsieh and Klenow (2010), Bartelsman et al. (2013), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Midrigan and Xu (2014). For example, Hsieh and
Klenow (2010) discuss why total factor productivity (TFP) varies across countries,
highlighting misallocation of inputs across firms and industries as a key determinant.
In this paper, we look at a different chain of causality that may explain differences
in firms’ productivity across countries. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) shows that
genetic distance can capture cultural traits transmitted intergenerationally over the
long run within populations, thus acting as a prominent source of large and persistent
variations in income across countries. Following this idea and earlier study by Comin
and Hobijn (2010), we proposes a theoretical framework highlighting the mechanism
through which genetic distance from the world leader, the United States, acts as a
barrier to technology adoption in laggard countries, thus influencing negatively the
TFP of firms in those countries.
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There are some challenges in testing this theory empirically. First, the treatment
variable (genetic distance) is measured at country-level while the outcome variable
(firm productivity) is available at firm-level, which makes the standard panel data
method useless in identifying the causal effect since the treatment variable will be
dropped out after a within-type transformation. Second, there is a substantial
heterogeneity across the distribution of firm productivity, hence a mean-type
regression analysis is not appropriate, i.e., a distributional method, such as a
quantile regression analysis, is warranted. Third, due to the presence of group-level
unobservables (country fixed effects) in the model, a standard quantile regression
such as in Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) will yield inconsistent estimates, thus is
also not appropriate in dealing with this type of problems.
Using a novel method on quantile treatment models with group-level
unobservables recently proposed by Chetverikov et al. (2016) that accommodates
the above problems, along with more than 32,000 firms from 94 countries, we show
that the impact of genetic distance on firm productivity is consistently negative and
near inverted U-shaped across the distribution of firms’ total factor productivity
(TFP). This means that the relationship between genetic distance and TFP is
not monotonically decreasing. Indeed, although firms operating in a country
genealogically far from the technology leader (the US) tend to have lower level of
productivity, it is also the case that a country with a very low technology adoption
(i.e., a very low TFP) and that with a moderate or relatively high technology adoption
can be impacted identically by the same shock on current genetic distance. This
may justify why some countries that appear genealogically closer to the US have
not benefited from technology adoption compared with their peers that are far from
the US, or vice versa. We provide several robustness checks that show that the
near inverted U-shape property of the relationship between genetic distance and the
distribution of firms’ TFP is: (i) robust to alternative measures of productivity and
genetic distance; (ii) robust to the inclusion of institutional quality and trade openness
in the model; (iii) robust to the exclusion of European countries whose genetic data
are likely measured with less error than non-European countries.
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Moreover, we discuss a plausible chain of causality that my explain differences
in firms’ TFP across countries. Indeed, we document that current genetic distance
is negatively correlated with technology adoption in the 1500AD, which in turns
is strongly positively associated with current median firms’ TFP across countries.
As such, one may expect current genetic distance to have a negative impact on
the distribution (at least the median) of firms’ TFP, thus corroborating the main
findings of our study. It is nonetheless important to note that the latter analysis is
only based on correlations, so more investigations are required to clarify if genetic
distance influences firms’ productivity through its impact on the technology adoption
in the 1500AD. We leave these investigations for future research.
Our study contributes to the emerging empirical literature on the impact of
genetic distance on technology diffusion.1 For example, Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009) show that genetic distance is a key determinant of differences in income
across countries, and their result is robust to the inclusion of covariates such as
geographical distance, climatic differences, transportation costs, and measures of
historical, linguistic, and religious distance. Bove and Gokmen (2017) show that
the negative impact of genetic distance on income across countries is stable over
time, while Proto and Oswald (2017) establish that some nations may have a genetic
advantage in well-being– e.g., the closer is a nation to the genetic makeup of Denmark
the happier this nation is. Similarly, Ang and Kumar (2014) investigate the impact
of genetic distance from the world technology frontier on financial development.
They find that genetic distance negatively affects financial development through
its influence on countries ability to adopt innovations from the frontier technology.
Although all these studies have some similarity with ours, there are two fundamental
differences. First, our study examines the impact of a group-level treatment (genetic
distance, that is measures at country-level) on a micro-level outcome (firms’ TFP,
that measures at firm-level), while theirs focus on a group-level analysis as both
their treatment (genetic distance) and the outcome (income/financial development)
variables are measured at country-level. Second, while their studies focus on a
1See Giuliano et al. (2006), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), Guiso et al. (2009),Ang and Kumar
(2014), Bove and Gokmen (2017), Ashraf and Galor (2013b) and Ashraf and Galor (2013a).
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mean-type regression analysis, we show that a distributional approach is warranted
to capture heterogeneity across the distribution of the outcome variable. As such,
applying a mean-type regression approach, such as the 2SLS method, often yields an
inconsistent estimate of the treatment impact on the outcome variable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents the theoretical
framework that leads to a testable empirical econometric specification. Section 7.3
presents the empirical specification and describes the estimation strategy. Section
7.4 provides a brief description of the data, including the data sources and the main
variables used in the paper. Sections 7.5 presents the baseline results, while Section
7.7 provides some robustness checks. Section 7.8 introduces a brief mechanism that




A theoretical model describing the mechanism through which genetic distance from
the frontier country can endogenously affects technology adoption in laggard countries
(thus impacting on firms’ productivity) was first developed Comin and Hobijn (2010).
In this section, we show how this theoretical framework can be adapted to a micro
level analysis. In particular, we demonstrate how genetic distance can influence
firms’ total factor productivity (TFP), and we test the theory with an econometric
specification.
Following Comin and Hobijn (2010), we consider a three sectors model: the
households, the world technology frontier, and the firms. We assume there are
identical households in the economy with unit mass. Each household supplies
inelastically a unit of labor, receives wage (w), and saves in bonds that are available in
the domestic market with zero net supply. The representatives household maximizes
his life time utility subject to the budget constraint and the no-Ponzi scheme
condition on bonds. The technology frontier country is characterized by a set
of technologies and vintages specific to each technology at time t. At each instant
t a new technology (τ) exogenously appears. Denoting a technology by the time it
was invented, the range of technologies invented by the frontier country are given by
(−∞, t]. For each existing technology, a new and more productive vintage appears in
the world frontier at every t. We denote the vintage of technology τ by Vτ . Vintages
are indexed by the time in which they appear. Hence, the set of existing vintages of
technology τ available at time t is [τ , t]. The productivity of a technology has two
components: Z(τ, Vτ ) and aτ . The component Z(τ, Vτ ) is common across countries
and is purely determined by technological attributes, i.e.
Z(τ, Vτ ) = e
(χ+γ)τ+γ(Vτ−τ) = e(χτ+γVτ ) (7.1)
where (χ+γ)τ is the productivity level associated with the first vintage of technology
τ and γ(Vτ − τ) represents the productivity level associated with the introduction of
new vintages. The second component, aτ , is the country specific productivity term
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that is described in (7.2) below.
Identical firms operate competitively in each country. They adopt a new
technology τ from the frontier countries, combine it with labor and intermediate
goods to produce output. We assume countries that are adopting a technology τ are
below the world technology frontier country. If Dτ denotes the adoption lag that
reflects the time lag between when the best vintage in use was invested and when
it was invented for production in the economy, then the vintage of technology τ is
defined as Vτ = [τ, t−Dτ ] and represents the set of technology-τ vintages available in
the economy. We also assume that new vintages (τ, V ), where V ≡ Vτ hereinafter, are
used in production through new intermediate goods that embody them. Intermediate
goods Xτ,V are combined with labor Lτ,V to produce output Yτ,V associated with a
given vintage. The form of the production function for Yτ,V is given by:





In (7.2), aτ represents the factors that reduce the effectiveness of a technology in
a country. Comin and Mestieri (2014) designate it as barriers to the diffusion of
technology. aτ also determines the long-run penetration rate of technology in a given
country, thus is usually referred to as the intensive margin of technology adoption.
The representative firm combines the outputs associated with the different









for some µ > 1. (7.3)









for some θ > 1, (7.4)
where τ denotes the most advanced technology adopted in the economy.
As shown by Comin and Hobijn (2010), the ‘factor demand’ and ‘final output
can be derived straightforwardly. More precisely, taking the price of the final output
as the numeraire, both he demand for an output produced with a given technology
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and that of a particular technology vintage are given by:










where Pτ is the price of sector τ output and Pτ,V refers to the price of the (τ, V )
intermediate good. Equation (7.5) indicates that both the national income (Y ) and
the price of the technology (Pτ ) affect the demand of output produced with a given
technology τ . Due to the homotheticity of the production function, the income
elasticity of technology τ output is one. Thus under perfect competition, the demand













From (7.3), we can thus express the production function of total output produced









Lτ,V dV is the total amount of labor employed in sector τ , Xτ =∫ t−Dτ
τ
Xτ,V dV is the productivity level associated with technology τ , and Zτ denotes

























Equation (7.11) indicates clearly that the productivity of technology τ is determined
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by three factors: the intensive margin (aτ ), the embodiment effect (which shows
the productivity of the best vintage), and the variety effect (which represents the
productivity gains from using more vintages). As such, the adoption lag Dτ has
two effects on Zτ . First, the shorter Dτ the more productive are the vintages used.
Second, a shorter Dτ implies that more varieties are used, which in turns leads to
higher productivity.













Following Comin and Hobijn (2010), the process that governs the diffusion of
technology in this model is given by:
yτ − y =
θ
θ − 1
[zτ − (1− α)(y − l)], (7.13)
where yτ is the log of sectoral output produced with technology τ , y is the log of
final (aggregate) output, hence yτ − y is the log of the share of sectoral output with
technology τ in the total output, θ is the elasticity of substitution, zτ is the log of
productivity associated with technology τ , 1−α is the share of labor in the production
of yτ , l is the log of the total amount of labor employed in the production of Y , and
(y − l) represents the log of per capita output.
From (7.11), we can write zτ when max{t−Dτ , τ} = t−Dτ as:












Applying a double Taylor expansions to (7.14) as in Comin and Hobijn (2010) yields:2
zτ = ln(ατ )+(χ+γ)τ +(µ−1)ln(t−τ −Dτ )+
γ
2
(t−τ −Dτ )+R(t−Dτ −τ ; γ, µ), (7.15)
2Where we first take a Taylor expansion of order 2 of 1 − e−
γ
µ−1 (t−Dτ−τ) around the starting
adoption date, and then apply the log operator to the result, and take again a Taylor expansion of
order 1 of the latter result.
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where R(·) is the accumulated error resulting from the two expansions and is a
function of t− τ −Dτ and the parameters γ and µ. The log intensive margin, ln(ατ ),
appearing on the RHS of (7.15) incorporates all the sets of barriers for the adoption
of technology τ by the country, (χ + γ)τ is the associated productivity level, µ is
the elasticity of substitution parameter in the sectoral output production function,
while Dτ is the age of the best vintage available for production in the country for
technology τ.
By substituting (7.15) into (7.13), we can write yτ − y as:


















θ−1(µ − 1), δ1 =
θ
θ−1 , δ2 =
− θ
θ−1(1 − α), and R(t − Dτ − τ ; γ, µ, θ) =
θ
θ−1R(t − Dτ − τ ; γ, µ). Clearly, (7.16) is
the linear projection of yτ − y on a constant, time trends t and ln(t − τ −Dτ ), the
log intensive margin aτ , and the log of per capita output, where R(t−Dτ − τ ; γ, µ, θ)
can be viewed as the error associated with this projection. As such, the long-run
barriers to the diffusion of technology to a country are captured by the intensive
margin ατ [similar to Comin and Ferrer (2013) and Comin and Mestieri (2014)]. In
particular, Comin and Mestieri (2014) highlights that the factors that determined
the intensive margin (ατ ) for a given country are: genetic distance from the frontier
country, human capital, geographical factors (such as landlockedness, distance from
the technology frontier, tropical land area), openness to trade, institutional factors
and other cultural factors. Therefore, we can specify a linear model for the intensive
margin (in natural log) as:
ln(ατ ) = φ0 +GDφ1 +Xφ2 + vτ , (7.17)
where GD is the measure of genetic distance from the technology frontier, X includes
other control variables (landlockedness, absolute latitude, tropical land area, legal
origin, language distance, and religion distance), φ0 is the intercept, φ1 is the
coefficient on genetic distance, φ2 denotes a parameter vector on X, and vτ is an
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error term. By substituting (7.17) into (7.16), we obtain the specification
yτ − y = βτ + γ1t+ γ2ln(t− τ −Dτ ) +GDβ1 +Wβ2 + ετ , (7.18)





′, W = [X
... y− l], and ετ = R(t−Dτ−τ ; γ, µ, θ)+
δ1vτ . In this study, we investigate how a relationship such as (7.16) evolves at a
micro-level (i.e., at firms level), rather than a country-level as usually done in the
literature on this topic.
To enable a micro-level analysis, we look at the diffusion of total factor
productivity (TFP) of firms as oppose to output in the country-level specification
(7.16). In particular, our main objective is to identify the effect of genetic distance on
firms’ TFP in developing countries. We stress the fact that TFP is often regarded as a
measure of technology in the economy, especially in the early versions of real business
cycle (RBC) models where it is well documented that growth in TFP drives growth in
the long term. The main difficulty in our analysis is that genetic distance (treatment
variable of interest) is measured at country-level while TFP data are available at
firm-level. This render the standard panel data method such as fixed estimation
useless in identifying β1 since the variable GD will disappear after a within-type
transformation. Using recent developments on quantile treatment models with
group-level unobservables, we are able to identify β1 (the effect of genetic distance on
TFP) despite the presence of grup-level unobservable confounding factors. Section
7.3 details the empirical specification as well as the estimation strategy.
7.3 Empirical Specification
To identify the effect of genetic distance on TFP, we use a quantile treatment approach
when group-level unobservables are present. Section 7.3.1 presents the specification
used, while issues related to model identification are discussed in Section 7.3.2.
Finally, Section 7.3.3 describes briefly the measurement of firms’ total productivity
(TFP) by the World Bank analysis unit.
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7.3.1 Model
Let U denote a set of quantile indices and consider the framework of IV quantile
regression for grouped-level treatments (Chetverikov et al., 2016):




cγ2(u) + εc(u) (7.19)
εc(u) = f(u, ηc), (7.20)
where QTFPic|GDc,Xic,Zc,εc(u) is the uth conditional quantile of TFPic given
(GDc, Xic, Zc, εc) for firm i in country c, GDc is a measure of genetic distance of
country c with respect to the global technological frontier (here the US),Xic is a vector
of firm-level characteristics3 that affect the productivity of firm i in country c, Zc is a
vector of country-level control variables,4 εc ≡ {εc(u) : u ∈ U} is a set of country-level
unobserved random shifters which maps the unobserved country-level covariates ηc
affecting TFPic but not included in Zc through an unknown function f(·). There is no
parametric restriction on the form of f(u, ηc), hence any arbitrary nonlinear effects of
the country-level unobserved covariates are allowed. The parameters β(u) and γj(u)
(j = 1, 2) are unknown: β(u) and γ2(u) represent the effect of group-level covariates,
while γ1(u) represents those of individual-level covariates. Industry specific effect
is omitted from (7.19)-(7.20) because the study focuses on manufacturing firms only
and the estimation of the TFP (see Section 7.3.3) assumed homogeneity in technology
within each sub-sector of industries, including the manufacturing sector.5 We assume
that Xic and Zc are exogenous, i.e., E[Xicεc(u)] = 0 and E[Zcεc(u)] = 0, but GDc
may be endogenous due to various reasons discussed in the next subsection.
We are particularly interested in estimating β(u), which measures the effect of
genetic distance on TFP at the uth quantile. As discussed previously, most studies
3These include age, size and ownership types.
4These include GDP, per capita income, trade openness, institution, tertiary education, legal
origin, language, and religion distance and geographical variables such as landlockedness, absolute
latitude, tropical region, land area, distance.
5The World Bank classifies industries into sectors of two-digit ISIC codes, and estimates TFP of
each firms by controlling for sectoral fixed effects. Due to homogeneity in the production function
across firms within sub-sectors, sectoral fixed effects constitute good approximation of industries
specific effects, and the latter are quite constant within each sub-sector in the classification of the
World Bank.
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on the topic have taken the mean regression approach which does not allow to account
for heterogeneous effect of genetic distance across the distribution the TFP variable.
For example, one expect the effect of genetic distance to be higher on the upper
quantiles of the distribution of TFP than the lower quantiles, but the mean-type
regression cannot pick up these differences. Chetverikov et al. (2016) outlined the
difficulty to identify β(u) using the traditional fixed effect panel data method. Indeed,
the genetic distance variable (GDc) is measured at country-level, hence is constant
across firms in a given country. As such, a within-group transformation will eliminate
it from the regression. Chetverikov et al. (2016) propose a quantile estimation method
that can be applied even in the presence of country-level unobservables [i.e., εc(u)].
Before moving on to the description of this method, it is important discuss issues
related to the identification of β(u) in model (7.19)-(7.20).
7.3.2 Threat to Identification and Estimation Strategy
The presence of country-level unobservables render the use of standard quantile
regression techniques, such as the methodology of Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978),
inconsistent, and this is true even if the country-level treatment variable, GDc, were
exogenous. Recent studies have expanded Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) framework
to models similar to (7.19)-(7.20); see Kato et al. (2012) and Kato and Galvao (2011).
However, these studies often focus on estimating γ1(u) (rather than β(u)) so that a
within-group transformation still applies. As the focus of our study is to estimate
β(u), the techniques in Kato et al. (2012) and Kato and Galvao (2011) are not
applicable and an alternative method is warranted.
Another problem is that GDc is possibly endogenous in (7.19)-(7.20). This,
along with the presence of country-level unobservables εc, complicate further the
identification of β(u). They are various reasons sustaining the endogeneity of GDc
in this model. First, the unobserved country specific effect (ηc) affecting firms
productivity are likely to be correlated with genetic distance (e.g., see Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2009). Second, genetic distance is possibly measured with error
due to migration (e.g., see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Ang and Kumar, 2014),
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therefore cannot be exogenous. Third, they may be a problem of reverse causality as
migration could lead to a pattern of genetic distances today that is closely linked to
technology adoption and productivity. To identify the causal effect of GD on TFP ,
it is important to account for these problems. Since we are interested only on the
effect that genetic distance exert on TFP, we did not specify a full system showing
all interactions between GD and TFP. Rather, we adopt the limited information
approach as described in (7.19)-(7.20). In particular, we deal with the endogeneity
issue by using the measure of genetic distance from the UK in 1500 relative to the
English population (namely GD1500c,UK) as an instrumental variable (IV) for GDc. We
argue that GD1500c,UK does not have a direct influence on the current TFP of laggard
countries as the mass migration of the modern era started after 1500. GD1500c,UK is
also possibly a strong instrument because it likely highly correlated with the current
genetic distance of laggard countries which are measured relative to the US. A failure
of at least one of these two conditions constitutes a threat to identification. While the
strength of GD1500c,UK can be assessed using, for example, a weak IV test,
6 unfortunately
its validity cannot be tested since the model is exactly identified (in the sense that
we only have one instrument and one endogenous regressor in the specification).
Now, suppose that the orthogonality condition E[GD1500c,UKεc(u)] = 0 is satisfied
for all u ∈ U , i.e., GD1500c,UK is a valid instrument for GD at every quantile of
the distribution of TFP. From Chetverikov et al. (2016), β(u) can be consistently
estimated following a two-step methodology as described below.
Step 1 : For each country c and each quantile u ∈ U , estimate the uth quantile
regression of TFPic on Xic and Zc using the data {(TFPic, Xic, Zc) : i =
1, . . . , Nc} by the classical quantile regression of Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978):
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Step 2 : Estimate a 2SLS regression of β̂c(u) ≡ β̂c on GDc using GD1500c,UK as an
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(β̂1, . . . , β̂G)
′, and for any full-columns rank matrix W , PW = W (W
′W )−W ′
is the projection matrix on the space spanned by the columns of W.
The estimator β̂(u) in (7.22) is consistent and asymptotically normal if G → ∞
and G2/3ln(NG)/NG → 0, along with other regularity conditions (Chetverikov et al.,
2016, Assumptions 1–8), where NG = min
c=1,...,G
Nc. It is worth noting that the number
of countries in our sample is G = 94, which may not be very large as required for
β̂(u) to achieve consistency and asymptotic normality. However, the Monte Carlo
simulations (see Chetverikov et al., 2016, Table A.I) show that β̂(u) has an overall
good properties even when G = 25, which is far less than 94 groups in our sample.
7.3.3 Measurement of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
This study uses TFP data from the World Bank (WB) analysis unit, and have
been estimated following a two-step methodology. First, the production function
is estimated for each industry in each country. Then, firms’ TFP is deduced as a
Solow residual of this production function.






where Yi is the output of firm i, Li is labor inputs (represented by the total annual
cost of labor), Ki is the capital (represented by the replacement value of machinery,
vehicles, and equipment), and Ai measures the TFP of the firm.
7 Due to the lack
of physical output data, the WB analysis unit employs a revenue-based estimation
7We have also used the estimates of TFP based on an extension of model (7.23) that includes
raw material (Mi) and our main findings are quality the same with those using TFP measured from
(7.23).
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of the TFP, i.e., Yi is the total annual sales of the establishment. This approach
raises some econometric issues. First, input choice is likely to be correlated with the
productivity of the producers. Second, there may be a selection bias as less efficient
producers are more likely to exit from the sample. Syverson (2011) argues that the
selection problem is not important because producers with high productivity will
likely be efficient regardless of the specific way their productivity is measured.
Another problem also is that the specification (7.23) assumes perfectly competitive
markets with common production technology. This assumption is restrictive, and in
order to incorporate some form of heterogeneity, the WB analysis unit estimates
the production function (7.23) by grouping industries in sectors of two-digit ISIC
codes. The elasticities of labor and capital (ak and al) are allowed to vary by
income-level categorized according to the WB classification. To control for an average
economy-level and time specific effects, dummy variables for each country and year
are included. More specifically, the econometric model used by the WB to estimate
TFP at the sectoral level is given by:
ln(Yisc) = α1 ln(Kisc) + α2 ln(Lisc) + α3 ln(Kisc)× Ic + α4 ln(Lisc)× Ic + νisc
νsci = ωc + ωy + λs + ζisc, (7.24)
where ln(Yisc), ln(Kisc), and ln(Lisc) are the natural log of output, capital, and labor
respectively, of firm i in sector s and country c; Ic is a dummy variable indicating
whether country c is high or low income based on the WB classification as of the year
in which each survey was conducted; ωc and ωy captures country and year fixed effects,
while λs is sector specific effect, and ζisc are idiosyncratic shocks. The total factor
productivity (TFPisc) is the Solow residual of the production function, therefore is
approximated by the residual from the regression (7.24) including the fixed effect
terms, i.e.
T̂FP isc = ω̂c + ω̂y + λ̂s + ζ̂isc. (7.25)
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7.4 Data
The data on firms are obtained from the World Bank enterprise survey (WBES). The
survey was conducted between 2006 and 2010 on more than 30,000 manufacturing
firms from over 100 countries. The survey questionnaire contains identical questions
for all countries and industries were stratified by size and income level. The survey
provides an exhaustive information on firm-level productivity (TFP) estimates (the
fraction of output that is not explained by the amount of inputs used), firms’
commencement year, ownership type, sale, labor, capital and other important
variables. The survey also provides a revenue-based firm-level productivity estimates
(World Bank, 2017).
The macro-level variables are collected from different sources. The treatment
variable (i.e., genetic distance to the world technological frontier–the US) is from
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2017), and includes culture, habits, values and customs
(Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). It is important to note this measure is based on the
assumption that differences in gene distributions between populations across a range
of neutral genes show the time that has passed since two populations shared common
ancestors (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). In this study, we view the genetic distance
to the US as a measure of the extent of genetic relatedness between populations of
laggard countries and the US. Following Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), we use data
on genetic distance weighted by the share of population belonging to each distinct
ancestral group in each country. This variable is standardized to take values between
0 and 1, where a value of 0 shows that the two populations have identical genetics
and that of 1 indicates the two populations are completely different.
Figure 7.1 plots the median level of TFP against the normalized genetic distance
to the US. The scatter plots show a negative relationship between genetic distance and
median TFP, thus confirming the idea that genetic distance is related to barriers to
the diffusion of technology from the world frontier (here the US). While countries like
Costa Rica and Brazil appear closer to the US in terms of genetic distance, Papua New
Guinea and Solomon Islands are genealogically very far from the US. Some African
countries like Morocco, Middle East countries like Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, and
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Eastern European countries like Ukraine, Russia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria also appear
genealogically close to the US. The figure also illustrates some form of heterogeneity
across the distribution of median TFP, meaning that a mean-type regression may
under-or over-estimate the impact that genetic distance exerts on TFP. As such, our
quantile regression approach is better suited to this type of analysis as it captures the
heterogeneity across the distribution of TFP, as opposed to a mean-type regression
analysis employed in various seminal work on the topic.
Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables in the sample,
this includes the first, second and third quartiles of the main firm-level characteristics
and country-level variables. Three observations stand out from the table. First,
the dependent variable (TFP) and the treatment variable (genetic distance) appear
quite dispersed, which translates into their first, second and third quartiles being
quite different, thus highlighting some form of heterogeneity of TFP. Second, the
distribution of the technology adoption in the 15 century was more heterogeneous
across countries than it was in the 20 century, as showed per the growth of their
quartiles. Finally, the genetic to the UK in the 15 century is quite heterogeneous
across the three quartiles, thus underling that the instrument GD1500UK exhibits some
variability in the sample, which is needed for the identification of the model.
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Table 7.1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75
Total factor productivity (TFP) 1.762 1.000 -2.356 5.584 1.101 1.698 2.384
Genetic distance to US, weighted 0.031 0.011 0.008 0.07 0.020 0.036 0.040
Genetic distance to UK (1500 match) 0.017 0.012 0 0.046 0.008 0.013 0.030
Genetic distance to UK, weighted 0.018 0.013 0.001 0.058 0.005 0.013 0.030
Technology adoption (1500Ad) 0.460 0.282 0 0.9 0.166 0.466 0.758
Technology adoption (2000) 0.381 0.100 0.173 0.856 0.316 0.368 0.450
Firm age 20 16 11 214 9 15 25
Export dummy 0.104 0.306 0 1 0 0 0
Foreign dummy 0.095 0.293 0 1 0 0 0
log(Gross domestic product) 25.492 1.880 19.820 28.713 23.774 25.737 27.015
log (Per capita income) 7.765 1.036 5.338 10.185 6.791 7.746 8.748
log (Trade openness) 4.024 0.450 3.296 5.324 3.640 3.981 4.238
Institution quality -2.004 3.802 -14.118 9.610 -4.648 -2.180 0.170
Language distance 0.961 0.054 0.367 1 0.933 0.974 1
Geographical distance 9880 3947 2387 16465 8069 10213 13131
Religious distance 0.822 0.135 0.602 1 0.661 0.890 0.921
Legal origin 0.286 0.452 0 1 0 0 1
landlockedness 0.095 0.293 0 1 0 0 0
Tropical 0.575 0.420 0 1 0.037 0.512 1
Latitude 0.236 0.236 0 1 0.111 0.222 0.333
Africa 0.267 0.442 0 1 0 0 1
Note. Table 7.1 presents the summary statistics from the pooled sample for the main firm-level
and macro-level variables. Q 0.25, Q 0.50 and Q 0.75 symbolize the 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles,
respectively.
195
7.5 Estimation and Interpretation of Results
To shorten the presentation of the paper, our analysis focuses on the estimated
impact of the treatment variable of interest (genetic distance measure), i.e., the
quantile estimates β̂(u), u ∈ U from model (7.19)-(7.20). To facilitate readability
and understanding our results, we use a combination of graphical representations
and summary tables.
7.6 Baseline Results
Table 7.2 presents the estimated impact of genetic distance on TFP. Column
(1) reports the two stage least square (2SLS) estimates obtained through a
mean-regression, while columns (2)-(6) contains the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and
90th quantile estimates. In Panel A, we do not control for micro- and macro-level
covariates, while those exogenous covariates are accounted for in Panel B. While the
robust standard errors are reported for the 2SLS estimates, the bootstrap ones are
presented in all tables for the quantile estimates. Several interesting observations are
of order.
First, the estimated impact of genetic distance on TFP, both at the mean and
across the quantiles, is negative after controlling micro- and macro-level exogenous
covariates (Panel B), confirming the conjecture that genetic distance acts as a barrier
to technology adoption by firms of laggard countries from the technological frontier
(i.e., the US). Second, 2SLS method tends to overestimate the magnitude of the
impact of genetic distance on TFP from the lower up to the middle upper part of the
distribution of TFP, while the method overwhelmingly underestimates this impact at
the upper top of the distribution of TFP. This pattern is illustrated clearly in Figure
7.2(b) where a significant range of the quantile estimates β̂(u) are consistently above
the 2SLS estimates before falling below at the very top of the distribution of TFP.
These results underline a significant heterogeneous effect of genetic distance across
the distribution of TFP, implying that a mean-type regression analysis– such as the
2SLS method– could be misleading. For example, while the 2SLS estimate (Panel B)
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indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in genetic distance from the technology
frontier leads to a 5.34% average decline in firm productivity of laggard countries,
this effect is roughly 1.65% for the countries situated at the 10th quantile of TFP,
3.50% for those at the 30th quantile, 1.92% for those at the 50th quantile, 3.71%
for those at the 70th quantile, and 12.12% for those at the 90th quantile. Third, an
appealing and certainly interesting finding is that the impact of genetic distance across
the distribution of TFP is a near inverted U-shape, meaning that the relationship
between genetic distance and TFP is not monotonically decreasing as postulates the
2SLS estimation. Indeed, it clearly from Figure 7.2(b) and others that a country with
a very low technology adoption (ranked from 0 up to 30th quantile) and a country
with moderate technology adoption (ranked in 30th–50th quantile) or relatively high
technology adoption (ranked in 50th–70th) can be impacted identically by the same
shock on current genetic distance. This may indicate why some countries that appear
closer to the US (the World technology frontier) have not benefited from technology
adoption compared with their peers that are genealogically relatively far from the
US, or vis-versa.
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Table 7.2: The Effect of Genetic Distance from US on Firm Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile
Panel A: Without controls 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -6.11*** 2.25*** -1.45*** -3.97*** -6.56*** -10.37***
the US, weighted (0.5966) (0.2426) (0.2213) (0.1728) (0.1818) (0.2114)
Individual Controls No No No No No No
Macroeconomic Controls No No No No No No
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 32,038 32,276 32,276 32,276 32,276 32,276
Panel B: With all controls
FST gen. dist. to -5.3394*** -1.65*** -3.50*** -1.92*** -3.71*** -12.12***
the US, weighted (0.8409) (0.2141) (0.1788) (0.1665) (0.1965) (0.2271)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 31,212 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The
macro variables include log (GDP), log (PCI), linguistic distance with the U.S., religion distance
with the U.S., legal origin, landlockedness, tropical land area, absolute latitude and continent
dummy. Robust standard errors for the 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors for the quantile
estimates are reported in the parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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7.6.1 Alternative Measure of Productivity
To examine the robustness of our baseline results to the measurement of TFP, we
also use the World Bank’s (2017) revenue based measure of total factor productivity
measure (TFPR) that excludes material inputs.
Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3 present the effect of genetic distance at the mean (2SLS)
and across the distribution of TFPR, after controlling for all micro- and macro-level
covariates. As before, column (1) presents the 2SLS estimate while column (2) to (6)
report the estimated quantile coefficients. Robust standard errors are reported for
2SLS estimate, whereas bootstrap standard errors are used for the quantile estimates.
As seen, the results are qualitatively the same as in the case of the TPF measure with
material inputs included (see Table 7.2 vs. Table 7.3 and Figure 7.2(b) vs. Figure
7.3). In particular, the impact of genetic distance across the distribution of TFPR is
an inverted U-shape,thus confirming that the relationship between genetic distance
and TFPR is not monotonically decreasing as the 2SLS estimate tends to suggest. In
general, the effects of genetic distance tend to be deeper on the distribution of TFPR
than that of TFP (see Table 7.3 vs. Table 7.2), especially at the top quantiles. In
addition, while the impact of genetic distance across the distribution of TFP is a near
inverted U-shape, that on TFPR is an inverted U-shape, thus supporting our main
result that there is a (quasi-)inverted U-shaped relationship between firm technology
adoption and genetic distance.
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Table 7.3: Revenue Based Measure of Total Factor Productivity (TFPR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -4.88*** -5.00*** -1.09*** -2.05*** -5.42*** -15.39***
the US, weighted (0.6848) (0.19604) (0.1567) (0.1373) (0.1697) (0.2382)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 30,474 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The macro
variables include linguistic distance with US, religion distance, legal origin, landlockedness,
tropical land area, absolute latitude, continent dummy, log of average RGDP, log of average
RGDP per capita, log of tertiary education and log of average openness. Robust standard
errors for the 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors for the quantile are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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7.6.2 Alternative Measure of Genetic Distance
In the previous sections, we consider the US as the global technology frontier.
However, several technologies were also invented in other advanced societies (Ang
and Kumar, 2014) and assuming the US is the only global leader in technology may
be too restrictive. To investigate the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the
world leader, we use the United Kingdom (UK) as an benchmark world technology
frontier. This choice is supported by Ang and Kumar (2014) and the data on weighted
genetic distance of laggard countries from the UK are from Bove and Gokmen (2017).
Figure 7.4 and Table 7.4 presents the estimated impact of genetic distance on TFP.
As seen, the results are very similar to the baseline ones with the US as the technology
frontier; see Section 7.6. In particular, the near inverted U-shaped impact of genetic
distance across the distribution of TFP is clearly demonstrated, thus indicating a
non-monotonic relationship between genetic distance and the diffusion of technology.
Overall, the results of this section underscore the fact that our previous analysis
in Section 7.6 are not driven by the choice of the global technology leader.
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Table 7.4: Alternative Measure of Genetic Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
Group IV Quantile 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -4.52*** -2.66*** -3.64*** -1.39*** -2.57*** -10.34***
the UK, weighted ( 0.7872) (0.2028) (0.1699) (0.1609) (0.1868) (0.2205)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 31,212 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The macro
ones include linguistic distance with the US, religion distance, legal origin, landlockedness,
tropical land area, absolute latitude and continent dummy, log of average RGDP, log of average
RGDP per capita, and log of tertiary education. Robust standard errors for 2SLS and bootstrap
standard errors for quantile estimates are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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7.7 Other Robustness Checks
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results to the inclusion of
additional covariates and the relative weight of European countries in the sample.
7.7.1 Controlling for Additional Covariates
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) and Ang and Kumar (2014) highlight that technology
diffusion has increased for more open economies. Therefore, the transfer of technology
may be higher for countries that have good quality of institution, even after
controlling for geographic and cultural factors, human capital, language and religion
distance, and continent dummies, as done in Section 7.5. As such, it is important to
check whether the trade openness and the quality of institutions alter our baseline
results of Section 7.5. To address this concern, we also control for trade openness
and institutional quality in the baseline regression. Both covariates are included in
our sample.
Table 7.5 presents the estimated impact of genetic distance at the mean (2SLS)
and across the distribution of TFP when trade openness and institutional quality
are also controlled for. Panel (A) reports the results when only trade openness is
controlled for, while Panel (B) shows the results when both trade openness and
institutional quality are included. In all cases, both the 2SLS and quantile estimates
of the impact of genetic distance on TFP are similar to our baseline results of Section
7.5. Interestingly, controlling for trade openness and institutional quality has even
strengthened the impact of genetic distance on technology adoption, both at the mean
(2SLS) and across the distribution of TFP, thus suggesting that our baseline results
are not driven by the degree of globalization or institutional quality across countries.
Furthermore, Figure 7.5, again, illustrates the appealing finding that the relationship
between genetic distance and the distribution of TFP is a near inverted U-shape.
As such, we clearly see that the 2SLS method under-and over-estimate the impact
of genetic distance at important parts of the distribution of TFP. In particular, it
is clear from Figure 7.5(b) that a country with a low technology adoption (ranked
between 0–30th quantile) and a country with moderate technology adoption (ranked
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between 30th–50th quantile) or relatively high technology adoption (ranked between
50th–70th) can be impacted identically by the same shock on current genetic distance.
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Table 7.5: Controlling for Additional Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
Panel A: controlling for
openness only 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -6.05*** -6.21*** -6.17*** -2.94*** -3.82*** -13.10***
the US, weighted (1.0377) (0.2583) (0.2153) (0.2009) (0.2647) (0.3171)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 30,885 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142
Panel B: controlling for openness and Institution
FST gen. dist. to the US, weighted -7.71*** -6.75*** -6.56*** -3.28*** -3.88*** -13.94***
(1.0696) (0.2754) (0.2251) (0.2077) (0.2920) (0.3426)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 94 94 94 94 94 94
Number of firms 30,885 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142 31,142
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The
macro ones include linguistic distance with US, religion distance, legal origin, landlockedness,
tropical land area, absolute latitude, continent dummy, log of average RGDP, log of average
RGDP per capita, log of tertiary education and log of average openness. Robust standard errors
for 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors for quantile estimates are reported in parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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7.7.2 Excluding European Countries
We investigate the stability of our baseline results to the exclusion of European
countries from the sample. There are two main reasons to do so. First, the
measurement error in genetic distance data for Europe is relatively smaller as
the sample populations almost match the nation-state boundaries (Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2009). Second, technology spreads more easily to the east-west direction
which makes European countries more advantageous over more isolated countries
(such as Australasia) and over continents that are located to the north-south axis
(such as Africa and Latin America); see Diamond and Renfrew (1997). The latter
hypothesis is well known as “the Diamond gap.” Therefore, by excluding Europe
from the sample, we can: (i) check the stability of our baseline results when only the
countries with a relatively larger measurement error in the genetic distance data are
used; and (ii) test whether our baseline results are driven by the Diamond gap.
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Table 7.6 and Figure 7.6 presents the results. Consistent to our baseline
results, genetic distance has a large negative effect on firms’ productivity at the
higher quantiles. Moreover, all the quantile estimates are larger in magnitude and
statistically significant at 1% nominal level compared with our baseline results of
Section 7.5. A close inspection of both the 2SLS and quantile estimates suggests
that 2SLS under-estimates the effect of genetic distance at lower and higher parts of
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Table 7.6: Excluding Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantiles
Group IV Quantile 2SLS 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
FST gen. dist. to -4.81*** -7.86*** -7.74*** -5.13*** -6.27*** -14.77***
the US, weighted (0.8997) (0.2348) (0.2044) (0.1956) (0.2613) (0.3062)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 84 84 84 84 84 84
Number of firms 29,310 28,997 28,997 28,997 28,997 28,997
Note. The micro variables include age, export dummy, firm ownership, and firm size. The macro
variables include linguistic distance with US, religion distance, legal origin, landlockedness,
tropical land area, absolute latitude, continent dummy, log of average RGDP, log of average
RGDP per capita, log of trade openness and log of tertiary education. Robust standard errors
for the 2SLS and bootstrap standard errors for the IV quantile are reported in the parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
the distribution of TFP due the near inverted U-shape property of the relationship
between the two. Clearly, our baseline results are not driven by measurement error
in the genetic distance data or the Diamond gap.
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7.8 Genetic Distance, Technology Adoption, and
TFP
Section 7.5 established a robust negative and near inverted U-shape effect of genetic
distance along the distribution of firms’ productivity across countries. One may
argue that the specification (7.19)-(7.20) that led to this result is a reduced-form,
thus be willing to provide an endogenous mechanism through which genetic distance
impacts on firms’ TFP. Such a chain of causality could be that genetic distance
influences firms’ productivity through technology adoption, but this is yet to be
formally demonstrated. Our goal in this section is not to provide a definitive answer
to the effectiveness of such a mechanism, rather we offer suggestions that could help
to advance future research in that direction.
Previous studies documented that genetic distance is one of the persistent barriers
to contemporary technology adoption (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Ashraf and
Galor, 2013a). Along the same vein, Figure 7.7 shows the scatter plots between
country-level measures of historical technology adoption in 1500AD and standardized
genetic distance to the world leader, the US. The technology option data consists
of 24 technologies provided by Comin and Hobijn (2010). In this dataset, the 24
technologies are classified in five broad sectors: agriculture, industry, transportation,
communication, and military. Each technology is measured as a binary variable
indicating whether it was present in a given country in 1500AD. Comin and Hobijn
(2010) combined them into one factor labeled ‘Overall technology adoption in 1500 ’
(see the y-axis of Figure 7.7). This factor is simply compute as the sample average
across sectors of the technology adoption levels. As it can be seen from that graph,
the standardized genetic distance is negatively correlated with the overall technology
adoption in the 1500AD, thus corroborating the findings of Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009) and Ashraf and Galor (2013a). To examine how this relationship has evolved
over time, Figure 7.8 depicts the scatter plots between the two variables in the 2000AD
for all countries in the sample. Again, the figure shows a negative correlation between
genetic distance and overall technology adoption in the 2000AD, thus highlighting
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the persistence of their relationship over time.
In our sample, countries such as Ethiopia, Nepal, Burkina-Faso and Mali have
0.509, 0.574, 0.674, and 0.668 respectively as standardized measure of genetic
distance, thus can be classified as having less genealogical similarities with the US.
Yet unsurprisingly these countries had the lowest overall technology adoption level in
the 2000AD. For example, the four countries (Ethiopia, Nepal, Burkina-Faso, Mali)
had an overall technological adoption around 0.533, 0.3, 0.508, and 0.508 respectively
in the 1500AD, which has eroded to about 0.220, 0.228, 0.236 and 0.173 respectively
in the 2000AD. Meanwhile, Argentina, for example, which is genealogically close to
the US (with standardized genetic measure of 0.249) has moved from 0.02 overall
technology adoption in the 1500AD to about 0.484 in the 2000AD.
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Figures 7.9 shows the scatter plots between overall technology adoption in the
1500AD and current median firms’ TFP for all countries in the sample. As seen,
overall technology adoption in the 1500AD is strongly positively correlated with
current median firms’ productivity. Since current genetic distance is negatively
correlated with overall technology adoption in the 1500AD (as documented in Figures
7.7 & 7.8), we expect current genetic distance to have a negative impact on the
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distribution (at least the median) of firms’ TFP, thus corroborating our main findings
in Section 7.5. It is nonetheless important to note that the analysis in Figures 7.7-7.9
is only based on correlations, so more investigations are required to clarify if genetic
distance influences firms’ productivity through its impact on the technology adoption
in the 1500AD. We leave these investigations for future research.
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This paper exploits the theoretical framework of Comin and Hobijn (2010) to propose
a mechanism through which genetic distance from the world leader, the US, acts as
a barrier to technology adoption in laggard countries, thus impacting negatively on
firms’ TFP in those countries. There are some challenges in testing this theory
empirically, and we elaborate on how those challenges can be circumvent. First,
the treatment variable (genetic distance) is measured at country-level while the
outcome variable (firm productivity) is available at firm-level, which makes the
standard panel data method useless in identifying the causal effect since the treatment
variable will be dropped out after a within-type transformation. Second, there is
a substantial heterogeneity across the distribution of firms’ productivity, hence a
mean-type regression analysis is not appropriate. Third, due to the presence of
group-level unobservables in the model (country fixed effect), a standard quantile
regression such as in Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) will yield inconsistent estimates,
thus is not also appropriate in dealing with this type of problems.
Using a novel method on quantile treatment models with group-level
unobservables recently proposed by Chetverikov et al. (2016) that accommodates the
above problems, we show that the impact of genetic distance on firm productivity is
consistently negative and near inverted U-shaped across the distribution of firms’
TFP. This means that firms operating in countries genealogically far from the
technology leader tend on average to have lower level of productivity, but firms
in two countries, one with a very low technology adoption and the other with a
moderate or relatively high technology adoption can be impacted identically by the
same shock on current genetic distance. This may justify why some countries that
appear genealogically closer to the US have not benefited from technology adoption
compared with their peers that are far from the US, or vis-versa. We provide
several robustness checks that show that the near inverted U-shape property of the
relationship between genetic distance and the distribution of firms’ TFP is robust:
(i) to alternative measures of productivity and genetic distance; (ii) to inclusion
of institutional quality and trade openness in the model; (iii) to the exclusion of
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Appendix A: Variable Definition
Table A1: Variable Definition
Variables Definition
TFP Firm -level estimates of total factor productivity
Genetic distance to the US
or UK
The genetic distance between the current population
of a given country and the US (or UK). It is calculated
as the average pairwise genetic distance across all ethnic
group pairs. It captures the general relatedness of
the population of a particular country to US or UK
Genetic distance to the UK
(1500 AD)
The genetic distance between the populations of a given
country and the UK in the year 1500, prior to the
major colonizations of modern times & migration
calculated as the genetic distance between the two
ethnic groups comprising the largest shares of
each countrys population in the year 1500
Technology adoption (1500 Ad)
The overall adoption level is computed as the average of
the sectoral adoption levels, where sector adoption levels
is the simple average of the binary adoption values
across the technologies in the sector in 1500
Technology adoption (2000)
The overall adoption level is computed as the simple
average of the sectoral adoption levels, where
sector adoption levels is the simple average of
the binary adoption values across the technologies
in the sector in 2000
GDP Average gross domestic product (2000-2005)
PCI Average GDp per capital (2000-2005)
Export dummy =1 if a firm export
Foreign
=1 if the firm has at least 10% of
its equity held by foreigners
Small =1 if the firm has 5-9 employee
Medium =1 if the firm has 10-99 employee
Large =1 if the firm has above 99 employee
Geographic distance
Measure of the great circle (geodesic) distance
between the major cities of countries
Religious distance
Measure of religious relatedness based on
a nomenclature of world religions
Legal origen
Dummy variable that takes a value of one
if a countrys legal system is of
French, German or Scandinavian
Civil Law origin and zero otherwise
Landlockedness =1 if a firm is operating in a landlocked country
Tropical
The % of land area classified as tropical and
subtropical based on the Koeppen-Geiger system
Latitude
Absolute value of the latitude of a country,
scaled between zero and one, where zero is




This thesis explores the underlying causes of civil conflict and economic development
in developing countries. Economic shocks are shown to be crucial causes of civil
conflict. The idea is that negative economic shocks reduce the opportunity cost
of fighting which raises the likelihood of civil conflict. Several empirical studies
provide strong evidence to support the opportunity cost hypothesis using negative
income shocks such as international commodity price shocks, rainfall shocks and
interest rate shocks. Similarly, a large and growing number studies consider that
institution, geography, and culture are the deep and fundamental sources of economic
development. Despite a plethora empirical evidence on the underline causes of civil
conflict and economic development in poor countries, providing riveting explanations
using more credible econometric methods that establish causality has become a more
promising avenue of empirical research. As such, the thesis has sought to shed
some light on the root causes of civil conflict, trade, foreign direct investment and
productivity by employing modern impact evaluation econometric approaches.
Chapter 2 explores the impact of economic shocks that are related to RER
misalignment on the likelihood of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so,
we construct a RER misalignment measure that is driven by the short-run shocks of
foreign RER fundamentals. We found that RER over-valuation considerably raises
the probability civil conflict: a one standard increase in RER misalignment raises civil
conflict by about 4 percentage point. More importantly, the effect RER misalignment
significantly bigger than the effect of rainfall shock and international commodity price
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shocks–which are the two most common causes of conflict in the region. Besides, we
construct the traditional RER misalignment index that is consistent to the RER
theory and using the instrumental variable approach we find qualitatively similar
results with the baseline. As such, the findings suggest that stabilizing the RER to
the equilibrium level not only increase economic growth but also fosters economic
development by reducing civil conflict in the region.
In chapter 3, we investigate the causal impact of food aid on the incidence of
civil conflict in SSAs. In this chapter, we propose a novel identification strategy (i.e.
instrumental variable) to address the endogeneity problem in the existing foreign aid
literature. Employing the number of affected people by natural disaster in other SSA
countries as an instrumental variable (IV) to aid, we find that food aid has no a
statistically significant effect on increasing civil conflict in the region. The findings
also show that civil conflicts spillover to neighboring SSA countries after two years.
Some of the channels through which civil conflict may diffuse to other SSA countries
are ethnic connection, migration, and poor institutional qualities. Hence, the findings
suggest that food aid is still an important international development policy tool to
fight hunger and suffering in developing countries.
The integration of developing countries with advanced countries is crucial for
economic development. However, the economic integration may be deterred by
a range different factors. Chapter 4 commences the discussion on this topic by
comparing the effect of inflation targeting (IT) and fixed exchange rate monetary
policy rules in attracting FDI in the context of developing countries. To address the
issue of self-selection by countries into the inflation targeting or fixed exchange rate
regime, we implement the propensity score matching and the difference-in-differences
estimation approaches. The estimates show that as long as one of these policies is
pursued, there is no perceivable advantage in adopting inflation targeting over a fixed
exchange rate (and vice-versa) for attracting FDI.
Likewise, chapter 5 extends the discussion on the key determinants of economic
integration by investigating the the causal effect of geographical impediments on
trade. This chapter focuses on examining the causal impact of landlockedness on
219
disaggregate export and import in Ethiopia. Exploiting the de facto landlockedness
of Ethiopia in 1998 and using a triple difference-in-differences strategy, we find that
landlockedness has a large negative and statistically significant effect on the import
and export of several goods. Overall, the dynamic impact of loosing access to
the port also increase overtime. Similarly, chapter 6 explores the causal impact
of establishing agricultural commodity exchange in improving the export quantity
of agricultural export commodities. Following the establishment of the Ethiopia
Commodity Exchange (ECX) in 2008 and exploiting the sudden introduction of
coffee in the ECX market, the estimated results show that ECX has a strong impact
in increasing coffee export. As such, agricultural markets may assist in reducing
poverty in LDCs by raising primary commodity export.
Finally chapter 7 analyzes the the role of deep-rooted historical factors on the
diffusion of technology from the technology frontier to laggard countries. This chapter
has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides micro channel
evidence through which genealogical distance reduces the diffusion of technology
from the technology frontier to the adopter countries. Second, it investigates the
distributional impact of genetic distance on the productivity of firms. Employing
the survey data of more than 32,000 firms and group quantile IV (GQIV) estimator,
we find that the effect of genetic distance is bigger for more productive firms. The
findings provide an underlying mechanism for the earlier empirical studies in such
a way that cultural differences reduce the flow of technology to firms (which reduce
firm productivity) and hence the diffusion of development for the country.
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